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Issues:

1)

does

a

protective

2 -

order

barring

publication

of

material obtained during discovery violate the First Amendment?
and 2) must the religious organization reveal its list of members
and donors?
2.

THE

FACTS:

Foundation in 1950.

Keith

Rhinehart

founded

the

Aquarian

The Foundation is a spiritualist church,

whose religious views are in some respects unpopular.

Beginning

in 1973, the Seattle Times published a series of articles about
the Foundation and Rhinehart that accused Rhinehart of being a
'

~ <:..harlat~ and the Foundation of conducting religious ceremonies
~~ involving nudity and extolling homosexuality.

~

3.

PROCEEDINGS BELOW:

In February 1980,

Rhinehart,

the

Foundation, and several of its members sued the Seattle Times and
several of its employees for defamation and invasion of privacy.
The plaintiffs alleged that the Times articles caused a reduction
in both membership and donations in addition to other injuries.
On June 27, 1980,

the ~ attle

Times served interrogatories on the

plaintiffs that requested financial information and address lists

/

of members and donors.

The plaintiffs objected on grounds of the

--------~~~-----

constitutional right to associate.
Judge Scholfield of the King County Superior Court initially
directed the plaintiffs to respond to the interrogatories.
plaintiffs,

however,

submitted

Scholfield reconsidered.

five

affidavits,

and

The

Judge

On June 26, 1981, he issued two orders.

The first directed plaintiffs to respond to the interrogatories;

v

the second granted plaintiffs a p rotective orner under Wash. R.
Civ. P. 26(c), which is modeled on Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).

The

ffl~~~~
latter order prohibited

the Times

from using

the

in format ion

obtained through discovery for any purpose other than preparing
for trial.

He held that the rule applied to the press and that

there was a reasonable basis for the order.

He distinguished In

re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (CADC 1979), as involving a request for a
protective order after discovery had already occurred.

In the

first paragraph of the order, Judge Scholfield referred to the
five

affi ~ its

submitted by plaintiffs, which alleged that they

had been threatened and physically abused by unknown persons
after the publication of the Seattle Times articles.
DECISION BELOW:

4.

discretionary
/

review

of

The Washington Supreme Court granted
both

orders

and

affirmed.

Justice

osellini, writing f rl( a majority of five, held that the order
compelling discovery was not an abuse of discretion because the
plaintiffs sought to withhold the very information upon which
their damages claims were based.
/

As to the

{P!O tecti~ the press is entitled to no

greater First Amendment protection than other persons.
disinclined to view the order as prior restraint,
even under
Assn.

v.

that doctrine the order
Stuart,

427

intrusive measures, and
judicial process.
to manage

u.s. 539

th~ rder

The rule

(1976).

There

it held that

Nebraska Press
are

no

less

protects the integrity of the

-------provides

the discovery process

is valid.

Although

--~----------------

so

the trial judge discretion
that

full

disclosure of

relevant information will occur and so that the participants will
be protected from the harmful side effects of full disclosure.
Of course,

once the material has been introduced in a public

- 4 -

trial, there is a right to publish.
Many

statutes

prevent

the

disclosure

of

information

collected by the government for specific purposes.

In re Halkin

is not relevant because the party seeking the protective order
there was the government and the matters involved were of public
importance.
suppress

Moreover,

from

the documents the government sought to

publication

were

already

purged

of

sensitive

information, and the protective order was not sought until after
they had been produced.

In In re San Juan Star, 662 F. 2d 108

(CAl 1981) , the media intervened to gain information discovered
by an attorney subject to a protective order.
a

good

cause

standard

with

heightened

The CAl relied on

sensitivity

to

First

Amendment concerns to find that the order was valid as against
the press.
The rule imposed by the In re Halkin and by the In re San
Juan Star courts is unduly burdensome on trial courts and is not
required by the Court's decisions.
v. Virginia, 435

u.s.

829

Landmark Communications, Inc.

(1978), while invalidating a criminal

sanction imposed on a nonparty who obtained secret information
concerning the proceedings of a state judicial review commission,
stated

that

careful

internal

protect the secrecy interest.

procedures

and

controls

could

The Seattle Times has described no

public interest in the publication of this information: it simply
wants to exploit the fruits of the judicial system.

The interest

in the integrity of the judicial process is sufficient to meet
the heavy burden required by prior restraint doctrine.
Justice Dolliver,

joined by two others, concurred.

First

- 5 -

Amendment analysis does not apply to discovery protective orders,
as Judge Wilkey's dissent in In re Halkin notes.
Times does

not

have

The Seattle

a First Amendment right to receive

the

information: it cannot object to restrictions on its reception.
Justice Utter,
would

remand.

doctrine:

joined

The

majority

in ef feet,

Amendment.

by Justice Pearson,
misapplies

the

/

dissented and

prior

restraint

it exempts pretrial orders from the First

The prior restraint doctrine is inappropriate in this

context because the mode by which the information is acquired is
relevant.
first

The In re Halkin court adopted a two-part test of

ascertaining

the

significance

of

the

First

Amendment

interests restrained, and then of determining the appropriateness
of the restraint in light of the harm prevented, the narrowness
of the order, and the availability of alternatives.

The In re

San Juan court adopted a sliding scale test of evaluating the
interests involved.
should

consider

A trial court in issuing a protective order

the

extent

of

the

First Amendment

interest

restrained, the harm the the order prevents, the status of the
party seeking the order, and any other specific concerns.
order should be narrow.
attempt

to

reasonable

weigh

the

basis was

Any

In this case, the trial judge did not
First

too

Amendment

speculative.

interests,
On

remand,

and

its

it should

identify the specific harm that warrants protection.
5.

CONTENTIONS:

No. 82-1721

v

The Seattle Times contends: 1) the decision below does not
identify a

sufficiently

specific

harm

to

justify this prior

- 6 -

v

restraint and creates a blanket exemption to the Nebraska Press
Assn. rule.

2) The decision conflicts with In re Halkin and In

re San Juan Star, and other CA and state court decisions that
recognize significant First Amendment interests in this context.
Civil litigation is a major source of newsworthy information.

3)

The order is vague and overly broad in scope and duration.
Rhinehart

and

~quar ian

the

Foundation

contend:

1)

the

specific harm involved is the physical danger posed to Foundation
members.

The court below properly balanced the plaintiffs'

2)

right to freedom of religion and privacy against the defendants'
free press rights.
Star.

The same test was applied in In re San Juan

The court below did not hold that the First Amendment does

not apply
indicate

to discovery material.
it differs

only

The facts of In re Halkin

in degree

from

the

opinion

below.

Washington pretrial discovery is not open to the public.
Prior

3)

restraint analysis does not apply to pretrial discovery
/

rna ter ials.

4)

1

L

\\

The Seattle T irnes attorney waived any right to

object by agreeing at a deposition that the plaintiffs should
have a protective order.
No. 82-1758
Rhinehart

and

the

Aquarian

Foundation

contend:

1)

,;identification of donors and members directly impairs the free
exercise of religion.
promise

given

the

Producing the information would violate a

donors

and

members.

Especially

when

the

religion involved is unpopular, such an order subjects a group to
abuse and

threats~

the protective order is an ineffective shield,

given the Seattle Times prior behavior.

The effect of the order

7

- 7 will be to force abandonment of the suit.

Less intrusive means

exist for obtaining proof on the damages issue.
below

con~ cts

The
damages

with other CA decisions.

Seattle

Times

contends:

may

not

refuse

at

the

damages

directed

objection by bringing

to

the

government

need

for

itself

1)

comply

issue.

a

plaintiff

with
The

a

plaintiffs
2)

seeks

request

waived

any

None of the

they either involved situations in

discovery had evaporated or

sought

that

discovery

the suit on that issue.

cited cases is in conflict:
which

2) The decision

the

information.

jurisdiction because there is no final

3)

in which

the

The Court lacks

judgment not subject to

revision and because the challenge is not ripe as discovery has
not taken place.
6.

DISCUSSION:

v"'

direct conflict.
of membership
[ adequate

to

The issue in No. 82-1758 does not pose any

~d

The plaintiffs chose to raise the issue of loss
donations and should be subject to discovery

elucidate

the

issue.

The

trial

judge

in

its

discretion chose the method of discovery: production of the lists
with

a

protective

order.

There

is no reason

to

review that

exercise of discretion.
The
Washington

issue

in

Supreme

§ .
Court

82-~

is

attempted

more
to

substantial.

hedge

its

The

position

by

applying a prior restraint test in spite of its claim that the
publication of
under that test.

discovery material

is not amenable to analysis

If the prior restraint test does apply, I find

the Washington court's application of it unconvincing.

The In re

Halkin court seems to have applied a prior restraint test; the In

I

J

- 8 -

re San Juan Star court,

however,

applied something less.

What

the Washington court actually did is more consistent with the In
re San Juan Star decision.
If a person has possession of information, his publication
of

that

information

circumstances.
plaintiffs

can

be

restrained

in

sought

to

publish

the plaintiffs'

protective order.
the

information

information

not

exceptional

hands

the

that

first

~

obtained

through

government

requested

a

the Seattle Times reception of
place

If such an order

automatically

in which the

It was only after the information

In this case,
in

protective order.
does

in

This was the case in In re Halkin,

discovery from the government.
was

only

receive

is
is

the

conditioned
invalid,

on

the

the newspaper

information;

instead,

the

trial judge will have to refashion the discovery procedures.

I

would view this as a question of discretion in which the trial
judge must take cognizance of the First Amendment interests of
~

the Seattle Times.

The

issue

is <rnportant and

grow~ng.

i _e

All

rr~ation

received by a party in civil litigation is protected in some way
.
Amen d ment.
b y t h e F1rst

standard of Fed.

R.

Civ.

.
.
1'1ty o f
T h e /const1tut1ona

P.

26(c)

is at

the goo d cause

issue.

Although the

conflict between this decision and In re Halkin does not exist as
a matter of form, it is certainly present in substance.
7.

RECOMMENDATION:

I

recommend granting No.

82-1721 and

denying No. 82-1758.
There are responses.
July 11, 1983

Van Zandt

opn in petn
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Seattle Times,

etal.

v.

Rhinehart, The Aquarium

Foundation, et al.
MEMO TO FILE
This memo, after a preliminary look at the briefs, is
to refresh my recollection on the

issues when

I prepare

for the arguments and Conference.
Statement of the Case
The case
washington.

is here on cert from the Supreme Court of
It

arises

out of

a

state court

libel

suit

filed by respondents against petitioners, the primary one
being the Seattle Times (the Times).
several news
libelous

and

primarily

on

stories that,

presentation"
Penitentiary.
below,

is

the

probable
"baazar
staged

unless true,

maliciously

so.

performances"

at

for

inmates

founder

and

leader of

According

to

death,

at

They

focus

"religious

a

the

State

a

small,

unpopular

respondent's brief,

known as the Aquarium Foundation - promotes

"moral values and ethical conduct",
after

undoubtedly were

Respondent Rhinehart, the primary plaintiff

"spiritualist" church.
the church -

The suit is based on

and

ability

to

believes in survival

communicate

with

deceased

~.

persons through a medium.
"falsely

implied

that

The articles are said to have

the Aquarium Foundation

is a Jim

Jones-like cult, and that Rhinehart defrauds his followers
and supporters.
The Protective Order Under Rule 26b(l)

----

The case remains at a pretrial stage,
---~

.....

and involves

only the validity of a protective order entered by the
trial court

that limits

the use of certain

information

obtained by discovery from being published by the Times
and other media.
Rule 26b(l), modeled after the federal rule, provides
in pertinent part as follows:
"Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action,
whether it relates to the claim or defense of
the parties seeking discovery or to the claim or
defense of any other party, including the
existence,
description,
nature,
custody,
condition and location of any books, documents,
or other tangible things and the identity and
location of persons having knowledge of any
discoverable matter.
It is not ground for
objection that the information sought will be
inadmissible at the trial if the information
sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence."

I

As

is customary under the liberal discovery rules,

the Times and other defendants went after the plaintiffs!.

.J.

According
produce
past

to

respondent's

all documents

ten

years,

------~

brief,

prepared

including

~

returns,

financial

evidence

gifts

they were

by Rhinehart within

United

statements,

and

donations

required

States

income

from

any

the
tax

which

documents

all

to

source,

and

documents that r "Jrect the assets and liabilities of the
A

.

Reverend

Rhinehart.

Depositions

were

requested

and

apparently have been set for deposing Rhinehart and each
of the plaintiffs, that include four women members of his
church.

--

donors

Defendants
to

interrogatories sought the names of

Rhinehart

and

amount of donations and

his church,

together

with

the names and addresses of the

---------~ ~--------~--~------------------------·

members

of

Respondent's

the

brief

the

church

states

would "fill an entire room"

over

that

the

the

last

ten

documents

years.

produced

(br. p. 6).

As this case involves the validity of the protective
order (a type of order frequently made to limit the use of
discovered information), I set it forth in full:

m

"The defendants and each of them shall make
no use of and shall ~ not disseminate the Yl-A-..k)...__
i hl or ma tion
which · is
gained
through /~'~
~
discovery, other than such use as is necessary ~
in order for the discovering party to prepare
....___.;
and try the case.
As a result, information
gained by a defendant through the discovery
process may not be published by any of the
defendants or made available to any news media

for
publication
or
dissemination.
This
protective order has no application except to
information gained by the defendants through the
use of the discovery processes."
At

least

on

its

face,

the

first

sentence

of

the

protective order appears to be fully in accord with Rule
26b(l).

Apparently the plaintiffs in the libel suit were

required to provide all of the information requested by
the defendants.

~~se
i--19

thereof to the

~ "necessary

cl.h--'1
~

~

The protective order, however, limits the

ex~nt tha~

particular information is

in order for the discovering party to prepare

and try the case".

----issue here,

is

the

In addition, and what is directly at
second

sentence

that provides

that

information not necessary to prepare and try the case "may
not

be

publi§hed

by

any

of

the

defendants

or

made

available to any news media for publication".
The Supreme Court of Washington,

in a long opinion

that reviewed - perhaps at unnecessary length - a host of
First Amendment cases - found that the trial court had not
·"

abused its discretion by the protective order.
Arguments of the Parties
It is not clear to me (and I have not rechecked the
opinions or the briefs) whether the courts below drew any
distinction between the several categories of documentry

5.

information

that

was

provided.

Respondents

brief

(for

Rhinehart, the Foundation and the four female members of
•
his church), focuseQ primarily on the request of the Times
and

other

addresses
donations.

media
of

defendants

donors

and

to

publish

members,

and

the
the

names

and

amounts

of

The petitioners assert a First Amendment right

to publish everything obtained by discovery under Section
26

in

a

law

suit,

including

the

most

private

and

sensitive information.
Petitioners, for the media, make arguments along the
following lines.
to

litigation

requirements,

Litigation is a public
are

not

exempt

from

matter~

First

parties

Amendment

the order in this case restricts protected

speech, the right to publish is particularly important in
a defamation suit, etc.

The entire litany of this Court's

First Amendment cases are cited, with many quotations used
that have little or no relevance to this particular case.
None of this Court's prior cases has addressed the
specifi (' issue presented here.
'\

.

Petitoners rely primarily

on the CADC case in In Re Halkin, 595 F.2d 176, in which
Judge

Wilkey

dissented.

CADC

ruled

that

a

protective

order

restrainting litigants "from communicating matters

of public importance for an indefinite period of time •••

0.

constitutes

direct

governmental

action

limiting

speech

that must be carefully scrutinized in light of the First
Amendment."
to

Petitioners cite a number of other cases said

recognize

disseminating

a

basic

First

Amendment

discovery materials.

At

interest

other

points

in
in

their brief, petitioners say - and cite some cases - for
the

view

that

a

compelling

interest

must

be

shown

to

prevent publication.
Petitioners
that

argue

recognizes

disseminating.

First

should

establish

Amendment

a test

interests

in

Also "strict scrutiny" must be applied to

protective orders.
dissemination

that we

A court should weigh

against

restrictive order

these

interests,

the

insure

"harm" of
that

any

is narrowly drawn, and that the court

could find no other alternatives less intrusive.
Petitioners do make a valid point, I think, when they
say there is no time limit in the court's order, although
certainly

they

would

have

a

right

to

reapply

for

permission to publish at some later date.
Respondents

rely

equally

strongly

on

Amendment rights of association and religion.

the

First

They make

rather persausive arguments that disclosure particularly
of the names, addresses and donations of members of the

I •

religious organization would be a serious infringement of
both of these rights.
Although I do not believe respondents discuss In Re
Halkin,

it

discussed

was

at

some

length

and

distinguished - in the Washington Supreme Court's opinion.
It noted that in Halkin, the protective order concerned

and

to other

had

been purged of

documents relating to government surveillance of opponents
of

the

Also,

Vietnam War
the

documents

matters

before

pursuant

to discovery".

had

been

sought

being

handed

until

political activities.

over

Moreover,
after

to

"all
the

sensitive
plaintiffs

no protective orders

the documents were

in the

hands of the plaintiffs and they proposed to release some
of

them

privacy

to

the

to

be

Washington
Amendment

press.

Nor

protected"

Supreme

were
in

Court,

associational

there
Halkin.

while

rights

particularly "rights of privacy".

as

any

"rights of
Indeed,

recognizing
important,

the
First

emphasized

See Petition 20-23a.

*In a concurring opinion filed by Judge Dolliver of the
Washington Supreme Court, Judge Wilkey's dissent in Halkin
was quoted at length as explaining why a protective order
such as in this case is "not an assault on the Bill of
Rights".

Petition 39a.

0.

Comments
Although I am certainly not at rest, and will need to
read the materials more carefully and have the benefit of
my clerk's views including a bobtail, conclusory memo, I
do make these comments.
The

protective

order,

as

I

read

it,

limits

use,

including publication, of all of the discovered material
"other

than

such use as

is necessary

in order

for

discovering party to prepare and try the case".
of

the

inforamtion discovered may not affect

the

As some
the First

Amendment or privacy rights of the respondents, the order

--

may

be overbroad.
If
...
....
narrowly drawn order.
With
names,

we

could

remand

respect to the media's desire

addresses

unorthodox

so,

and

"religious"

donations

of

for

to publish

members

organization,

a more

of

First

the
this

Amendment

rights of association and religion - as well as the more
nebulous rights of privacy - certainly are directly and
adversely affected.
with

respect

to

I
this

find

the arguments of

type

of

the media

information

to

be

unpersuasive.
This

is a civil suit,

not a criminal prosecution.

There is no claim that the respondents - plaintiffs below

----------------~-------------------------------------~.

- had no right to bring this libel suit.

As the courts

below

this

found,

if

information

the

obtained

media
on

may

publish

discovery,

there

sort

will

be

of
a

"chilling" of libel litigation.
Nor

there

is

any

proof

that

this

religious

organization, however, "odd-balled" it may be, is in fact
a sort of criminal conspiracy like the Jim Jones cult.
It would not be easy to write an opinion, as I view
it now, that would not apply to a libel suit brought by
Billy Graham,

Oral Roberts, or perhaps a host of other

religious organizations

in which

donors had been "discovered".
of

such

organizations,

a list of members and

There are apparently dozens

unlike

the

Graham

and

Roberts

foundation, that are on the fringes of commonly accepted
rationality.

f

And what about disclosure of the members and

contributions of Communist and Nazi parties, both favoring
revolution and the destruction of freedom?
LFP, JR.
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Bench Memorandum
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SEATTLE TIMES V. RHINEHART
Robert M. Couch

February 21, 1984

Argument scheduled for Tuesday, February 21, 1984.

Question Presented

Whether a showing of good cause is sufficient to support a
protective order where the restricted party is a newspaper.

Recommendation

I recommend that the Washington

s.

Ct. be affirmed, although

the TC should used a balancing test rather than a good cause determination in its decision to grant the protective order.

bench memo: SeattlP Times v. Rhinehart

page 2

Discussion

At the outset, I should address a question you raised in your
second "file memo."
tion order would

Although resps argue that the TC's produc-

require

them to

reveal

the membership of the

Aquarian Foundation, you could not find such a requirement in the
discovery order that

is reprinted

in the joint appendix.

As I

understand it, resps theory is that the membershi£ roles can be

_____

---------------

discovered through the ,____.___
donation roles.
to

reveal

the

names

and

The TC has ordered resps

five
i.
~
See Paragraph 17 of
~

addresses of all donors

years preceding the date of the complaint.

the

In- ~
-;;;} 1,..,.

terrogatory No.

the

28) •

According

to resps,

every member of

Since there are very

few contributors other than members (I don't doubt the truth of

~this
~

for

the Order Compelling Discovery, J.A., at 6la (pertaining to

religion/sect/cult/whatever c.must pay .......dues.

~

~

argument), discovery of the list of donors is the equivalent

of discovery of the list of members.

--

Thus,

the TC has allowed

"backdoor" discovery of the membership roster.
~

U nfortunately,

in order to have a memo in your hands before

you hear argument in this case, I must be fairly conclusory.
here goes:
ment.
than,

But

I have trouble going along with the newspapers' argu-

Reduced

to

its essentials the argument

is nothing more

"We are newspapers, we can print any fact we come across,

no matter how we come across it."

To make their argument even

more compelling the newspapers point to the fact that the public
has a great deal of interest in news stories about cults and other

unusual

religions,

particularly those that solicit from the

bench memo: SeattlP Times v. Rhinehart

public.

page 3

In the newspapers' view, judicially compelled civil dis-

covery is just another source of information, access to whirih the
media is entitled.
I think that the newspapers are wrong, in both a legal sense
and a practical sense.

First,

I think it is important to note

that this is not a "prior restraint" case.

--

your concurrence in

As you point out in

--------------------Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,

443

u.s.

368, 399

(1979), a prior restraint occurs only when a reporter is prohibi ted

from

reporting

Here,

as

in Gannett,

wished

(although

some

information regardless of the source.

the newpapers could

they

seem

to

argue

report

that

anything

they

were

they

totally

~ k:l

~f

"""~
information did ~
-

"gagged" by the TC)
not originate
prior

about resps, so long as the

in court ordered discovery.

restraint case,

I

do not put much

Since this is not

ao?/z.M'.c..u/.
t/)c., ~

faith

in the

argument ~

•

that the case should be controlled by the "heavy burden" test set /~
out in In re Halkin,
Wash.

s.

598 F.2d 176

(CADC 1979).

(As I read the

Ct. opinion, resps made a sufficient showing to satisfy ~

~~~

even the strict Halkin test.)
In both Gannett and Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia,

435

~

s~

u.s.

829

(1978), the Court used balancing tests for de-

termining whether the 1st Amendment rights of the news media outweighed the particular rights of the litigants.

I think a simi-

lar balancing test should be used in this case.

As resps point

out, and you recognize in your file memoranda, publication of the
information that

is the subject of the discovery order in this

case might affect the resps'

privacy rights, rights of associa-

tion, and their right to petition the courts for redress.

Resps

~

apparently convinced the TC and the Wash.
effect

of

publication

rights

of

privacy,

weighed

the

rights.

of

the

discovered

association,

adverse

inpact on

s.

and
the

Ct. that the adverse
information

access

I

their

to the courts out-

newspapers'

first

amendment

(The Wash. S. Ct. also correctly noted the need to pre-

serve the integrity of pre-trial proceedings.)
ter,

on

think

this

showing

should

be

As a legal mat-

sufficient,

particularly

where the protected information is not traditionally disclosed to
the public, unlike actual proceedings in court.
the Wash.

s.

(Note that under

Ct.'s opinion, once the infromation is admitted into

evidence at trial,

the newspapers are free to publish it.

See

Petition, at 38a.)
I think this rule makes sense from a practical standpoint as
well.

Reversal of the Wash.

s.

Ct. would publicize and legiti-

mize a new weapon in the media's fight against libel suits.

Any

libel

its

plaintiff

that

has

any

embarrassing

files would be foolish to sue a newspaper.
al discovery rules

in most states,

infromation

in

Because of the liber-

the newspaper could rummage

freely through the plaintiff's files and publish at will.

I can

think of nothing that would have a greater chilling effect on a
plaintiff's decision
scrupulous

to

institute a civil suit.

newsgatherers

could

use

lawsuits

Moreover,

un-

offensively.

Trumped-up allegations and a well-worded complaint coupled with
an attorney who knows how to write interrogatories might be all
an investigative journalist needs to write a story about virtually any subject.

I do not believe this is the use to which the

Rules of Civil Procedure were meant to be put, nor do I think the

1st Amendment will thrive when used as a shield for such abuses.
In short, both the law and good sense support the Wash. S. Ct.
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

Rob

DATE:

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

March 7, 1984

82-1721 Seattle Times v. Rhinehart
After reviewing my Conference notes and thinking
further about this case, I agree that we should affirm on
the ground that there is no constitutional right at issue.
There certainly is no constitutional right to have any discovery.

Prior to the adoption of the Civil Rules in 1938,

there was little or no discovery in most states, and certainly there was none under the common law.
Thus, the entitlement of a party to discovery derives here from the Rules of Civil Procedure.
emphasize the purpose of these rules.

We should

Perhaps the law li-

brary could help you with some commentary - in the law reviews or at the time of the initial adoption of the Rules
as to their purpose, and particularly the purpose of the
provisions for pretrial discovery through depositions and
interrogatories.
It would follow that there is no constitutional
right under the First Amendment to publish information discovered solely for the purpose of trial preparation.

In

this respect, the Seattle Times is to be viewed as having no
rights different from those of other litigants.

As Justice

White noted, the Seattle Press could not have obtained the
information it wishes to publish without the power of the

2.

Court under the Rules.

Of course, Rule 26 expressly contem-

plates protective orders.
Justice Stevens expressly said there was no constitutional right to discovery.

He did say that there could

be a rule that all discovered information is presumptively
open to the public.

I

would not say this - certainly unless

it is necessary to obtain a Court.

Justice Stevens did

qualify his comment by noting that the trial court should
find good cause for denying a request to publish, but that
this would not require much of a showing.

He concluded that

the order in this case was valid on its face.
The state interests are quite substantial as I
believe you noted in your bench memo, and this should be
made clear.

I

think

I

was mistaken in emphasizing that the

First Amendment rights of the defendant would be violated by
publishing the names and amounts given by donors.

I

would

include, at least in an initial draft, a footnote stating
that the protective order was particularly appropriate in
this case.

The trial court had entered an extremely broad

order authorizing discovery.

And the particular information

that the Seattle Times wished to publish, involving the
names of donors and their

contributions, ~~ ~

association and even of religion.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

1
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MEM.ORANDUM
TO:

Rob

DATE:

FROM:

Lewis~.

March 7, 1984

Powell, Jr.

82-1721 Seattle

~imes

v. Rhinehart

After reviewing my ("onference notes and thinking
further about this case, I agree that we should affirm on
the ground that there is no constitutional right at issue.
There certainly is no constitutional right to have
covery.

Prior to the adoption of the Civil

~ules

a~y

dis-

in 1938,

there was little or no discovery in most states, and certainlv there was none under the common law.
Thus, the entitlement of a party to discovery derives here from the Rules of Civil

~rocedure.

emphasize the purpose of these rules.

We should

Perhaps the law li!

brary could help you with some commentary :... in the law reviews or at the time of the initial adoption of the Rules as to their purpose, and particularly the purpose of the
provisions for pretrial discovery through depositions and
interrogatories.
It would follow that there is no constitutional
right under the First Amendment to publish information discovered solely for the purpose of trial preparation.

In

this respect, the Seattle Times is to be viewed as having no
rights different from those of other litigants.

As

Justi~e

White noted, the Seattle Press could not have obtained the
information it wishes to publish without the power of the

.:~-,____.

_______

__,,~-----~.

'

""'.

' ....

'"

2.

Court under the Rules.

Of course, Rule 26 expressly contem-

plates protective orders.
Justice Stevens expressly said there was no constitutional right to discovery.

He

~i~

say that there could

be a rule that all discovered information iq Presumptively
open to the public.

r would not say this- certainly unless

it is necessary to obtain a Court.

Justice Stevens did

qualify his comment by noting that the triaJ court should
...............

'--·~_

............

find good cause for denying a requent to publish, but that
,_____ ...--._.../--'\._

'---~

'-'.__""'\..o______'--_

this would not require much of a showinq.

He concluded that

the order in this case was valid on its face.
The state interests are quite substantial as

I

believe you noted in your. bench memo, and this should be
made clear.

I

think

I

was mistaken in emphasizing that the

First Amendment rights of the defendant would be vl.olateo by
pubJishing the names and amounts given hy donors.

I

would

include, at least in an initial draft, a footnote stating
that the protective order \'7as particularly appropriate in
this case.

The trial court had entered an extremely broad

order authorizing discovery.
that the Seattle

Time~

And the particular information

wished to publish, involving the

names of donors and their contributions, involved rights of
association and even of religion.

L. F. P. , Jr.

ss
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MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

Rob

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

March 15, 1984

82-1721 Seattle Times v. Rhinehart
It was a mistake for me to express the hope that
you

could

give

commenced.

me

a

draft

before

the

March

arguments

The case is not as easy as I had thought, and

your draft reflects - at least as I read it - the level of
care and sophistication that this case deserves.

But you

have not had enough time to do it justice.
I

suggest

that

you

put

Seattle

Times

on

the

"back burner" until you have caught up on your certs and
completed

bobtail

bench

memos

for

the

March

arguments.

Then get back on Seattle Times with the view to giving me
a draft by March 30.

Of course, you will also have some

bench memos for the April arguments, but your memos can be
quite brief cases.

assuming that I know a good deal about the

My primary interest is to know from my clerk his

or her recommendation, and an outline of the analysis.
I have not tried to rewrite any of your March 14
draft.

You have followed pretty much my suggested general

2.

outline.

I

now

know more about the case,

and make the

following observations and suggestions.
1.
be stated

I think the pleadings and the facts need to

somewhat more

fully,

using

the exact language

from the critical phrases of the complaint.
2.
parties stated

Similarly,

I

think

the

position

particularly that of petitioners'

more

connection,

explicitly.

It

to make clear

is

-

important

of

the

should be
in

this

before commencing Part II the

scope of petitioner's assertion of First Amendment rights.
Although neither
I

courts

below so construed

petitioner

pursuant

to

it

brief nor oral argument is crystal

clear,

that

think

the
is

is

clear

enough

and

I

believe

the

the pleadings and arguments -

insisting

discovery

-

is

that whatever

per

se

public

is disclosed
information

available as much to any member of the public as to the
media.
least

A secondary, supportive type argument, is that at
with

respect

to

the

media's

claimed

right

to

publish, the limitation of a protective order must serve a
compelling

state

interest.

arguments,

we can

think

reply on Pell

respect

to

"discovered

publish

is

to

be

I

info"

viewed

no

the

for

in addressing
the

view that with

right of

differently

these

the press to
from

that

of

3.

and

~~ citizens

other

Incidentally,

businesses.

I

do not

~ think your use of Pell is accurate.

3.
is

I think the first paragraph in your Part II

Use

good.

(at

the

bot torn of p.

10)

the quote

from

Welsh that I have written out at the bottom of that page.
Also

cite

other

cases

illustrating

limitations

literal language of the First Amendment.

on

the

One easy place

to find these cases is on page 15 of petitioner's brief.
4.

In my

brief memo of March 7

(just a week

ago!), I suggested that we should emphasize the purpose of
the Rules.

I am afraid you were misled by me.

Your draft

devotes some seven or eight pages - a third of the entire
opinion -

to the general

importance and purposes of the

Rules of Civil Procedure and particularly discovery.

I do

not

used

that

Discovery Rules

have

want

praised

to

the

repeat
Rules,

been a disaster.
of my

dissent

all
as

I

of

the

think

language
the

you

You might ask Sally to give you a copy

from

the

proposed

amendment

to

the

Rules

sent to Congress in 1980 or 81.
I find Judge Wilkey's dissent in Halkin helpful
in

several

ways.

He

discovery quite briefly.
Hickman

(p.

15 your

states

the

relevant

purpose

of

The portion of your quote from

draft)

is on

target.

Use only the

4.

portion

thereof

I

have

I

indicated.

would

preface the

quotation by saying that although Hickman was written in
1947,

less

than

a

decade

after

the

Federal

Rules were

first adopted, and before abuse of the Discovery Rules had
become a serious problem, the Court emphasized the "vital
role

[of discovery]

u.s.,

at 501.

in

the preparation for

trial".

329

You can probably find a similar quotation

in Prof. Wright's book, and perhaps in other sources.
The trial court,

in its opinion in this case,

justifying its protective order stating that its purpose
was to assure that the "discovering

party make no use or

dissemination of the information gained through discovery
other

than

such

use

as

is

necessary

in

order

for

the

discoverying party to prepare and try the case." (emphasis
supplied).

A

53a.

emphasizing

that

Cit

this

is

what

authority

the purpose -

you

can

find

indeed the only

purpose - of permitting the type of wide-ranging discovery
authorized

by

the

Rule.

The

purpose

is

to

facilitate

preparation and trial of the case.
If you have not done so, Rob, I suggest that you
read the notes of the Advisory Committee commencing at the
bottom
edition

of
of

page
the

75

of

Federal

West

Publishing

Rules.

I

call

Company's
your

1983

attention

5.

particularly to what was said about the 1983 amendment on
p.

84.

I

would

quote

in a

footnote what

I

have marked

from begin to end on pages 384 and 385.
5.

It is important to emphasize

(as you have)

that although there is a constitutional right of access to
the

Court

this

discovery.

right

does

not

extend

to

pretrial

It is a matter wholly within the authority of

the legislative branch to adopt rules, and thereafter for
the courts -

in the exercise of their large discretion in

conducting trials - to oversee the use of the Rules in the
interest of justice.

To the extent you can find authority

for the foregoing, it is important to cite it.
If Judge Wilkey, in Halkin, correctly uses Judge
Friendly's opinion Koons, 325 F.2d 403, 407-08, this would
be a

helpful citation.

cited

as

saying

that

constitutionality of
forbid

the

a

no
rule

publicizing,

information
Wilkey

At page

obtained

cites

two

by

other

203 of Halkin,

doubt

exists

allowing a
in

one
cases

advance

party
that

from
may

is

to

the

as

federal
of

Koons

court to

trial,

another.
not

be

of

Judge

quite

so

helpful but, as he uses them, seem supportive.
6.
have made

Wilkey makes very well the basic point you

(emphasized by Judge White at Conference)

that

6.

the information at issue is available to petitioners only
by virtue of

the exercise by the Court of its authority

under the identical rules that also authorizes the Court
to impose conditions in a protective order in the interest
of

justice.

This

is a

critical point

in our analysis.

Perhaps you can get some help from Prof. Wright also.
recognize,
point.

of

course,

that

already

have

made

the

I merely am emphasizing its importance.
7.

As

reading page 18
position,
(prior

a

relatively

citing

two

restraint)

neither

and

Gannett

which

is

Rob,

when

you state petitioner's
Near v.

(dealing

with

Minnesota

limitations

Richmond Newspapers is another

that petitioners
of

point,

types of cases:

in the latter category.

recognize

minor

(near the bottom)

with respect to trials).
case

you

I

Would

it not be better to

rely on both lines of cases,

pertinent

for

the

reasons

you and

Wilkey both have stated?
8.

Petitioners present two questions

Perhaps we should make this somewhat

petition for cert.

clearer in our opinion.
exactitude,

and

position

that

public.

The

both

all

in their

Neither question is framed with

appear

to be

information

first

question

a

departure

obtained
seems

on

to

from the

discovery
say

that

is
the

7.

information

is

public

unless

there

is

a

"showing

of

specific harm" or "a particularized" showing of a need for
restricting publication.
The second question is whether publication may
be prohibited "upon a mere showing of

1

good cause 1 " .

The

only requirement in the Rule is a showing of good cause.
we should hold that this showing is all that is required,
and

reject

any

publication.
proved

until

need
Read

after

to

show

"specific

literally,

such

publication.

harm"

harm

In

caused

could

this

case,

by

not

be

harm

to

associational and religious rights may be assmed.
9.

we

should

address

cause requirement of Rule 26(c).
considerable

extent,

but

I

specifically

the

good

You have done this to a

believe

it requires somewhat

more careful consideration and drafting.
as an important part of our opinion.

~l:Hi

I do view this
"har.-RI"

..io selfd - -

ev.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-a~~~

The "harm" is self-evident, and
apart from other consideration meets any standard of good
cause.

John

Stevens

referred

to

this

at

Conference,

adding that this could be satisfied without requiring much
of

a

cause".

showing.
The

Both
trial

of

the
court

courts

below

expressly

found

"good

found

that

8.

respondents had
the order.

"reasonable grounds"

(Appendix

52a-53a)

for

There

the issuance of

is a

good deal

language in the trial court's excellent opinion
10,

1981,

that

should

Wilkey's

footnotes.

be

quoted

in

our

of

of June

text

or

in

opinion also may be helpful on the

good cause on the good cause issue.

* * *
Rob:

As you will see,

outline a new draft.
importance,
our

views.

desirable,

and

Rather, I have identified points of ,

possible

Before

I have not undertaken to

I

sources of

concluded

help

that

a

in documenting
fresh

start

I had gone over the opinion once hurriedly and

done some fairly light stylistic editing.

You might note

some of this just to remind you of my eccentricities.
you need not consider my changes to be binding on you.
will get another shot at those in your second draft.
have

I

is

indicated except in a

few

yours to be retained or omitted.

instances,
I think a

But
I
Nor

language of
"rewrite" of

the opinion is necessary.
In the most general sort of way,
outline as follows:

( i)

case,

positions

including

the

I think of an

a more careful statement of the
of

the

parties

and

the

9.

decisions of the courts below;
the

Discovery

Rules,

( i i)

emphasizing

a briefer section on
that

they

are

not

constitutionally required, and that their only purpose is
to

facilitate

information
separately

preparation

to
or

the
in

for

public

the

trial

or

the

preceding

not
media;

section,

constitutionality of protective orders

to

provide

(iii)

either

establish

the

(Judge Friendly) ,

and then emphasize - as you have and as Judge Wilkey did that

the party requesting

and obtaining broad discovery

does so only on such conditions as the Court may impose as
authorized

by

Rule

23(c);

and

(iv)

address

the

"good

cause" predicate to a protective order, and show that good
cause

was

abundantly

shown

and

found

to

exist

in

this

general.

It

case.
The

foregoing

outline

is

quite

omits specific reference to the arguments of petitioners
that I do think we must indentify fairly and reject.
of these,

as you have noted,

interest

must
I

information.
requirement

be

is

shown

believe
that

good

One

is that a compelling state
1 imi t

to
the

cause

answer
be

publication
is

shown.

that
My

the

of
only

"bobtail"

outline above does not include some of the good portions
of

your

first

draft

e.g.,

f!.

contast
1\

between

the

10.

constitutional

right

of

access

to

purely statutory right to discovery.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

the

courts

and

the
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PLEAS E REPLY TO SEATTLE OFF I CE

March 20, 1984

Mr. Alexander L. Stevas
Clerk of the United States
Supreme Court
One First Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C.
20543
Re:

Seattle Times Company, et al. v. Rhinehart, et al.
Docket No.
82-1721

Dear Mr. Stevas:
In the Reply Brief for the Petitioners, filed on February 2,
1984, and in Oral Argument on February 21, 1984, reference was
made to the decision of a panel of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Tavoulareas v.
Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1984}. That panel
decision was rendered on January 6, 1984.
On March 15, 1984, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, en bane, granted rehear i ng
en bane and vacated the panel decision:--A copy of the Orde r
is respectfully enclosed.
Very truly yours,
DAVIS, WRIGHT, TODD, RIESE & JONES
Attorneys for Petitioners

By~

~Bruce E. H. Johnson
BEHJ/bh
Enclosure
cc: Malcolm L. Edwards, Esq., w/encl.
James C. Goodale, Esq., w/encl.

- ,
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Dnit.e~ §taf~s
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<t!nurf nf l\pp~nls

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIP.CLJIT

No.

September Term, 19

83-1688

William P. Tavoulareas, et al.

Civil Action No. 80-03032
Unite<~
Str.e 1 COUrt c .t /',..__ ••
.
r.:
1•..,. ..,.lfTtct ol Co'·· . ,.,....,.., IS
.;.;~UI C.Wcuif

v.

._

-

The Washington Post Company, d/b/a/
The Washington Post, a Delaware
Corporation, et al.
~fubil

nuo .MAR 151984
Gi:ORGZ A fiSW=ro..
CUlts(
w.r;

Corporation, et al.
Appellants

BEFORE:

s3

Robinson, Chief Judge; Wright, Tamm, Wilkey, Wald, Mikva,
Edwards, Ginsburg, Bork, Scalia and Starr, Circuit Judges
.·

0 R DE R
TheSuggestions for Rehearing en bane of the Washington Post
Company and The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, et al.,
and the Brief Amicus Curiae in support thereof, have been circulated to
the full Court. A majority of the judges of the Court in regular active
service have voted in favor of the suggestions. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED by the Court en
are granted and it is

~

that the aforesaid suggestions

FURTHER ORDERED by the Court that the Opinion and Judgment of
this Court entered on January 6, 1984 be, and the same hereby are,
vacated.
Further proceedings in this case will be governed by a future
Order of the Court.
Per Curiam
For the Court:
GEORGE A. FISHER, Clerk
Robert A. Bonner
Chief Deputy Clerk
~

.

Circuit Judge Bork did not participate in this Order •
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OUTLINE FOR SECOND DRAFT OF
SEATTLE TIMES V. RHINEHART
I.

Fairly detailed statement of the case.

II. Dicussion of Seattle Times' argument
-1st Amendment protects the right to disseminate
information learned through litigation processes
-status as litigant doesn't affect this right
-before depriving a litigant of his right to
disseminate information, the TC must specifically
find that a protective order is the least intrusive
means of avoiding a substantial and serious threat
to a compelling state interest

.--

\

III. Seattle Times' argument is b sed on a fundamental
misunderstanding of 1st
ndment doctrine--there is
no constitutional right to disseminate information
gained through discovery

-terms of 1st Amendment seem to apply in this situation,~~~~
but the Court does not give those terms a literal
~~
interpretation
~ l~t';l{. ~~~.. ~
-there is no constitutional right to access to in~rmat1on
-matter of legislative grace
~ 1.4~, ~"'~•'-legislature can deny access all to together or ~ke i b~~~-~ i
\- t
\ ,
access subject to conditions
tlt21#~4.t. ----, r...v~
~"'t;
J\~ ,
-legislature can make access subject to TC' s protective
""'~""-' '~.~ ·
orders
VVJ' ,'ii
~ourt has long recognized the unique status of trial
~
participants for 1st Amendment purposes

.

Q

J

¥"-~~~IV ~ashington

State, and other jurisdictions,
to civil EliscouQry

~ '?~ ~.....t"easana.hl e,...a;gpr.cac·.h

n~-~~~-civil

have~~

~~~

rules provide for extensive i~trYBi¥e discovery for
JVD ~,
t~e sole purpose of.~¥~ ef£icienk resolution o~~~~
~·t"cJ.i.spnte-5
~,/p...tzu-,
~
1
LAA(
-%~~~es also give TCs broad discretion to control ~---~~LCe~c_.
~tvv
5f discovery and uses to which discovered
~
fV.~
information can be put
~ / ~ a,,_ 4 ~~
: ,1-protective orders are not ii.t. ilei~ett'I!Pl prior restraints.., ~d4...(
~ J
-only covers info gained through use of the coercive
powers of the TC
-parties can disseminate identical info from ~other
source.:s
v '~~
} -Rule 26(c) recognizes the inherent powers of a TC to
~d?' 0~ ~~protect the integrity of its own processes
~~~~
-Rule 26(c) recognizes the need to protect the rights
c.. 0 ~ _rcJ- , \ L f those forced to produce information
~Q.., \o~·
~
-right of access to the courts 1;-f~
~ ,'jj 1 1LL.
-right to a fa1r trial
~v-right to privacy

vr

a

page :G.

V.

While not necessary to the disposition of this case, the
court below required a showing of good cause, the same
standard provided for in the federal rules and most states

~

.1_1-

<9

5/C:/W~~~
;~tc;: t> ~ •<:..: ~6,f"!'ctt(.

~·tt'4w=a~~

t

4<?

A:' I"'U-i-4 "'Ji~

~ ~

~~~-4r~

lfp/ss 04/12/84
MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

Rob

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

April 12, 1984

Seattle Times
Your
approval.

I

approach

to

this

case

has

my

It was not suggested by what the Justice said

at Conference.
than

analytical

had

But I believe this is a sounder approach
initially

thought

we

should

follow.

My

comments on your draft are as follows:
1.

As you anticipated,

there is no way we are

going to circulate in this case a draft that I estimate
would print out at least 25 pages.

I therefore have done

a fair amount of "scratching up", and for about the last
one

third of your

draft,

I

have substantially rewritten

it.

I
most

part

emphasize,
off-the-cuff

Rob,

that my revision is for

dictation,

and

careful editing by you and your editor.
to

coordinate

Likewise,
subparts.

or

even

include

all

of

it

will

the

require

Nor have I tried
your

footnotes.

I have not tried to divide it into appropriate

--~~--------~----------------------------~~------------ ~.

I

do

think

that

your

draft

substantially

"overargues" the application of Procunier v. Martinez.
agree that case provides the framework.
omit

obvious

statements,

statements.
for

the

It is best,

jugular"

and

to

and

some

We simply have to
arguably

desirable

as trial lawyers learn,
do

so

I

rather

boldly.

to "go
We

are

clearly on the right and reasonable side of this case.
As
draft -

a general observation,

in its concluding portion -

I do not think your
takes full advantage

of the findings of the trial court and the opinion of the
state Supreme Court.
One minor opportunity to save some pages, as you
suggested, may be to reduce the statement of the facts on
the first

three pages of the opinion by about a page or

two.
2.

Specific points or inquiries are as follows:

(a)
depositions
authorize

Interrogatories

are

involved

in

interrogatories.

as

well

as

this case.
I

have

discovery

Rule 26 doesn't

not

thought

about

whether the Rules specifically authorize protective orders
for
is

interrogatories available under the Rule
34)

that

relates

to

documents.

We

(I think it

should

make

any

.:J.

appropriate changes

to recognize

that we are not simply

talking about depositions.
(b)

You

state

in

a

couple

of

places

that

discovery may be made of information in the possession of
third parties, not involved in the litigation to the same
extent of parties.

The Rule itself draws no distinction,

but I have thought that there are constraints applicable
to third party discovery that may exceed those applicable
to parties.
this

case

Justice
because

he

Marshall
said

voted

"the

anybody who

other

way"

institutes a

in
law

suit accepts the risk of "being undressed" by discovery.
(c)
n.

The opinion says little about Halkin (only

9), or other cases that have addressed the issue here.

Do we get any help from Koons other than the quote in n.
23?

Perhaps there is little help beyond Wilkey's dissent

in Halkin.

Can we use any part of this- e.g., his use of

cases?

* * *
Rob, I think you - with a good assist from David
- have made real progress with this case.
a day or
carefully.

two to fit

in my changes -

This will be worth it.
L. F. P. ,

ss

Jr.

It may take you

and to polish them

lfp/ss 04/21/84
MEMORANDUM
April 21, 1984

DATE:

TO:

Rob

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Seattle Times
Here is our first Chambers Draft with my light

stylistic changes, together with a couple of riders.

I am

quite pleased with the draft.
I have a couple of minor questions.
first

full

paragraph,

affidavits.

The

respondent's

initial

we

summary

summarize
is

about

objection

to

On page 5,

the
as

respondent's

conclusive

as

Do

the

discovery.

affidavits elaborate in any way that would be helpful to
the opinion?
summary

On p. 9, I noted, as a question, whether the

there

was

fair

to

petitioner's

contention.

I

believe it is, particularly in view of what we say on the
following page.
The

only

the omission of
The

Justices

and

significant change

the
law

first

paragraph

I

clerks

here

that

I

in Part

often

seem

suggest
IV, p.
prone

is
10.
to

repeat principles that are known to every first year law
student.

!

\

try to avoid \this.

My suggestion is that we

commence Part IV with the paragraph at the top of page 11,

2.

with an appropriate change in the language of the first
sentence.
Then, Rob, I would add a footnote - keyed to one
of

the sentences

in the

first

paragraph on p.

11, that

includes the good statement from American Communications
Ass'n v. Douds.

I would eliminate footnote 18.

* * *
As soon as you hear from your co-clerks, and in
the

absence

of

any

substantive

changes,

proceed with a

first draft that we will circulate early next week.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

t__ .-r-1.

,jttprtmt <!Jllltrl ttf tift ~tb .jtatt.e~Jringtttn, ~.

<If. 21lbiJ!~

CHAMBERS OF

.JUST I CE BYRON R . WH ITE

April 25, 1984

No. 82-1721

Seattle Times v. Rinehart

Dear Lewis,
I agree.

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE

w....

J. BRENNAN, JR .

April 25, 1984

Re: Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, No. 82-1721

Dear Lewis:
As you will recall, I agreed at Conference that the
protective order issued by the Washington courts could be
upheld on the basis of the privafY and religious rights of
the respondents. I am pleased to see that your draft
opinion takes that basic approach, first by noting an
appropriate standard for review of the First Amendment
interests implicated by a protective order (at 10-11), and
then by recognizing that the government may have a
substantial interest in preventing the abuse of its
processes that might result from the public release of
information damaging to reputation and privacy (at 13-14).
I am concerned, however, that some of the discussion in your
opinion could be read to depart from th~lySis
~ ~

-

}~

-

r _J

In particular, as your opinion suggests at 13-14, the
governmental interest that should be balanced against the
pett€1oners' FirstAmendment interests is the substantial
interest in protecting the privacy and religious rights of
litigants or other parties from whom confidential
information is discovered. See generally Herbert v. Lando,
441 U.S. 153, 178-180 (1979) (POWELL, J., concurring). As
now written, however, the holding of your opinion could_be
understoo~ to su~est that the countervailing governmental
interesT rs simp y in preserving tfie 1nt:e i
f its '
ju~ E.g.,
e therefore hold that
whe~s in this case, a protective order is limited to
narrow context of pretrial civil discovery and does not
restrict the dissemination of the information gained from
other sources, it does not offend the First Amendment.").
Without further definition, however, that governmental
interest could justi.._fy y_i~tua_l.q_every_pro~ect~ve order ever
issued by a court. rn other words, me-government's
in~smooth functioning of its discovery process
is present in every case. Yet, if a court issued a
protective order without any reason, or if a State rule
provided for protective orders in all cases regardless of
special circumstances, I think we would agree that there
might be First Amendment interests that would invalidate
such an order. In sum, the reason this particular
protective order is permissible is because it protects the
privacy and religious rights of the respondents, and not

1

~

~~
'~

1

because it serves to protect the State's discovery process
in the abstract.

If the case arose in the federal courts, we could
protect First Amendment interests by policing the courts
under Rule 26's "good cause" requirement, and therefore
could hold that the Ruie satisfies constitutional
.
requirements. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S.
89 (1981). For cases arising in the state courts, however,
we must accept the State's interpretation of its own rules.
As a result, our constitutional approval of those
interpretations should require that the courts do more than
simply assert the State's interest in the judicial process.
In this case, the Washington courts satisfied whatever
specific requirements the Constitution might require by
finding that the respondents "had a recognized privacy
interest" and that release of the discovered information
"would allegedly and understandably result in annoyance,
embarrassment and even oppression." Upholding the
protective order because of the presence of such a finding
would not impose a very heavy burden on the state courts.
Nor, in my view, would it lead to substantial amounts of
litigation.
I wonder if you could see your way to amending your
draft opinion along these lines?
Sincer'ely,

~ ~GG

WJB, Jr.

Justice Powell

~u:puutt

<ltllurl O'f tlr.t ~ttit.t~ ~hd.t.&'

~rurJrittgtlln. ~.

<It·

2llbi'At~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

April 25, 1984

Re:

82-1721 - Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart

Dear Lewis:
You have written a persuasive and important
opinion with which I am in virtually complete
agreement. I do, however, have three concerns that I
hope you will consider:

1. On page 11 you cite the Chief Justice's
opinion in Houchins in a way that I am afraid will
have the effect of elevating it to a Court
op1n1on. You will recall that you and I dissented
from the broad position that he took on page 11 of
his opinion.
I wonder if you would either omit
the citation entirely, or perhaps qualify it with
some indication that we do not completely endorse
it.
2. In footnote 20 on page 12 you quote from
the Chief's opinion in Gannett. He is quite wrong
in stating that "it has never occurred to anyone"
that a deposition might be a public proceeding.
In 15 u.s.c. § 30, Congress provided that
depositions in antitrust cases should be public.
Moreover, this quotation implies that the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public
trial would never encompass a pretrial proceeding.
Could you either omit the footnote entirely, or at
least the quotation?
3. On page 10 you introduce your statement
of the critical question by stating that the
"information" obtained by discovery is protected
by the First Amendment. This is a new concept
that I really do not understand and, I am afraid,
may confuse future analysis. The Amendment does
not protect information~ it protects the

communication of information and ideas. In my
opinion it does not guarantee the right to
communicate information that a litigant obtains
only by virtue of a court order that limits its
use to the litigation.

?

I believe we are ultimately holding that the
First Amendment does not protect a litigant's
communication of information that is covered by a
valid protective order. In other words, such
speech is not a species of "protected speech." I
therefore wonder if you have properly framed the
decisive question at the bottom of page 10 as
whether an order is an invalid restraint "on
protected speech."
May I suggest that you consider a revision of
the paragraphs at the bottom of page 10 and the
top of 11 to read something like this:
"It is, of course, clear that information
obtained through civil discovery authorized by
modern RUles of P''ivil Procedure would rarely, if
ever, {all within the classes of unprotected
speech identified by decisions of this Court. In
this case, as petitioners argue, there certainly
is a public interest in knowing more about
respondents Rhinehart and the Aquarian Foundation.
This interest may well include most--and possibly
all--of what has been discovered as a result of
the Court's order under Rule 26(b) (1). It does
not necessarily follow, however, that a litigant
has a~~y unrestrained right to disseminate
information that has been obtained through
pretrial discovery. For even though the broad
sweep of the First Amendment seems to prohibit all
restraints on free expression, this Court has
observed that "freedom of speech ... does not
comprehend the right to speak on any subject at
any time." American Communications Assn. v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 394-395 (1950).
"The critical question that this case
presents is whether a litigant's freedom
comprehends the right to disseminate information

that he has obtained pursuant to a court order
that both granted him access to that information
and placed restraints on the way in which the
information might be used. In addressing that
question it is necessary to consider whether the
"practice in question [furthers] an important or
substantial governmental interest unrelated to the
suppression of expression" and whether "the
limitation of First Amendment freedoms [is] no
greater than is necessary or essential to the
protection of the particular governmental interest
involved." Procunier v. Martinez, 416 u.s. 396,
413 (1974); see Brown v. Glines, 444 u.s. 348,
354-355 (1980); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 u.s. 1, 25
(1976)."
This is just a rough attempt at a reformulation of
the paragraphs that trouble me. I merely propose it
because it is sometimes easier to consider specific
language than a general suggestion.
With these exceptions, I am prepared to join you.
Indeed, perhaps you can persuade me that I simply join
the opinion as it is now drafted.

,Justice Powell

~u:pr~uu <IJGurl Gf t!rt ~tb j;ta.Us

jtas!ringtcn:, ~. <If. 2llbt'1~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUJST

April 26, 1984
Re:

No. 82-1721

Seattle Times co. v.

Rhineha~t

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely·~

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

v

.iuprtmt (!fourt of tlrt ~tb .;\Udtg
._a~Jringt~ ~. <If. 211.;tJt~
CHAM8ERS OF

.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, .JR . ·

82-1721

May 1, 1984
Seattle Times v. Rhinehart

Dear Bill:
This is my first opportunity to reply to your letter of
April 25. I appreciate your giving me the opportunity to
consider your concerns.
I would be glad to omit the concluding sentence in
Subpart c on p. 15, and add the following as a final three
sentences in the opinion on page 16:
"We hold that the protective order issued in this case does not offend the First
Amendment. It was entered by the trial court
upon a showing that constituted good cause as
required by Rule 26(c). Also, it is limited
to the context of pretrial civil discovery,
and does not restrict dissemination if the
information is obtained from other sources."
In addition, I would add a footnote, keyed to the
above, reading substantially as follows:
"25. It is apparent that substantial
government interests were implicated. Respondents, in requesting the protective
order, relied upon the rights of privacy and
religious association. Both the trial court
and the Supreme Court of Washington also emphasized that the right of persons to resort
to the courts for redress of grievances would
have been 'chilled'. See supra n. 23."
I would be reluctant, Bill, to imply that a state's
interest in the integrity of its judicial process would not
in some situations be sufficient to constitute the requisite
good cause.
If the foregoing substantially meets your concerns, I
will see if these changes are acceptable to the Justices who
have joined me.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
lfp/ss

<!fonti

.jnp:rtut~
of 14~ ~b .jtatts.as-Jri:ttght~ ~. <If. 2ll~,.~
CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

May 2, 1984

Re:

82-1721 - Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart

Dear Lewis:
I

join.
Regards,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
/

May 2 , 1984

82-1721 Seattle Times v.

~hinehart

Dear ,John:
This is a belated thank you note for your comments
on the first draft of my opinion.
Your comments are constructive, and I plan to incJude the substance of them in a seconA draft .
Sincerely,

Justice Stevens

lfp/ss

C H A MBERS OF

..J U ST I CE WM . ..J. BR ENNA N , ..JR.

May 3, 1984
Re:

Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, No. 82-1721

Dear Lewis:
Thank you for your note of May 1, and for your
consideration of my suggestions. If you could find your way
to incorporating them I would be pleased to join your
opinion.
I'm bothered by one other matter, and hope you might
address it, though my join is not conditioned on this
change. Its about the first full paragraph on page 12, and
note 20 attached thereto, which discuss rights of access to
pretrial discovery. Although it is undoubtedly true that
discovery proceedings "are not public components of a civil
trial," I am not so sure that the materials generated by
discovery are not, as a matter of modern practice, open to
the public. Indeed, recent amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (Rules 5 (d) and 30 (f) (1)) suggest that
such materials must be filed with a court and therefore,
absent a court order to the contrary, are open for
inspection by the public and the press. Because of this I
would much prefer either omission of the paragraph and its
footnote entirely, or their severe limitation. And, because
this is not a public/press access case (i.e., the Seattle
Times is a litigant who automatically has access to
discovered materials), I would much prefer the omission.
Finally, although I join, I may add a paragraph or so
in concurrence.

Since.J?ely,

~~i{

wJ£ , Jr.

Justice Powell

.itt¥tttttt Ofltltrt of tqt ,nittb .itatt%
'Jihudtington, ~. <If. 2llgtJ.t~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

May 3, 1984

No. 82-1721

Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart

Dear Lewis,
I have read your opinion with interest. You have
found a clever way to avoid making every motion for
protective order a constitutional issue.
I expect to be
able to join it, but I still have a few concerns.
This case probably does not require us to address
the broad and difficult question of a 1st Amendment public
right of access to pretrial discovery material.
Petitioners
acknowledge they have been granted access by statute and
they simply want to publish the information.
It is my understanding that some of the material
to which the protective order was applied had already been
obtained and filed with the court records as a public
record.
It is typical of the practice in a number of states
for the rules to provide for the filing in the public record
of answers to interrogatories and depositions.
Your opinion
draws no distinction between protective orders issued before
the discovery is obtained and those issued after material
has been obtained and made a matter of public record.
I
think the distinction may be important and the 1st Amendment
may well require case-specific particularized findings (as
in Press-Enterprise) by a court which decides there is good
cause for restricting publication of material already in the
record.
I am troubled, therefore, by the first paragraph on
p. 12 and by footnote 20. At least in some jurisdictions
pretrial discovery material which has been filed in the
public record is a traditionally accessible source of
information. Perhaps it would help to also add a footnote on
p. 16 noting that the Washington Supreme Court has
apparently interpreted the trial court's protective order as

2.

terminating once the discovered material is made public by
the judicial process or by the parties independently of
discovery. See Joint Appendix at 13la and n. 9. Thus, any
discovery material which has already been made public by
being filed in records of the court in compliance with state
or local rules would not be encompassed by this protective
order.
It also seems to me that it would be useful to add
to the last sentence of Part IV C on p. 15 the requirement
that the protective order must be issued on a proper showing
of good cause. The trial court will be exercising its
discretion which, I assume, is to be on a "good cause"
standard.
If you feel these suggestions are not
inappropriate or "out of line" with your views, perhaps
these concerns can be easily accommodated.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

May 4, 1984

82-1721. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart
Dear Sandra:
I received your letter yesterrlay after we had
"gone to press" with some revisions in this case. I believe
the changes in my second draft (see particularly n. 20, p.
12) address - at least in part - the concerns you exp~essed.
As the First Amendment issue was the principal
issue presented by the case, and I understood we granted
Seattle Times to address it, I think it is appropriate, and
may be helpful, to write it subRtantially as I have.
My new note 20 deals with the variation ln practice as to the filing of interroqatories and depositions.
In most of the federal districts, there are local rules on
the subject. In the Eastern District of Virginia, depositions and interrogatories usually wer.e left in the hands of
the lawyers unless one party or the other wished to have the
intervention of the court. Under Rule 5(c), now mentioned
in my footnote 20, that practice may well have changed. But
the important point is that the court controls the situation, as it should.

It may be, as you suggest, that in this case some
of the material had already been filed with the trial court
before the protective order was issued. I read the protective order as applying to the information that respondents
identified as violating their privacy and rights of association. This seems entirely appropriate to me.
In sum, I think the importance of our opinion is
to make clear that where good cause is shown with respect to
discovered material, the trial court has authority under the
Rules to protect it from public disclosure unless and until
the information is used in the trial.
I hope the changes made in my second draft will
have your approval.
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
lfp/ss
------~ '~'',;(.il.._----------~·~

May 4, 1984

82-1721 Seattle Times v. Rhinehart

Dear Bill:
I appreciate your willingness to join my opinion.
20, that
tion. I
do think
I should

I have made changes on page 12, ann rewritten note
I think meets in large part your further suggesprefer to leave the paragraph in the opinion, but I
the footnote substantially clarifies the situation.
have referred to Rule 5(d) in my first draft.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
lfp/ss

.-.J

.iu:prmtt Qtanri af tlft ~b .itaft.1
'Jfas~

10. Qt.

2!1~,.~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE

w ... .

J . BRENNAN, JR.

May 4, 1984

No. 82-1721
Seattle Times v. Rhinehart

Dear Lewis,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

.§u:pl".ttm Qftturl ttf tlf.t ~ttitt~ .§tattl\'

••lfin:gftttt, ~. <!f.

211gi'1~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

J
May 7, 1984

Re:

82-1721 - Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

.:§uprtm.t (!fou:rt of tqt 'JlUtiftb ~ta:tts

'Dras Jrittgtcn. 10. "f.

2.0,?'! ~

CHAMBERS OF

..JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

May 9, 1984

Re:

No. 82-1721-Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart

Dear Bill:
Please join me in your concurring opinion.
Sincerely,

;jtVf .
T.M.

Justice Brennan
cc:

The Conference

•

,jn.prt'ltU Q}ltltrl of tlr~ ~b ,jtattg
~agfringhtn. !fJ.

<q.

20~'1~

CHAMBERS OF"

ay 10, 198 4

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

RE:

82-1721 - Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart

Dear Lewis:
I have some concern about your most recent draft in
this case. In the first draft, the holding of the Court
appeared as follows:
"We therefore hold that where, as in this
case, a protective order is limited to the
narrow context of pretrial civil discovery
and does not restrict the dissemination of
the information gained from other sources,
it does not offend the First Amendment."
In the most recent draft to circulate, the holding of the
Court is stated:
"We hold that the protective order issued
in this case does not offend the First
Amendment. It was entered by the trial
court upon a showing that constituted good
cause as required by Rule 26(c). Also, it
is limited to the context of pretrial
civil discovery, and does not restrict
dissemination if the information is
obtained from other sources." (footnote
omitted).
The footnote to this latter holding reads:
"It is apparent that substantial
government interests were implicated.
Respondents, in requesting the protective
order, relied upon the rights of privacy
and religious association. Both the trial
court and the Supreme Court of Washington
also emphasized that the right of persons
to resort to the courts for redress of
grievances would have been 'chilled.'"
The two paragraphs stating the holding of the Court
are clearly different, significantly because the latter
adds a requirement that "good cause" be shown under the
State's rule. As I recall the Conference, we thought this
added element was essential. However, even aside from the
addition, I read the latest draft to take on a

significantly different tone from the first, so that it
now suggests that a First Amendment balancing is required
each time a court issues a protective order during
pretrial discovery. Whereas in the first draft, it was
clear that if the "good cause" requirement is satisfied,
if the order is limited to the pretrial discovery context,
and if the order does not limit dissemination of
information obtained from other sources, it satisfies the
First Amendment, the latter draft implies that a different
balance might be struck if different privacy interests
were asserted. This plays right into what is implicit in
the suggestion in the concurrence that the Court is
deciding no more than that the balance tilts in favor of
permitting the order in this particular case.
The tone change I suspect will prove very important,
and I cannot join that. I could join if you replace the
holding paragraph on the last page of the latest draft to
read something like the following:
"We hold that because the protective order
issued in this case was entered by the
trial court upon a showing of good cause
as required by Rule 26(c), was limited to
the context of pretrial civil discovery,
and did not restrict dissemination of the
information if it was obtained from other
sources, it does not offend the First
Amendment. "
This modification would recapture the holding in the first
draft, and remove the doubt that I think now exists as to
whether an order meeting the three specified conditions
might nonetheless fail to satisfy the First Amendment.
Regards,

Justice Powell

j)nprtutt <!f!tltrl of tlrt ~tb ,jtatts

._asfri:ttghm, J. <If. 20~~$
CHAMBERS OF

JU STI CE W ILLIAM H . RE HNQUI ST

May 10, 1984

Re:

No. 82-1721

Seattle Times v. Rhinehart

Dear Lewis:
I cheerfully joined your first draft in this opinion,
and did not pay close attention to the revisions in your
second draft until Bill Brennan's concurrence came around
today. The holding of the Court, as I understood it from
your first draft, appears at page 15:
"We therefore hold that where, as in this case, a
protective order is limited to the narrow context
of pretrial civil discovery and does not restrict
the dissemination of the information gained from
other sources, it does not offend the First
Amendment."
Now, however, the holding of the case found on page 16 of
the second draft reads:
"We hold that the protective order issued in this
case does not offend the First Amendment. It was
entered by the trial court upon a showing that
constituted good cause as required by Rule 26{c).
Also, it is limited to the context of pretrial
civil discovery, and does not restrict
dissemination if the information is obtained from
other sources." {emphasis supplied)
It seems to me that the second draft lends support to
Bill's concurrence in a way that I would prefer it did not,
suggesting that every pretrial order is subject to First
Amendment analysis on a case-by-case basis , rather than
being governed by the more generic statement in your first

- 2 -

draft. If the second draft remains as it is, I may well
want to write separately.
Sincerely, ~

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

May 11, 1981
82-1721 Seattle Times v. Rhinehart
Dear Chief and Bill:
As your letters of May 10 express similar concerns, I reply to you both.
The Chief's letter does suggest a revision of the
holding paragraph to read as follows:
"We hold that because the protective order
issued in this case was entered by the trial
court upon a showing of good cause as required by Rule 26(c), was limited to the context of pretrial civil discovery, and did not
restrict dissemination of the information if
it was obtained from other sources, it does
not offend the First Amendment."

'·

I can accept the Chief's suggested paragraph, with
minor language changes as follows:
"We therefore hold that where, as in this
case, a protective order is entered on a
showing of good cause as required by Rule
26(c), is limited to the context of pretrial
civil discovery, and does not restrict the
dissemination of the information if gained
from other sources, it does not offend the
First Amendrnent.1!j
Actually, it does not seem to me that the differences in the paragraphs we are discussing are really substantive, particularly in view of the way the opinion itself
is written. This is a First Amendment case, and accordingly
its relevance has to be addressed.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Justice Rehnquist
lfp/ss

May 11, 1984

82-17 21 Seattle 'T'i.mes v. Rhinehart

Dear Bill:
~

'

'

As you said, I seem to be a bit "in the middle" as
a result of my making the changes that you suggested.
You have seen Bill Rehnquist'~ letter circulated
to the Conference. The Chief has now written a letter, not
circulated, in which he states he cannot join my revised
draft. As Bill Rehnquist and the Chief joined the initial
draft, I owe them a good deal of deference - as I mentioned
in my letter of May 1, to you.
In my view, the perceived differences are not
really great. I suggest changing the final paragraph
slightly to read as follows:
"We therefore hold that where, as in this
case, a protective order is entered on ~
showi.ng of good cause as required by Rule
26(c), is limited to the context of pretrial
civil discovery, and does not restrict the
dissemination of the information if gained
from other sources, it does not offend the
First Amendment.~
I believe this language will address the concern you
expressed in your letter of April 25, 1984. If you agree, I
will submit this to the Chief and Bill Rehnquist.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
lfp/ss

Qfourl of tlt~ 1!;tnthb ~taUs
-M!titt\lbttt. !IJ. Qf. 2llp"'$

~tm:t

C H AMBE:RS OF"

..J U STI CE HAR R Y A . B LACK MUN

May 14, 1984

Re: No. 82-1721 - Seattle Times Company v. Rhinehart
Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

,jltpftmt Qfttttrlttf tqt ~tb ,jtatts

._asftingtltlt. ~. <!f. 20~~~
C HAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

May 14, 1984
Re:

No. 82-1721

Seattle Times v. Rhinehart

Dear Lewis:
I am perfectly content with the revised version of the
final paragraph in your opinion in this case which you suggest
in your letter of May 11th. It seems to me that the text of
footnote 24, as it now reads in the second draft, is not entirely
consistent with the revised language in the text, and perhaps
should be modified or deleted, but so far as I am concerned
that is up to you.
Sincerely, ~

Justice Powell
cc:

The Chief Justice

<q(tlttf: af tlft ~ttittb ~hdte
Jraslfi:ttghm. ~. <q. 2llgt~~

j;up~tnu

May 14, 1984

C HAMBE R S O F

J U S TI CE H ARR Y A . BLACK MU N

Re:

No. 82-1721, Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart

Dear Lewis:
I thought you might like to have the following trivia
called to your attention:
1.

Footnote 11 refers to "n. 11."

Should this be "6"?

2.
Should the references to petitioners in the fifth
line of the paragraph beginning on page 4 and the fifth
line from the top of page 5 be, instead, to respondents?

Justice Powell

~nvrttttt

<ltltttrt cf t4t 'J'nitth ~taft.G'

Jia.G'ftittgtctt, !l. <It· 2llbi'*~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

May 15, 1984

No. 82-1721

Seattle Times Company v. Rhinehart

Dear Lewis,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference

82-1721 Seattle Times y, Rhinehart
Respondent Rhinehart is the founder of the
~~

respondent Aquarian Foundationr an

~orthodox

religion with

"

a limited membership in the State of Washington.

Petitionersr~the Seattle Times and the Walla Walla Union
Bulletin

r/ published

about respondents.

several less-than-complimentary stories
They brought this defamation suit in a

Washington state courtr l seeking damages for allegedly
libelous statements in these articles.
In the course of extensive pretrial discoveryr
petitioner newspapers sought production of various financial
~J'
record, ;ei ~aapaaieft~Sr including lists o~ members and
donors.

The trial court ordered respondents to turn over

the requested information.
Arguing that information as to members and donors
1'\

would violate First Amendment rights of privacy and

association ~respondents

requested the court to issue a

protective order enjoining the newspapers from disseminating
this

-/1.-6.-/- LP-d--t...J

information ~gained

only through pretrial discovery.

The trial courtr acting pursuant to its rules of
~

civil proceduresl that are similar to the federal rules ~
issued such a protective order.

- ---- -..

- - ---

--

-- ~

on the ground that it violated their
...___ First Amendment rights •
Both the state trial court and supreme court rejected this
argument.
They emphasized that the purpose of discovery is
limited to the needs of parties to prepare fo~and try the
case.

The rules that authorize discovery expressly

providj~, upon a showing of good cause,~for a protective
order against its use for nontrial purposes.
We affim the decision of the Washington Supreme
Court.

We hold that where,~as in this case ~ a protective

order is entered on a showing of good

caus~

limited to

the context of pretrial civil discovery,J'and does not
restrict the dissemination of the information if gained from
other sources,j the
Allendment.

orde~ does not offend the First

~~~

~J} l k ~~iv~d~,j~
Aeeer~ingly, the i•~~meB~ is affiraa~Justice

Brennan has filed a c6ncurring opinion in which Justice
Marshall joins.
Our decision is unanimous.

~.

82-1721 Seattle Times v. Rhinehart (Rob)
LFP for the Court 3/5/84
1st draft 4/24/84
2nd draft 5/4/84
3rd draft 5/15/84
Joined by BRW 4/25/84
Joined by WHR 4/26/84
Joined by CJ 5/2/84
Joined by WJB 5/4/84
Joined by JPS 5/7/84
Joined by HAB 5/14/84
Joined by SOC 5/15/84
WJB concurring
1st draft 5/9/84
Joined by TM 5/9/84
Copy to Mr. Lind 5/4/84

THE WASHINGTON POST

~Supreme Court .

: Restrains Press
. In Some Cases
By Fred Barbash
WuhlnC'On Paalllalf Wrller

The Supreme Court, in a tint-ofits-kind decision, 118id yesterday that
· in IIOble circumstances judpe can
. bar the prel!8 from publiehinc certain .
· information.
In a unanimous ruling, the court
uid a judge in Wuhington l&ate
acted properly when he ordered
'newspapers DOt to publish material!
:they bad obtained during pretrial
·;•discovery" proceedings in a libel
IUit against them.
· · The decision appi'OYel a form of
-prior restraint" 011 the preae, IOIDe. thing the court bad repeatedly re. jected u a violation of Fint Amendment free-speech and free-press
' 1U8f8Dtee&.
: But the ruling applies ooly in Dar. lC'/11 circumstances, where the prell8
: il a party in a civihuit ad obtains
information through tbe discoYery
process. In this situation, eaid Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. writing for
the court, trial judges have -.obrt.antial latitude" to protect the privacy
of other litigants by barrinc publication.
First Amendment lawyers sugpsted yesterday that the ruling foreshadows an increase in -pg orders"
barring lawyers and other participants in civil or criminal CMeB from
lpe8king with nporterL h alao
weakens one deterrent to b'bel IUits
· that news organizatioDB have come
to rely on, the fear of additional embarrassing publicity.
.
In aDOther c:aae affecting lCC88 to
lee COUJT, A7, Cel. 1

\.

"'

High Court Restricts Publication
Of Information in Certain Cases

tice Thurgood Marshall, concurred in the opjnion
COURT, From AI
the judicial Byltem )Wterday, the court ruled but wrote leJ)8rately, explaining that the ruling
unanimously that pretrial proceedings in criminal . "recognizes that pretrial protective. orders,, designed to limit the dissemination of information
CIIMl8 .hould not pnerally be cloeed to the public
when the defendant wants them open. The ruling, pined through the civil dilcovery process, are
one in a aeries over the peat few yem opening up subject to ecrutiny under the Firat Amendment."
·The aecond press-related case yesterday, Waller
criminal proceediDp, ca~ts further doubt on the
court'• controvenial 1979 decision allowing the u. Georgio., ltemmed from a decision by a ·Georgia
judge to keep the press and public out of. beardoeure of aome pretrial hearings. ·
The prior restraint case, Seattle Times Co. v. ing on the admissibility of Wiietap evidence in a
RhiMhart, originated with a libel auit against The state gambling case, even though the defendant
Seattle Times and the Walla Walla Union-Bulle- wanted an open bearing.
Powell, writing for the court, said ·such "suptin brought by Keith Milton Rhinehart, leader of
a religious group calJed the Aquarian Foundation. pression" bearings are often • important to the
Rhinehart, described in the opinion • the chief criminal justice system as the trial. Some cases
*medium" for 'tbti organization, which believes in end after the hearing, he said.
In addition, auppression hearings ·frequently
communication with the dead, charged the news
organizations with publishing false and damaging attack ~ conduct of police and prosecutor
articles about him and his group. Other members .... The public in general h• a strong interest in
exposing IUbltantial allegations of police misconof the f()Undation aJao sued.
·
Over · Rhinehart's objections, the trial judge duct to the aalutary effects of public acrutiny."
·The Silth Amendment right to a public trial
eompelled the foundation to tum over to the opposing Bide a list of ita donors and the amounts of requires that any decision to dose "'UCh a hearing
donations. But the judge also iBiued a -protective must be carefully justified, he Baid. In this case,
order" barring the D8WB orpnizationl from pub- Powell uid the judge's order wu too broad and
lishing or otherwise using the data except to pre- too vague. It failed specifically to justify the reaIOns for closing the hearing and did not consider
pare for the trial.
The judge acted after the f~tion uid pub- alternatives. In addition, he 118id, the judge cloeed
liaation would subject ita members to harassment the entire aeven-day hearing even though less
and nprisals. .The judge Will t.lld that members than 21tl hours were devoted to the tapes.
The court ruled in 1979 (Gannett Co. v. DePasbad already received anonymous letters and telequale)
that the press and public could be kept out
phone cills, aome threatenillg 'phyaical harm.
of
pretrial
proceedings with the agreement nf the
Powell, upholding the Washington Supreme
Court, said that the "unique character of the dis- defendant. In 1980, however, it ruled that trials
Covery process" requires judges to have broad dis- should generally be open. This year) it eaid jury
cretion to issue such orders on a showing of "good eelection also should generally be open.
While ·the Gannett ruling baa BOt been over·
c:auae" by a party in a civil BUit. No •exacting First
ruled, it has been eeverely weakened.
Amendment ecrutiny" is required, he uid.
The U.S. Court of Appeals here now is considParties in civil cases are allowed vut 8Cal88 to
ering
a protective order imposed on material obinformation about the other tide through the distained
by The Washington Poet while defending
covery proce88, Powell uid. The courts need au·
i
taelf
in
a libel proceeding brought by Mobil Oil
thority to prevent abuees of the information, parCo.
President
William P. Tavoulareas.
ticularly information that "'if publicly released
could be damaging to reputation and privacy. The ,,....- - - - - - - . . . - - - - - - - - tovemment deaTly has a ~bstantial interest in
. preventing this aort of abuse of its pl'OC888es."
Powell said this was not a "classic" prior restraint and did not raise the •specter of govern- ·
ment censorship" that is inVolved in f!Ome cases.
The newspapers .would never have had access to
the information but -for t'he ·discovery process, he
. ,Bilid. No traditional right of "access" to the information e1ists, he added. Al!w, a news organization
is ~ to publish the material if it obtains it somewhere else, he BSid.
.
Justice William J. Brennan· Jr., joined by Jus-

' In Jnt:pari.ng Ul c: ll

HIGH COURT BACKS

TRIAL DATA CURB

------'
Unanimously Says Judge May
Forbid Pretrial Disclosure .. ~.
''
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WASHINGTON; =May'21 ;_IThe· su-·· ·.
preme Court ruled unanimously today ·
.. that~es to !l c!Y!!_ ~a:~'I'S!!i~;Jn9uding
·news organizations, may be barred from disclosing information obtained
~ from· the Other side before the trial.
"-•
- •. ... .... -··· ·- ~
The decision dealt with pretrial discovery, the process bywhiclieach_-sidein a civil lawsuit builds its case by obtainirig ·relevant dcX:Uinents· ·arid other
· material · from )the · other ·side: Ordl- ' .
narily' suCh ·infrii:niation ·can be. made ' public by' either party. But if it is highly·.
sensitive, one side often -asks the trial
judge to issue a "protective order'J for- ·
bidding pretrial disclosure of the material:. · .:· , ; ·_ ' , :·.: ..·:: ·. ; ... ~· ~ .., · ·
Under the rules governing civil trials
in the Federal courts and most state
courts, the trial judge must have "good
cause'.' for granting a party's request .
for a Protective order. · .· Courts ·a round the cotintry have been
split over the extent to which such protective orders impinge on the free
speech and free press rights that the
parties could ordinarily exercise under
the First Amendment. .
Issue of •Prior Restraint• ·
The question is particularly acute
when, as in the case-decided today, one
of the parties is a news organization,
typically a defendant in a libel suit. The
press bas frequently argued that the
protective order is a "prior restraint,"
which under the Supreme Court's First '
Amendment precedents . is _presumptively unconstitutional. ·
·
In a second decision, also unanimous, the Court ruled that a criminal
defendant may in most cases insist that '
a pretrial bearing be open to the public
and the press, despite a prosecution request to conduct the bearing behind
closed doors.
.
.
· The second fu1ing was-based on the
Sixth Amendment, which guarantees a
criminal defendant's right to a "speedy
and public trial." The decision did not
overrule earlier Silpreme Court rulings
under which the press has no independent right to attend a bearing if the. defendant objects.
The pretrial discovery case before
the Court was an a ppeal by two Washington state nev.'Sp3.pers, The Seattle
Tunes and The 'W:.lla Walla UnionLu.ii.:;•W, irom a dl·cision by the Suprerr.J C o~rt of was:un:;wa . That CC:!rt
h:!1 u;lhelc.i a prote-ctive order issu_J L-1
a lll ~l C:.'.S'=: bro"J"'.L arainst th~ t'' o
p:-r-:::-~ by Ke:tb k!UJtui:lrt , t11~ le"'cier
of a :;mall r eligious sect, the_Aquarian
F our;dation.

_, ,

ll~.l

dllca:....-, the

newEnpcrs 6ou&ht and n.-cctr<'<~ n:1 or:;
der mpelllng Mr. Rhlnchnrt to sup-.
t l ·ply
formation about the foundation's
ftnancial affairs, donors 1md members.
Mr. Rhinehart asserted thnt public re. lease of the information would subject
his membefs:·to Mrnsment, and the
·· · trialfjudge.isSued an order barring the ,
newfWapers from publlshine the information ~ making it available . to any
:, 'other news ·ol'ganizations.
I
• •
'
· The order applied 9flly to information · obtained through the discovery
, , process, with the newspapers remain, ·· ing free to print .t he information if they
· :. c).btalned it independently; · ·:. · - · ·
. .. '. ' The libel suit has not yet gone to trial.
· The protective order . will no longer
) ,. , apply to whatever portion of the material is eventually introduced as evi,: ·.. ~ence . . .-~,· ;·
·''·· , ... · · ..
The papers appealed on the ground
that a court order limiting expression
could be based only on a ."compelling
governmental interest" which, they
argued, bad not been shown. The Washington high Court rejected the argument, and the Supreme Court today upheld that decision. ..
··
Writing for the Court today, Associate Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. said,
"An order prohibiting dissemination of
discovered information before trial is
not the kind of classic prior restraint
·that requires exacting First Amendment scrutiny."
·

j

'·

<··

-

Powell ExplaiDs Decision
Justice Powell said, "A litigant has
no First Amendment right of access to
information made available only for
purposes of trying his suit." Pretrial
discovery, he said, is not "a tradition-

~1g~b~~~':v~f ~~~~~~t 1~

tude" to issue orders Ilmiting the release of potentially damaging information.
The opinion, Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, No. 82-1721, nevertheless qualified the trial judge's discretion to some
degree. The judge must have "good
cause" to issue the protective order tn
the first place, Justice Powell said. He
also noted that the newspapers would
be free to print any information that
was introduced as evidence at trial, as
·well as any information they obtained
· :by other means ..:In··those circu.ni. stances; he said, the order "does not of, fend the First Amendment."
The Court did not addresS the consequences of defying a protective order,
but presumably the discloser of the in-,
formation would be held in contempt.
The second decision today was a
criminal appeal from a decision of the
Supreme Court of Georgia by two men
convicted of commercial gambling.·
Before trial, they cballenged the admissibility of the state's wiretap evidence. The judge ordered a pretrial
bearing and granted the prosecutor's
request to close the proceeding on the
ground that the tapes to be played in
court might implicate other people.
The tapes were played for two hours of
the seven-day bearing.

.....

,I
1

;-.·~~ - ~; !~
: ·,

._ _

... _ _·

- - --

-

-

.if there is an "overriding·interest" in
clasure/ if the "closure is as limited as
possible, and if there are no reasonable
alternatives. .
·
· The practical significance of the ruling is likely to be .limited, because defendants are usually satisfied to keep
pretrial hearings closed. The more
typical situation involves a request by
the press for access to a hearing that
both the prosecution and defense are

.~~~,;·r ·, ; -~~-:·-,T ~~-: ··;::~ ·-~ .· ··~ - '.- . :··· ··- -·.·.. ' .
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or Burgundy.
~
9n the Sixth Floor,
·seeking to close.
:
Lord & Ta ylor,
The Court addressed that situation in '
h
Avenue--(212)
391-1199
Fift
a 1979 decision, Garmett v. De PasAnd at Manhass e t,
quale, in which it held that the press
Wes tchester, Garden Cit y,
does not have an independen t First
Am ::ndment right of acce:.;:; to a preMill burn,
trial hearing. The followinn year, ~I
Ridgewood-Para
mu s
Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia , the
and Stamford .
Court ruled that the First Amendment
d<X!:; ordinarily give the public and the
press a right to attend the trial itself. ,
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June 27, 1984

Hon. Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Associate Justice
Supreme Court of the United States
washington, D.C. 20543
Dear Lewis:

v.
Particularly impressive is the fact that
in each instance your opinion commanded the support
of the entire Court.
I hope that a few days hence your Court
will be in recess and you and Mrs. Powell will be
able to take a well-earned holiday.
Sincerely,

* I have to confess that I've only read Seattle
Times and Waller within the past few days, notwlthstanding that they were handed down over a month
ago.
Let me assure you that this signifies no
disinterest in your Court's work product - quite
the contrary; the volume of opinions emanating from
your Court is, however, awesome, and absorbing them
is a substantial job for a slow reader like me.

9106

April 11, 1984
SEAT GINA-POW

82-1721

Seattle Times

Rider A, page 16
Rule 26(b) (1), by its terms, provides that a

par ~~

tain [any information not privileged] "which is r-elati-r.Je to

"

the subject matter involved in the pending action ••• ".

It

further provides that discovery is not limited to matters
~

that will admissible at trial so long as the information
A.

sought "appears rasonably calculated to lead to · the discovery of admissible evidence." Wash. Super. Ct. C.R. 26(b) (1)

~

April 11, 1984

---

SEAT2 GINA-POW
82-1721

Seattle Times

Rider A, page 18

If a litigant fails to comply with a request for discovery,
the Court may issue an order directing compliance that is
enforceable by the Court's contempt powers.

Wash. Super.

Ct. R. 37(b)*

*In addition,
f1D its contempt power, Rule 37(b} (2) authorizes a trial court to enforce an order compelling discovery
by other means including, for example, regarding designated
facts as taken to be established for purposes of the action.
Cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 37(b)2.

~-

lfp/ss 04/12/84

Rider A, p. 21 (Seattle)

SEA21A SALLY-POW
Note to Rob:

This is an effort to summarize the

substances of pp. 21-25:
In Miller v. California, 43

u.s.

15, 23 (1973), we

observed that "[f]reedom of speech • • • does not
comprehend the right to speak on any subject at any time."
Obscenity was held not to be protected.
Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339

u.s.

See also American
382, 394 (1950).

There are "certain well defined and narrowly limited
classes of speech whose benefit to society is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order".

Included

among unprotected speech are utterances that are likely to
cause breaches of the peace and fighting words.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315

u.s.

See

568, 572-573 (1942)

~

2.

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395

u.s.

444, 447 (1969).

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418

u.s.

And in

323, 340 (1974) we

recognized the absence of any social interest in
falsehoods.

More recently, the Court also has held that

certain kinds of commercial speech are entitled only

totimited First Amendment protection.

See Central Hudson

Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447

u.s.

557, 562-563 (1980).
We think it clear, however, that information

obtained through civil discovery authorized by modern
Rules of Civil Procedure may be information protected by
the First Amendment.

Indeed, we do not doubt that only

rarely would such information fall within the classes of
unprotected speech identified by decisions of this Court.
In this case, as petitioners argue, there certainly is a

3.

public interest in knowing more about respondents
Rhinehart and the Aquarian Foundation.

This interest may

well include most - and possibly all - of what has been
discovered as a result of the Court's order under Rule
26(b) (l).

The critical question therefore

bec~mes:

whether the Court's protective order issued under Rule
26(c) is an invalid restraint on that speech.

This

requires us to decide whether the "practice in question
[furthers] an important or substantial governmental
interest unrelated to the suppression of expression" and
whether "the limitation of First Amendment freedoms [is]
no

grea~er

than is necessary or essential to the

protection of the particular governmental interest
involved."

Procunier v. Martinez, 416

u.s.

396, 413

4.

{1974); see Brown v. Glines, 444
Buckley v. Valeo, 424

u.s.

u.s.

348., 354-355 {1980);

1, 25 {1976).

In considering this question it is important to
bear in mind that the information at issue became
available to petitioners only by virtue of the Court's
order under Rule 26{b) {1), an order issued in the Court's
discretion.

A litigant has no First Amendment right of

access to information sought for purposes of trying his
suit.

Rule 26{b) {1) is a matter of legislative grace.

lfp/ss 04/12/84

Rider A, p. 29 (Seattle)

SEA29A SALLY-POW
The rules at issue enable parties to litigation
to obtain information "relevant to the subject matter
involved" that they believe will be helpful in the
preparation and trial of the case, including the narrowing
of the issues in dispute.
viewed in its entirety.

Rule 26, however, must be
Because of the liberality of

pretrial discovery permitted by Rule 26(b) (1), it is
necessary for the trial court to have the authority to
issue protective orders conferred by Rule 26(c).

It is

clear from experience that pretrial discovery by
depositions and interrogatories has a significant
potential for abuse.

This is not limited to matters of

delay and expense: discovery also may seriously implicate

2.

the privacy of persons and other parties.

The Rules do

not distinguish between public and private information.
Nor do they apply only to parties to the litigation;
relevant information in the hands of third parties may be
subject to discovery.

There is an opportunity, therefore,

for litigants to obtain - negligently or purposefully information that in fact not only is irrelevant but if

~
privacy.

released would be damaging to reputation and
The government interest in preventing abuse of

its processes therefore is substantia1. 23
Lando, supra, at 176-177.

~~le

26(c)

See Herbert v.

includes among its

express purpose the protection of a "party or person from
anoyance, embarrassment oppression or undue burden or
expense • • • "

Although the Rule contains no specific

reference to privacy or to other rights or interests that

3.

may be implicated, there can be no doubt that such matters
are within the broad purpose of the Rule.

As stated by

Judge Friendly in International Products Co. v. Koons, 325
F.2d 403, 407-408, "[w]hether or not the Rule itself
authorizes [a particular order] • • . we have no question
as to the court's jurisdiction to do this under the
inherent 'equitable powers of courts of law over their own
process, to prevent abuses, oppression, and injustices
I H

It is to be remembered, in this connection, that

government has provided expressly for liberal discovery
for the sole purposes of assisting in the settlement of

~

disputes~

use thereof for any other purpose may constitute

abuse.
The facts in this case, summarized in the margin
below, 24 illustrate the need for balancing the right to

4.

discover information against the correlative right of a
trial court to enter protective orders.

Only through such

~~~~~
orders may the rights
1\

~e

prot9cted of those who are

compelled - at the risk of being cited for contempt - to
produce information.

Moreover, as was emphasized in the

opinions of the courts below, persons otherwise would be
deterred from exercising the right of access to the courts
if protective orders were not available.

(Rob:

There are

some good quotes in the Supreme Court of Washington that
you might put in the text or in a footnote.

Also perhaps

your footnotes 25 and 26 also go in here somewhere citing
relevant cases).
In this case, the trial court's order allowing
discovery was extremely broad.

__,

As we noted, supta, at

it compelled respondents - among other things - to

5.

identify all persons who had made donations over a fiveyear period to Rhinehart and the Aquarian Foundation,
together with the amounts donated. In effect the order
would compel disclosure of membership as well as sources
of financial support.

Respondents' affidavits requesting

a protective order pointed out that public dissemination
of this information would violate their First Amendment
rights to privacy, freedom of religion, and freedom of
association, the trial court was persuaded - for the
reason well stated by it - that such an order was
necessary.*

*Here, Rob, I would simply make a cross reference back to
note 11 where you set forth provisions of the order.

6.

Both the trial court, and the washington Supreme
Court in its opinion affirming the entry of the protective
order, carefully weighed the competing interests.

The~oncluded

that the public interest - and particularly

the maintaining of fearless access to the courts required the restriction on public use or dissemination of
the information at
the identified governmental interests are substantial,
that they are unrelated to the suppression of speech: and
that in the circumstances of this case the limitation of
petitioner's First Amendment was no greater than
reasonably necessary to protect the governmental
interests.

See Procunier v. Martinez, supra, at 413:

Brown v. Glines, supra, at 354-355: Buckley v. Valeo,
supra, at 25.

(Rob:

You will note that I have tempered

7.

the language of Procunier by use of the word "reasonably".
Take a look at the language in each of the three cases
cited.

It may not be helpful to cite them again at this

particular point.)

v
We hold that the provision for protective orders
contained in washington Super. Ct. R. 26(c) does not
violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and that the
protective order issued in this case was a proper one
under this Rule.
Affirmed

The judgment accordingly is

lfp/ss 04/12/84

Rider A, p. 29 (Seattle)

SEA29 SALLY-POW
Rob:

Should we not add a footnote at the point indicated

on page 29:
It may be acknowleged that the civil rules of
discovery, first adopted in 1938 for federal courts, have

.
not uniformly furthered the interests of speedy and
inexpensive resolution of disputes.

The disappointment in

this respect does not, however, imply any lessening of the
governmental interest and purpose.

1·

I
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SEA21A SALLY-POW
Note to Rob:

This is an effort to summarize the

substances of pp. 21-25:
In Miller v. California, 43

u.s.

15, 23 (1973), we

observed that "[f]reedom of speech • • . does not
comprehend the right to speak on any subject at any time."
Obscenity was held not to be protected.
Communications Assn. v. Douds,_ 339

u.s.

See also American
382, 394 (1950).

There are "certain well defined and narrowly limited
classes of speech whose benefit to society is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order".

Included

among unprotected speech are utterances that are likely to
cause breaches of the peace and fighting words.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315

u.s.

See

568, 572-573 (1942);

2.

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395

u.s.

444, 447 (1969).

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418

u.s.

And in

323, 340 (1974) we

recognized the absence of any social interest in
falsehoods.

More recently, the Court also has held that

certain kinds of commercial speech are entitled only
tolimited First Amendment protection.

See Central Hudson

Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447

u.s.

557, 562-563 (1980).
We think it clear, however, that information

obtained through civil discovery authorized by modern
Rules of Civil Procedure may be information protected by
the First Amendment.

Indeed, we do not doubt that only

rarely would such information fall within the classes of
unprotected speech identified by decisions of this Court.
In this case, as petitioners argue, there certainly is a

3.

public interest in knowing more about respondents
Rhinehart and the Aquarian Foundation.

This interest may

well include most - and possibly all - of what has been
discovered as a result of the Court's order under Rule
26(b) (1).

The critical question therefore becaomes:

whether the Court's protective order issued under Rule
26(c)

is an invalid restraint on that speech.

This

requires us to decide whether the "practice in question
[furthers] an important or substantial governmental
interest unrelated to the suppression of expression" and
whether "the limitation of First Amendment freedoms [is]
no greather than is necessary or essential to the
protection of the particular governmental interest
involved."

Procunier v. Martinez, 416

u.s.

396, 413

4.

(1974}: see Brown v. Glines, 444
Buckley v. Valeo, 424

u.s. 348, 354-355 (1980}:

u.s. 1, 25 (1976}.

In considering this question it is important to
bear in mind that the information at issue became
available to petitioners only by virtue of the Court's
order under Rule 26 (b) ( 1} , an order issued in the Court's
discretion.

A litigant has no First Amendment right of

access to information sought for purposes of trying his
suit.

Rule 26(b} (1} is a matter of legislative grace.

lfp/ss 04/12/84
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SEA29A SALLY-POW
The rules at issue enable parties to litigation
to obtain information "relevant to the subject matter
involved" that they believe will be helpful in the
preparation and trial of the case, including the narrowing
of the issues in dispute.
viewed in its entirety.

Rule 26, however, must be
Because of the liberality of

pretrial discovery permitted by Rule 26(b) (1), it is
necessary for the trial court to have the authority to
issue protective orders conferred by Rule 26(c).

It is

clear from experience that pretrial discovery by
depositions and interrogatories has a significant
potential for abuse.

This is not limited to matters of

delay and expense; discovery also may seriously implicate

2.

the privacy of persons and other parties.

The Rules do

not distinguish between public and private information.
Nor do they apply only to parties to the litigation:
relevant information in the hands of third parties may be
subject to discovery.

There is an opportunity, therefore,

for litigants to obtain - negligently or purposefully information that in fact not only is irrelevant but if
publicity released would be damaging to reputation and
privacy.

The government interest in preventing abuse of

its processes therefore is substantia1. 23
Lando, supra, at 176-177.

See Herbert v.

Rule 26(c) includes among its

express purpose the protection of a "party or person from
anoyance, embarrassment oppression or undue burden or
expense • • • "

Although the Rule contains no specific

reference to privacy or to other rights or interests that

3.

may be implicated, there can be no doubt that such matters
are within the broad purpose of the Rule.

As stated by

Judge Friendly in International Products Co. v. Koons, 325
F.2d 403, 407-408, "[w]hether or not the Rule itself
authorizes [a particular order] • • • we have no question
as to the court's jurisdiction to do this under the
inherent 'equitable powers of courts of law over their own
process, to prevent abuses, oppression, and injustices
I H

It is to be remembered, in this connection, that

government has provided expressly for liberal discovery
for the sole purposes of assisting in the settlement of
disputes; use thereof for any other purpose may constitute
abuse.
The facts in this case, summarized in the margin
below, 24 illustrate the need for balancing the right to

4.

discover information against the correlative right of a
trial court to enter protective orders.

Only through such

orders may the rights be protected of those who are
compelled - at the risk of being cited for contempt - to
produce information.

Moreover, as was emphasized in the

opinions of the courts below, persons otherwise would be
deterred from exercising the right of access to the courts
if protective orders were not available.

{Rob:

There are

some good quotes in the Supreme Court of Washington that
you might put in the text or in a footnote.

Also perhaps

your footnotes 25 and 26 also go in here somewhere citing
relevant cases).
In this case, the trial court's order allowing
discovery was extremely broad.

---'

As we noted, supta, at

it compelled respondents - among other things - to

5.

identify all persons who had made donations over a fiveyear period to Rhinehart and the Aquarian Foundation,
together with the amounts donated. In effect the order
would compel disclosure of membership as well as sources
of financial support.

Respondents' affidavits requesting

a protective order pointed out that public dissemination
of this information would violate their First Amendment
rights to privacy, freedom of religion, and freedom of
association, the trial court was persuaded - for the
reason well stated by it - that such an order was
necessary.*

*Here, Rob, I would simply make a cross reference back to
note 11 where you set forth provisions of the order.

6.

Both the trial court, and the Washington Supreme
Court in its opinion affirming the entry of the protective
order, carefully weighed the competing interests.
Theyconcluded that the public interest - and particularly
the maintaining of fearless access to the courts required the restriction on public use or dissemination of
the information at issue prior to trial.

We agree that

the identified governmental interests are substantial,
that they are unrelated to the suppression of speech; and
that in the circumstances of this case the limitation of
petitioner's First Amendment was no greater than
reasonably necessary to protect the governmental
interests.

See Procunier v. Martinez, supra, at 413;

Brown v. Glines, supra, at 354-355; Buckley v. Valeo,
supra, at 25.

(Rob:

You will note that I have tempered

7.

the language of Procunier by use of the word "reasonably".
Take a look at the language in each of the three cases
cited.

It may not be helpful to cite them again at this

particular point.)

v
We hold that the provision for protective orders
contained in Washington Super. Ct. R. 26(c) does not
violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and that the
protective order issued in this case was a proper one
under this Rule.
Affirmed

The judgment accordingly is

lfp/ss 04/12/84

Rider A, p. 21 (Seattle)

SEA21 SALLY-POW
If we conclude that this information is protected, we must
decide whether Rule 26(b) -conferring broad discretion on
a trial court to restrict dissemination of discovered
information - is justified by a sufficient state interest.

lfp/ss 04/12/84

Rider A, p. 21 (Seattle)

SEA21 SALLY-POW
If we conclude that this information is protected, we must
decide whether Rule 26(b) -conferring broad discretion on
a trial court to restrict dissemination of discovered
information - is justified by a sufficient state interest.

lfp/ss 04/19/84

Rider A, p. 24 (Seattle)

SEA24 SALLY-POW
The legislature of the State of Washington, following the
example of the Congress in its approval of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, has determined that such
discretion is necessary, and we find no reason to
disagree.

Rob:

The remainder of page 24 that I have circled in

pencil seems unnecessary, and I would omit it.

If the

Fed. Supp. case cited in footnote 23 is helpful on the
point for which you cite it, you could simply leave the
footnote in and add its holding stated as you have in the
text.

lfp/ss 04/19/84
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Respondents' affidavits requesting a protective order
persuaded the courts below that public dissemination of
this information could violate their First Amendment
rights to private, freedom of religion and association.
~e trial court was persuaded -

for reasons well stated by

it - that such an order was necessary to protect the
arguable rights of respondents, and also to insure that
the availability of liberal discovery does not deter
access to the courts.

24

We need not, of course, decide

whether any constitutional rights of respondents would
have been violated.

It is sufficient for purposes of our

decision to agree - as we do - that the Supreme Court of
the State of Washington correctly tound no abuse of

2.

discretion by the trial court.

We also hold that the

protective order at issue in this case does not violate
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

The judgment

accordingly is
Affirmed

Rob:

We should be careful not to say or imply that

respondents' asserted constitutional rights exist or are
valid.

The "right of privacy" for example - as Joe will

tell you in connection with the Jaycee case - has never
been defined broadly.

Also the limits of the right of

association remain vague.

As you take one final look at

the draft before having it printed, bear these thoughts in
mind.

It is important not to say too much.
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Rob:

The following may be helpful in n. 21, p. 14:

In Herbert v. Lando, supra, at 176, the Court
observed:

"[T]here have been repeated expressions of

concern about undue and uncontrolled discovery, and voices
from this Court have joined the chorus." (citations
omitted).

But until and unless there are major changes in

the present Rules of Civil Procedure, reliance must be had
on what in fact and in law are ample powers of the
district judge to prevent abuse."
supra, at 176,
concurring).

177~

Herbert v. Lando,

see also id., at 179 (Powell, J.,

But abuses of the Rules by litigants, and

sometimes the inadequate overight of discovery by trial

2.

courts, do not in any respect lessen the importance of the
purpose of the Rules and the government's substantial
interest.

lfp/ss 05/01/84

Seattle Times
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.....
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u

4.4·

We hold that the protective order , at d=Fws ue does
1\

not offend the First Amendment.

It was entered by the trial

court upon a showing that constituted good cause as required
by Rule 23(c), and also is limited to the context of
~.

pretrial civil discovery.

Moreover

c

J-t-_~

4--1; does Pl'e"t restrict
"-

~

dissemination if the information were gained from other
sources.

~

<"'tlf--1.{
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Rob:

The following may be helpful in n. 21, p. 14:

~

In Herbert v. Lando, supra, at 176, the Court
observed:

"[T]here have been repeated expressions of

concern about undue and uncontrolled discovery, and voices
from this Court have joined the
omitted).

chorus ~citations

-ut until and unless there are major changes in

the present Rules of Civil Procedure, reliance must be had
on what in fact and in law are ample powers of the
district judge to prevent abuse."

Herbert· v. Lando,

supra, at 176, 177; see also id., at 179 (Powell, J.,
concurring).~

But abuses of the Rules by litigants, and
J

sometimes the inadequate overight of discovery by trial
A

2.

courts, do not in any respect lessen the importance of the
purpose of the Rules and the government's substantial
interest.

lfp/rmc
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The affidavits detailed a series of letters and telephone calls
defaming the Foundation, its members, and Rhinehart--including
several that threatened physical harm to those associated with
the Foundation.

The affiants also described incidents at the

Foundation's headquarters involving attacks, threats, and
assaults directed at Foundation members by anonymous individuals
and groups.

In general, the affidavits averred that public

release of the donor lists would adversely afect Foundation
membership and income and would subject its members to additional
harrassment and reprisals.

INSERT 1
The affidavits detailed a series of letters and telephone calls
defaming the Foundation, its members, and Rhinehart--including
several that threatened physical harm to those associated with
the Foundation.
The affiants also described incidents at the
Foundation's headquarters involving attacks, threats, and
assaults directed at Foundation members b anon mous individuals
and rou s.
n
ra , the affidavits averred t at pu 1
e ease o the donor lists would adversely a~ct Foundation
~
membership and income and would subject
members to additional
harrassment and reprisals.

INSERT 2

'-JJ!_tJ s:

In Herbert v.
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Lando, ~: ~l7./

the Court observed:

"[T]here have been repeated expressions of concern about
undue and uncontrolled discovery, and voices from this
Court have joined the chor ~ "
_(t/
~until

(c ~; ations
•, I

omitted).

But

'

and unless there are major changes in the present

Rules of Civil Procedure, reliance must be had on what in
fact and in law are ample

the district judge to
a_;;l-

prevent abuse."
also id., at 179 (Powell, J., concurring).
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But abuses of

the Rules by litigants, and sometimes the inadequate
ove ~ ight

of discovery by trial courts, do not in any
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interest~
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MEMORANDUM
To: Justice Powell
From: Rob
Date: May 10, 1984
Re: Justice Rehnquist's letter in Seattle Times

I suggest that we substitute the following for our holding on
page 16 in Seattle Times v. Rhinehart:

We therefore hold that where, as in this case, a
protective order is entered on a showing of good cause,
is limited to the context of pretrial civil discovery,
and does not restrict the dissemination of the
information if gained from other sources, it does not
offend the First Amendment.l!/

rmc 04/10/84

..ef.~

The Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart
No. 82-1721
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

/

This case presents the issue whether parties to civil litigation have a First Amendment right to disseminate,

in advance of

trial, information gained through the pretrial discovery process.
I

Respondent Rhinehart is the spiritual leader of a religious

group,

the Aquarian Foundation.

The Foundation has fewer tha" j (

1,000 members, most of whom are located in the State of WashingAquarian beliefs include life after death and the ability
to communicate with the dead through a medium.

Rhinehart is the

primary Aquarian medium.
Over the years, the Seattle Times and the Walla Walla UnionBulletin have published stories about Rhinehart and the Founda\\

tion.
one

Altogether

articlQ

iR

~

tl::le

{\~S~dwfa.v'S
articles appeared in the seatt e-~imes and

UnioR-J3nllQt~

during

the years 1973,

1978,

page 2.

The

1979.

Rhinehart

five

and

the

They

described

paid

him

to

C..~,. stones •

'I'\

t!+le

...-raised
bat

put

them

articles

that had been

RrswspapQr

'"1fla§ioal

manner

seances

The

friends.

articles

accounts,

powers,

~e

s~abs;;tantial

that moM-of

~articles

that

appeared

in which

conducted
in

touch

also

by

the

Rhinehart

with

on

Foundation.

in which

deceased
that

focused

people

relatives

Rhinehart

had

and
sold

from his body.

Rhinehart

claimed

areieles also

amounts of

1973

he operated

stated

"expelled"

in

iFRpliog

income

thQ

otm~es

tl=tat

possessed

Rl:linehar:~

l:lad

in the Foundation's name,

the money had gone to Rhinehart.

One of the

referred to Rhinehart's conviction, later vacated,

for sodomy.
The four

articles that appeared

in 1978 concentrated on an

"extravaganza"

sponsored by Rhinehart at the Walla Walla State

Penitentiary.

The articles stated that Rhinehart treated 1,100

inmates to a 6-hour-long show, during which he gave away between
$35,000 and $50,000 in cash and prizes" t6 vario~o iAmate~a

ng-

page 3.

d'ur iu~

~

the snow, sometimes grassing as a man, e:l'te soJAQt iroes as ._
Another part of the prison show described in the arti-

cles was a "chorus line of girls [who] shed their gowns and bikinis and sang ... "

App. 25a.

Some of the articles referred again

to Rhinehart's sodomy conviction.
Two articles appeared

in 1979.

The articles

referred

to a

purported connection between Rhinehart and Lou Ferrigno, star of
the popular television program, "The Incredible Hulk."
to

the

articles,

Rhinehart.
Ferrigno,

The

Ferrigno once had served as a
articles

quoted

in which he denied any

telephone

According

body guard for

conversations

with

involvement with the Aquarian

Foundation and expressed a distrust of Rhinehart.
II

in_a false

li~,

~~-6

the

Rhinehart brought

of the articles
anatomy of both sexes
half way with

------------------

n behalf of him-
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self and the Foundation against the Seattle Times, the Walla Walla Union-Bulletin, the authors of the articles and their spouses.
Five female members of the Foundation who had participated in the
presentation at the penitentiary joined the suit as plaintiffs. 2
The complaint alleges that the articles contained statements that
were "fictional and untrue" and that the defendants--petitioners
here--knew, or should have known, of the' falsehoods.
to the complaint,
[Rhinehart]

According

the articles "did and were calculated to hold

up to public scorn, hatred and ridicule, and to im-

peach his honesty, integrity, virtue, religious philosophy, reputation as a person and in his profession as a spiritual leader."
App. 8a.

~

With respect to the Foundation, the complaint states:
"'\

tend to interfere
[the Foundation's] activities by prejudicing it in
--~--~public estimation.
Such communications tend to disparreligious corporation and the conduct of its
activities and thus to obstruct the accom ·
~QT]
i
te
ur oses.
In addition
the articles
have, or may have had, the effect of disc~uraging contributions by the membership and public and thereby
diminished the financial ability of the Foundation to
2

The record is unclear as to whether all five of the
female plaintiffs participated
in the
"chorus line"
described in the 1978 articles.
The record also does not
disclose whether any of the
female plaintiffs were
mentioned by name in the articles.

page 5.

pursue its corporate purposes."

App. 9a.

described the chorus line t
complaint alleges that the article misrepresented the
role of the Foundation's "choir"

3

and :m.i•led

re~impq"ii
"'\
~

that female members of the Foundation had "stripped off all their
clothes and wantonly danced naked •••• "
the complaint continues,

App.

the article had caused al

bers of the Foundation to suffer

injury
embarrassment and

and damage, including

and mental anguish, and

3 The complaint states:
"In truth and fact, the women were not a chorus
line--they did not dance.
They were not wearing
gowns--they were part of a church choir and were
formally attired in church choir robes.
In a
subsequent part of the special presentation the
women members of the choir did wear bikinis-which were at no time removed." App. 6a.

~-<Jf~;s fem.....,....,e,.be.-s

complain~~

F<>u~<latien.

answe~ te

4

tae

'f;k,~

Q<>IIIPl;W.R~ den~

the allegations and assert~ affirmative defenses. 5
1\

duction

~iz.t,l~~~
eposing Rhinehart,
.

of

,.. Al' oi

Petitioners

"'

promptly M!Ml'f discovery by

1

The

$14,100,000 in damages for the alleged

defamation and invasions of privacy.
Peti tionersl filed--.

of tAe

documents

pertaining

Rhinehart and the Foundation, and

to

the

request~ pro-

financial

~ serv~

affairs

of

extensive interrogaRespondents

turned

a.

over

~

~

I

I

~ome

q , _!

~,

~J

documents,

including

several

of

4/&·~·u..

Although
the
complaint
does
not
allege
tha
the~
articles caused a decline in membership of the ~oundation,
.~pondent~s answers to defendants interrogatories raised
~his
issue.
In response to petitioners request that
respondent's
explain
the
damages
they
are
seeking,
responden£7s claimed that the Foundation had experienced a
drop in membership in Hawaii and Washington II from about
300 people to about 150 people, and [a] concurrent drop in
contributions." Record 503.

~ ........,.,}'
~

A

financial

4

lf.VJ-

~

~· c a t ea>t I ii:t ")f..uu· ~ ,..., v-1

5AJAoq_g

-thE

Affirm~t~:~defenses.., ":;.~!;t!:;{ pet!tie~ecs

l~~ ~ contentions t at the articles were substantially true

~r

7•

that tRQ -~~~Q•~s were privileged under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, and that the statute of
limitations had
run as
to the 1973 articles,
that
respondents had consented to any invasions of privacy, and
h
respondents had no reasonable expectation of privacy
performing before 1,100 prisoners.

(0 and accurate,

C

1-L..~
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Rhinehart's income tax returns.

~ ~-e.~~
re~l:il

disclose other
.
A
financial

Respondents refused, however, to

d information

&,
)

p ~ iHiari±y

petta.ining te

""

6
condition of --Rhi n.efl.a...t:.L.nCl t.h.e. Eou-Rdati-en. -

t~

R~on~

~~~~~

~ .al!! e.-£ eE-t:le-ed pe~oners '= £e'fl:il€~ for a li.-t/\of the Founda-

i./t;::L
tion's donors during the preceding 10 years J and a list of ail of>

~ members

Gf the

Petitioners

~t..jan

h

filed

..:r-f

during that period •

a motion

t.ltlGQl"

Waliib in.g~oA Supe-£ ior Co~u ~

s hiZt-.t ~.s·

~ Jl.lu_
1\ Rule 26 (b) (1)

ery.8

In

requesting i-esuarwe &f an order compelling discov-

thei~orand~

tftis metion, petition-

6 Rhinehart also refused to reveal the current address of
his residence.
He submitted an affidavit stating that he
had relocated out of fear for his safety and that
disclosure of his current address would subject him to
risks of bodily harm.
Petitioners promptly moved for an
order compelling Rhinehart to give his address and the
trial court granted the motion.
7 Respondents
objected
to
several
individual
interrogatories and requests for production on various
grounds,
such as relevancy,
overbreadth,
or general
inapplicability of the discovery rules.
To the extent
that respondents continues to assert these claims, they
are not at issue before this Court.
8cR 26(b) (1)1\ provides in full:
"In
General.
Parties
may
obtain discovery
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action, whether it relates to the claim
or defense of the party seeking discovery or to
the claim or defense of any other party,
Footnote continued on next page.

/

_,s
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~4-t..k~

ers recognized that the principal peii:tlt of contil:tltLoR betlitze'iR t ~

(J

~

co~erl"l~S-

- r - parM-eo

respondents

"refusal,i to permit any effective

"'\
inquiry into their financial affairs, such as the source of their
donations,

their financial transactions, uses of wealth and as-

sets and their financial condition in general."
spondents opposed the

~4.~·~

motion fO~ th ; g~
~

-1

tion of the

Record 350.
,..._

Re-

Jz-~P··~..,;...

that compelled produc-

identities of its donors and members would violate

the members' and donors' First Amendment rights to privacy, freedom of religion, and freedom of association.
Respondents also moved for a protective order preventing petitioners from disseminating any information gained through discovery.

Respondents

noted

that

petitioners

had

stated

their

LA-c..~
~

to continue publishing articles about respondents and this

including the existence, description, nature,
custody, condition and location of any books,
documents, or other tangible things and the
identity
and
location
of
persons
having
knowledge of any discoverable matter.
It is not
ground for objection that the information sought
will be
inadmissible at the
trial if the
information sought appears reasonably calculated
to
lead
to
the
discovery
of
admissible
evidence."

litigation,

and

their

intent to use

information gained through

discovery in those articles.

~

~

of the
impair

their

argued that the pu

information sought by the motion to compel would

rights of freedom of expression,

~~

of

freedom of reli-

associa~t~i~o~n~·~--------------------------~

In a lengthy letter ruling, the trial

cour ~he
l\

mo-

tion to compel and ordered respondents to identify all donors who
made contributions during the five years preceding the date of
(

the complaint, along with the amounts donated.

The

~1

court

also required petitioners to divulge enough membership information to substantiate any claims of diminished membership.

v~tf~~

~~~ ~.
v~).., ~v

Di
appeals

Rely-

c~urt~_ Qf~

·

·
Balkin, the federal
considered the question had~
~
~
Wl~Relolt e~:tb.st!-anYal dieeuseien that the First Amendment
//'Ill~
did not affect a trial court's authority to restrict
~~~~
dissemination of information produced during pretrial
'·~·rz-Y·
discovery.
See Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 536
~6
F. 2d 1001, 1006 (CA3 1976) ; International Paper Products
~
La
, '2
v. Koons, 325 F. 2d 403, 407-408 (CA2 1963).
~ Halkin
~~
Z5 ee1:1rt considered the issue iCR depth. Re§Qrri ng e tc a~
~
protective order as a "para igmatic prior restraint," efl-e
~
~c~~ dQ.tlii-rmiRes;l t t such qJ;Ae...rs require close
/
F~en<3Hient scrutiny.
The cour~d that before a
~
~
Footnote conti ed on next page.
that

had

,
9

'f!>

l

'

~ :dolu.. • ~11<

al-~~ .

/'•cdc

e.

tJI..

(~-~~

··r1!:t:HL"

l..L;

~-r~
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refused

to

issue

a

protective

order ., CQIJ e r: i~
Tbe

JI-

con~;t

!!-he ==i-n format i e e:J
stated

that

"""
facts

alleged

by

respondents

in support of

their motion

the

for~~
-1

~e

order

were

too

conclusory

to

warrant

"good cause" as required by Wash. Super. Ct.

c.

a

finding

R. 26(c} . 10

of
The

~

court should issue a protective order that restricts
expression, it must be satisfied that t.hr t e c• i tw ia );)aue
--t~rn--~+-- "the
harm posed by dissemination must be
substantial and serious; the restraining order must be
narrowly drawn
and
precise;
and
there must
be
no
alternative means of protecting the public interest which
intrudes less directly on expression." Id., at 191.
lOwash. Super. Ct.

c.

R. 26(c} provides:

"Protective Orders. Upon moton by a party or by
the person from whom discovery is sought, and
for good cause shown, the court in which the
action is pending or alternatively, on matters
relating to a deposition, the court in the
county where the deposition is to be taken may
make any order which justice requires to protect
a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression,
or
undue
burden
or
expense,
including one or more of the following: (1} that
the discovery not be had; (2} that the discovery
may
be
had
only
on
specified
terms
and
conditions, including a designation of the time
or place; (3} that the discovery may be had only
by a method of discovery other than that
selected by the party seeking discovery; (4}
that certain matters not be inquired into, or
that the scope of the discovery be limited to
certain matters; (5} that discovery be conducted
with no one present except persons designated by
the court; (6} that a deposition after being
sealed be opened only by order of the court; (7}
that a
trade secret or other confidential
research, development, or commercial information
not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a
Footnote continued on next page.

6

page 11.

court stated, however, that the denial of petitioners' motion was
"without prejudice to

[respondents']

right to move for a protec-

tive order in respect to specifically described discovery materials and a factual showing of good cause for restraining defendants in their use of those materials."

Record 16.

In response to the trial court's letter ruling,
filed a motion for

respondents

reconsideration in which they renewed their

motion for a protective order.

r~pGRaeR~itted
....,

affidavits of sev-

eral~ers df~~o~dation] . ~Ao -~~gav~~s averr~hat

pub-

"'

.-..o.a~~~~l!...

lie release of the donor lists potentially would

i::fA.,
Foundation

membership

and

income

and

would

.

subject ii"'andatMn

members to harassment and reprisals.

~~:1affid~ ts,

the trial court issued a protec-

designated
way;
( 8)
that
the
parties
simultaneously
file
specified
documents
or
information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be
opened as directed by the court ••.• "
CR 26(c) is identical to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(c) and is
typical of the provisions adopted in many states.
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tive order covering any information obtained through the discovery process that pertained to "the financial affairs of the various plaintiffs,

the names and addresses of Aquar ian Foundation

members, contributors, or clients, and the names and addresses of
those who have been contributors,
the various plaintiffs."
publishing

or

clients, or donors to any of

The order prohibited petitioners from

disseminating

the

information

in

where necessary to prepare for and try the case.

any way

except

By its terms,

the order did not apply to information gained by means other than
the discovery process. 11

In an accompanying opinion,

the trial

11 The relevant portions of the protective order state:
"2. Plaintiffs' motion for a protective order is
granted with respect to information gained by
the defendants through the use of all of the
discovery processes
regarding
the
financial
affairs of the various plaintiffs, the names and
addresses
of
Aquarian
Foundation
members,
contributors, or clients, and the names and
addresses of those who have been contributors,
clients,
or donors to any of the various
plaintiffs.
3. The defendants and each of them shall make no
use of and shall not disseminate the information
defined in paragraph 2 which is gained through
discovery, other than such use as is necessary
in order for the discovering party to prepare
and try the case.
As a result, information
gained by a defendant through the discovery
Footnote continued on next page.
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court recognized that the protective order would restrict peti-

~~t~tl.J..,b~
tioners'

right

~t

to publish

information F t.bei ;:t'osse••l.<m, but

reasoned that the restriction was necessary to avoid

the "chilling effect" that dissemination would have on "a party's
willingness to bring his case to court."
Respondents appealed from the trial court's production order
and petitioners appealed from the protective order.
Court of Washington affirmed both.

654

P. 2d

673

The Supreme
(1982).

With

respect to the protective order, the court reasoned:
"Assuming then that a protective order may fall, ostensibly, at least, within the definition of a 'prior restralnt of free expression', we are convinced that the
interest of the judiciary in the integrity of its discovery processes is sufficient to meet the 'heavy burden' of justification.
The need to preserve that integrity 1s adequate to sustain a rule like CR 26(c)
which authorizes a trial court to protect the confidentiality of information gi~en for purposes of li tigation." 654 P.2d, at 690.
process may not be published by any of the
defendants or made available to any news media
for
publication
or
dissemination.
This
~rotective order has no application except to
1nformation gained by the defendants through the
use of the discovery processes.
12 Although the Washington Supreme Court assumed arguendo
that a protective order could be viewed as an infringement
on First Amendment rights, the court also stated:
"A persuasive argument can be made
Footnote continued on next page.

that when

J
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The court noted that "the information to be discovered concerned
the financial affairs of the plaintiff Rhinehart and his organization, in which he and his associates had a recognizable privacy
interest; and the giving of publicity to these matters would allegedly and understandably result in annoyance, embarrassment and
even oppression."

Joint App.

130a-13la.

Therefore,

the court

concluded, the trial court had not abused its discretion in issuing the protective order. 13
The Supreme Court of Washington recognized that its holding
conflicts with the holdings of the United States Court of Appeals
for

the

District

of

Columbia

in

In

re

Halkin,

598

F.2d

176

persons are required to give information which
they would otherwise be entitled to keep to
themselves, in order to secure a government
benefit
or
perform an
obligation
to
that
government, those receiving that information
waive the right to use it for any purpose except
those which are authorized by the agency of
government which exacted the information." 654
P. 2d , at 6 81 .
13

The Washington Supreme Court also held that, because
the protective order shields respondents from "abuse of
the discovery privilege," respondents could not object to
the order compelling production. We do not consider here
that aspect of the Washington Supreme Court's decision.

JU~ 7lL('~~k_f ~~ ~j!J'!'11 15. ~~~~u~
~)Jl!
~ w & 1;.,
(c.-r ~~

•

(1979)
cui t

1

'4~a~~~
4 r~~h~~ Court of Appeals for the First Cir- j,._..._

1)

in In re San Juan Star Co.

Court of Georgia

1

662 F. 2d 108 (1981)

resolve

and the

in Georgia Gazette Publishing Co.

248 Ga. 528, 284 S.E.2d 386 (1981).
to

15
1

~~

v.

We granted certiora-

J{z,
conflict , em

the

/

Cl1

I

III
Most

states,

including

Washington,

have

adopted

discovery

provisions modeled on Rules 26 through 37 of the Federal Rules of
Ci vi 1 Procedure.

14

F.

James and G.

See note 9 supra.

Hazard,

Civil Procedure 179

~~~

~

,~e

15 In San Juan Star
Court of Appeals for the r;irst
Circuit considered~ th.e ~tile .pU>pon-Rdeo jon Halki~ .axle
wajegt&o tR~ stringent approach to the constitutionality
of protective orders.
Although the San Juan court held
that protective orders require some First Amendment
scrutiny,
the
court
reasoned
that
First
Amendment
interests are somewhat lessened in the civil discovery
context. The court stated: "In general, then, we find the
appropriate measure of such limitations in a standard of
'good cause' that incorporates a 'heightened sensitivity'
to the First Amendment concerns at stake,
" 662 F.2d,
at 116.
16 The holding of the Supreme Court of Washington is
consistent with the decision of the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in International Products Corp. v.
Koons, 325 F.2d 403, 407-408 (1963).
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"any matter,

not
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matter i1

~
7_ ifr'm s,

o::t- ~

~·

be

Brumback,

Proc
con

~~~

th j

11':J%
should

?~~ I1J.-

41 ~~

26 (b) (1);
strued

privil"",.. _ _,

7

t~

w(tAA-~
~-~La

;ions
~ le."

/J,.L-~ ~ ~~

~

~

~~Pb~
:.:----.l:.'o

Ld

1401

provi af for discovery

1

142
~.

4/t% ..... .,

l
~

information in the pos-

!)

1 7 see Bushman v. New Holland Division, 88 wash. 2d 429,
518 P.2d 1078, 1080 (1978); Moore v. Wentz, 11 Wash. App.
796, 525 P.2d 290, ___ (Wash. App. 1974). The drafters of
the Washington Civil Rules prefaced the rules with the
comment that the format and numbering of the rules was
intended to mirror that of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The drafters hoped that this would facilitate
use of federal materials in the research of the Washington
rules.
In addition, the Washington Supreme Court has
stated that when the language of a Washington rule and its
federal counterpart are the same, courts should look to
decisions interpreting the federal rule when trying to
construe the Washington rule.
American Discount Corp. v.
Saratoga West, Inc., 81 Wash. 2d 34, 499 P.2d 869, 871
(1972); see In the Matter of Johns-Manville Corp., 99
Wash. 2d 193, 660 P.2d 271,
(1983).
This rule of
statutory construction applies---rn this case because the
Washington rule that provides for scope of civil discovery
and
the
issuance of protective orders is virtually
identical to its counterpart in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Compare CR 26(b) and (c) with Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 26(b) and (c).
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.

---session of third parties.

The rules also state that discovery

not limited to matters that will be admissible at trial.

is~
) I

A party

may seek any information that "appears reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."

---------

26(b)(l):

\_.~ -

Services v.
(1978):
§2008

Wash.

c.

Super.

Aro Glass Co.,

Ct.

c . . R.

89 Wash.

2d

Fed.

'

Rule _c ~

26(b)(l)_.z:-;:::t

I~

758,

575 P.2d

Fund

716,

719

Wright and A. Miller, 8 Federal Practice and Procedure
provisions necessarily

(1970) •

~lowj ~ discovery of much information that is only tangential-

ly relevant to the litigation.
and Procedure
The

~26.56[1].

rules do not differentiate between information that

private or

tach.

See 4 Moore • s Federal PractiJ

is

intimate and that to which no privacy interests at-

Under the

rule~~~~ l.t(j

~H-.s-,1- d~ ~ ~k,:l-

1'\ as- ~ is not privileged.) and ~e~nt to the subject matter
velwee iR1 the pending action.
i\

Thus,

~

11-i4-."'- ~

the rul~~ · ~l::ltfior i:oze exten"\

sive intrusion into the affairs of both litigants and third parties.

9

I
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"

The rules not only provide for intrusive discovery,
~

enlist the powers

<fl

• \, I f a litigant fails to
requeee~~~~ ~

_.=::::;:;

~~

-~k

• /

I

with,(r equests, Mor: !discoyerft

~

an order from the trial court compel-

~k+--'--~1

'

ling

~ry.

ction if neces

discover ~ .

Feaa Ftl:l~ 37( ~ wash. Super. Ct.

c.
I

R.

3 7 (a) •

If the trial court issues the requested order, · and a
~

party

fails

to comply,

through exercise of
37(b); Wash.

the . trial

court

its contempt powers.

Super. Ct.

R. 37(b).

can

enforce

Fed.

the

order

Rule Civ.

Proc.

(!})

The trial court also can en-

force an order compelling discovery by issuing additional orders
including:

/

/

"(A) An order
hat the matters regarding which the
order [compelli g discovery] was made or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the
purposes of he action in accordance with the claim of
the party o taining ~e order;
(B) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to
support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or
prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in
evide ce;

I

(C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof,
or staying further proceedings until the order [compelling d1scovery] is obeyed, or dismissing the action or
proceedings until the order [compelling discovery] is
obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceedings or any
part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default
against the disobedient party; .•. " Wash. Super. Ct. c.
R. 37 (b) (2); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 37 (b) (2).

.u

(

I

I

\

r
I

Th

effect of

these

l
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provisions is to give a

powers to compel a
discovery, or face penalties for contempt 18 or prejud' e to his
case.
quest

When
are

e possible sanctions for

coupled

rules, the extent

with

of

------

accompany litigation

the

extensive

refusing a discovery rescope

of

the

discovery

the intrusion into private affairs that may
I

----

/

is ~ apparent.

Despite t-he intrtls-i-v

argue

that

the

availability of

First
any

imposes

judicial order

str icting expression.

different

Amendment

r~ther

They contend

that

strict
has

the

limits

on

the

effect of re-

that civil discovery is no

,s

source of information, and therefore the
1\

information is "protected speech" for First Amendment purposes.

v.

j-

page 2~ "'l ,A.J

~~~~~f~~
~!b--t-

•

~~~~

They submit, however, that
-

--- I

-

-

I

·~

.,

1

~ tr~~

They submit,
al court should grant such a protective order only after
specific finding that it is the least intrusive means of avoiding
a

substantial,

serious,

and

immediate

threat

to

a

compelling

consideration of

state interest.

--r?
this area, we conclude that the rule petitioners
is not required by the First Amendment.
IV
a~~ Vtft9

language, the F1

ngress shall make no law ••• abridging the freedom of speech,
of the press: or the right of the people peaceably to asseme, and to petition the Go

ment for a redress of grievances."

~ The protections afforded by the First Amendment are encompassed
within the term "liberty" as contained in the Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth

(?~~~efi~~

action

Bank v.

;~d~ent, and ~ therefor ~ applicable

o~t~ l~gislaturQs

Bellotti, 435

v. Stuart, 427

u.s.

u.s.

and

765, 779

cour~s.

to

See First National

(1978); Nebraska Press Assn.

539, 556 (1975): Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wil-
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•

son , 3 4 3 U. S • 4 9 5 , 50 0- 5 0 1
Amendment

seems

( 19 52 ) •

to prohibit all restraints on free expression,

but this Court has declined
literal

to give

~iller

interpretation.

v.

"Freedom of speech

(1973) •

The broad sweep of the First

that

language

California,

413

af

ent:i:rely

u.S.

15,

-r

23

does not comprehend the right to

{
speak on any subject at any time."
v.

Douds,

339

u.s.

382,

394

American Communications Assn.

(1950).

There are "certain well-

defined and narrowly limited classes of speech" whose benefit to
society is "clearly outweighed by the social interest in order."
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
v.

Robert Welsh,

Inc.,

418

u.s.

u.s.

568, 572-573

323,

340

must

~t

determine

whether

information

gained

discovery, and not yet presented at trial, 4s

.

Gertz

through

civil

(1974).

91~~~UL-L
1\

~

(1942)

~Q

cf tbQ Rarro, ·

~

~~~~~~~~~~~~-.A&c-~~~~

ment.

t.,/- iA.... ,

protected by the First Amend-

1\
decide
whether
If ~~' we must ~ n

a· 4~~
van ;;~7overn-

~;:;:J.
~.S~a-i/
ment interes ( justifies a rule, like that in effect in ~Washing-

A

ton,

affording

a

trial court broad discretion to restrict the
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$..4Adissemination

of

information.

discovered

Hans. Inc. v. Virginia, 435

u.s.

1. Landmark

Communica-

829, 841 (1978).

A

Our past decisions have recognized two classes of expression
the First Amendment does not protect.

First, we have held

that utterances that comprise "no essential part of any exposition of ideas" or that are of "slight social value as a step to
truth" are unprotected.
\

See Chaplinsky, supra, at 572.

Included

in this category are profanity, obscenity, and false statements
/

of

fact.

See Miller

Gertz, supra, at 340.

v.

California,

413

u.s.

15,

23

(1973):

The second category of unprotected speech

utterances that are likely to cause breaches of the
peace.
this

Incitements to riot and fighting words fall~tl¥ within

category.

Ohio, 395

u.s.

See

Chaplinsky,

444, 447 (1969)

supra,

at

573:

Brandenburg

v.

.~

~e ~ als~ held

that certain kinds of commercial
speech are entitled to only limited First Amendment
protection.
See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Comm'n, 447 u.s. 557, 562-563 (1980).
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/

It

is

clear

that

the

dissemination

of

information

gained

through pretrial discovery is protected by the First Amendment.
To be sure, most civil discovery relates to essentially private
matters.

Assigning fault

in a car accident, quieting

title to

I
real estate, or parcelling up the tangible re ains of a marriage
may not be subjects in which society has ;{ compelling interest.
I

Nevertheless, civil actions often involve subjects with which the
public properly is concerned.

For example,

the newspaper arti-

cles at issue in this case described an unorthodox religious organization which actively sought new members and financial support
manner

from

the

general public.

The articles also reported

the

in which the leader and several of his followers enter-

tained a large segment of the inmate population at a state penitentiary.

These articles served a useful function by making the

public aware of the existence of the religion, the substance of
its philosophy, and its principal method of raising funds.

Sto-

ries concerning the management of prison affairs are also of publie interest.

Although more compelling examples can be imagined,

page 24.

the present case amply illustrates that information

proL in

pretrial discovery may be of value to society.

ntermittant

The

gener-

occurence of cases such as this is sufficient to

alization that discovered information is alw; ys of "slight social
I

value as a step to truth."

Accord Craig

)1. Harney, 331 u.s. 367,

~

378 (1947).

We also are satisfied that dj/~ semination of such information

I

would not lead to breaches of the peace.
I
adverse

party might

try

/

to disseminate

The prospect that an
discovered

information

I

might cause some citiiens to resolve their disputes through less
peaceful methods tI ~an civil litigation.

That possibility is too

remote, however, to suggest that dissemination poses a realistic
threat

to society.

We

therefore hold

that

information gained

through civil discovery is protected speech.
I

I

B

' Having determined that the dissemination of discovered infor-

I

mation is "protected speech," we must consider whether the issuance of a protective order under Wash. Super. Ct.

c.

R. 26(c)

is

page 25.

----

----

constitutional ~-a:-±"fi't on that speech.

This inquiry requires

us to decide whether the "practice in question [furthers] an important

or

substantial

governmental

interest

suppression of expression" and whether

unrelated

to the

"the limitation of First

Amendment freedoms [is] no greater than is necessary or essential
to

the

protection of

volved."

the

Procunier v.

Brown v. Glines, 444

particular

Martinez,

u.s.

416

governmental

u.s.

396,

413

interest

in-

(1974}:

see

348, 354-355 (1980}: Buckley v. Valeo,

424 {Y.S. 1, 25 (1976}.

l

I

_j
right

of

Conrt

loc.g,__.bas

~

sa~

access

to

~I

held

information.

information needed
tb• ~

Zemel

there
v.

is nol\ First Amendment right to
Rusk,

381 U.S.

"There is an undoubted right to gather news

1,

16-17

(1965}.

'from any source by

means within the law,' ••• but that affords no basis for the claim
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that

the

First

Amendment

compels

governments--to supply information."

u.s.

1, 11 (1978).

~opinion

others--private

persons

or

Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438

~,
·who

the

of Burger,

""
sserts a First Amendment right to disseminate

~ ~f.,to ~ ~
matio ~ must realize that his access to that in

rmation is a rna

ter of legislative grace and judicia

In addition, we n

(,

J

I

e that the First Amendment

/

affected by fi protective order are thdse of a trial participant.
/

'
Tri /

/

p(rticipants

occupy

a

Although

. First

special
litigants

status
do

in relation

not

to

"surrender

the

their

First Amendment rights at the courthouse door," In re Halkin, 598
F.2d, at 186, those rights

~~~ subordinatedlto
/\

ests that arise in this setting.

other inter-

For instance, on several occa-

sions this Court has approved restriction on the communications
of trial participants where necessary to further the administration of

justice.

601 and n.

See Nebraska Press,

427

u.s.,

at 563;

id., at

27 (BRENNAN, J., concurring): Oklahoma Press Publish-
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ing Co. v. District Court, 430
v. Maxwell, 384

u.s.

u.s.

308, 310-311 (1977): Sheppard

333, 361 (1966).

"In the conduct of a case,

a court often finds it necessary to restrict the free expression
of participants, including counsel, witnesses, and jurors."
Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452

Fu~~~c~Q, ~

u.s.

Gulf

89, 104 n. 21 (1981).

order prohibiting dissemination of discovered

information before trail is not the
straint that requires

~~st
'\

nett Co. v. DePasquale, 443

u.s.,

kind of classic prior re-

Amendment scrutiny.

See Gan-

at 399 (Powell, J. concurring).

As in this case, such a protective order prevents a party from
disseminating only that information obtained through use of the
discovery process.

Thus, the party may disseminate the identical

information covered by the protective order as long as the information is gained through means other than the court's processes.
Finally, it is significant that the information at issue here

~

,_ ~
. d.~~~
~.
ga1ne
JaR
... ...... sc;:.rurer.z.

. .11A•QFH\e:et~
l.S

~Jmw,

p!'.Q-·~

""'
;Pr etrial

,.,~-e- ='-"'"'-r'1!
UR±l:
a s

'th em-

~~ :'.. ~~"'J~~~:i::l~e

~~vf4(...~ . ~0
in~

Such proceedings were not open to the public at

Footnote(s) 20 will appear on following pages.

page 28.

common law, Gannett Co.,
they are conducted
See

id.,

at

390;

supra, at 389

in private as
Marcus,

(1979), and,

in general,

a matter

of modern practice.

Reality

in Protective Order

Myth and

Litigation, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1983).

~

Much of- the information

~ ~ 1.- -~""'"-' ""tt.~,d>'-

that-~faces during pretrial discoveryA~only tangentially re-

·•Pi p lei?

lated ; to the underlying cause of action.

presented at trial

is presumptively public information,

the

----?

me cannot be said for information that ultimately may only
ible

evidenc •

In

sum,

judicial

limitations

on

a

of trial implicates the First Amendment rights of the restricted
party to

~

a~ lesser

20 In

extent than would the same restraint in a dif-

a concurring
BURGER stated:

opinion

in

Gannett,

CHIEF

JUSTICE

"During the last 40 years in which the pretrial
processes have been enormously expanded, it has
never occurred to anyone, so far as I am aware,
that
a
pretrial
deposition
or
pretrial
interrogatories were · other than wholly private
to the litigants.
A pretrial deposition does
not become part of a 'trial' until and unless
the contents of the deposition are offered in
evidence." 443 u.s., at 368.
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ferent

Therefore,

context.

our

~

~y-s-is

of

the

provision

for

protective orders contained in the Washington Civil Rules takes
into account the unique position that such orders occupy in relation to the First Amendment.

I
~i

ned to further

,they
- ='
i£]!1!!f'!!t
are
1n en d e d
tice.

~

~
t a dm1n1strat1on
. .
.

t o promo t e t h ef-aAJ-'
e f f ..1c1en

"'

rl~,

further

of jus-

One of the essential functions of a government is to pro-

vide for the peaceful resolution of disputes

f;Lo.o..

First,~

important governmental interests.

Civil rules,

~

~

ae-e~·1h~~

~fiia

· i\

including discovery rules,

interest by attempting

c.

R. 1.

j~riedic-

~
.,a.pe

designed to

~~~~~

to,.(~e

"the just, speedy,

and inexpensive determination of eery action."
Proc. 1; Wash. Super. Ct.

~~

Fed.

Rule Civ.

By providing for liberal and

extensive discovery, the rules enable each party to assemble all
the information that is necessary to try his case and narrow the
issues

that are

in dispute. 21

If trial

is necessary,

pretrial

Footnote(s) 21 will appear on following pages.

~t

~r? ~ /,t)

/
discovery will have smoothed the way.

1 pvt
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~

.'

In short, liberal discov-

ery rules are intended to make civil litigation "less a game of
blindman' s

bluff and more a

fair

contest with the basic issues

and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent."
States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356

21 In
Hickman
stated:

v.

u.s.

Taylor,

the

1.)

Re-

Court

"The various instruments of discovery now serve
(1)
as a device, along with the pre-trial
hearing under Rule 16, to narrow and clarify the
basic issues between the parties, and ( 2) as a
device
for
ascertaining
the
facts,
or
information as to the existence or whereabouts
of facts, relative to those issues.
Thus civil
trials in the federal courts no longer need be
carried on in the dark.
The way is now clear,
consistent with recognized privileges, for the
parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge
of the issues and facts before trial."
Id., at
500-501.
22 Before

the advent of modern discovery procedures,
access to information in advance trial was severly
limited. As a general rule:
"(1) Discovery could be had only of facts which
pertained to the case of the party seeking
discovery.
Any
attempt
to
pry
into
the
adversary's case was regarded as an improper
fishing expedition.
(2) Some courts insisted
that the facts sought by discovery had to be
otherwise unavailable to the party seeking them •
... (3)
Discovery could reach only facts or
documents which would be admissible in evidence
at the trial. (4) Discovery could be had only
against the adverse party."
F. James and G.
Hazard, Civil Procedure §6.1 (1977).
Footnote continued on next page.

•

I~

United

677, 682 (1958) • 22

supra,

~

1..
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stricting the availability of protective orders might cause those
prossessing
with

information

requests

for

to

less

willing

production and might make

willing to compel production.
to relevant facts

be

comply

voluntarily

trial courts

less

To the extent that complete access

"is essential to proper litigation," Hickman,

supra, at 507, either result is inimical to the efficient administration of justice.
A government also has an inherent interest in seeing that the
tools of civil

justice are not put to an unjust use.

Although

extensive pretrial discovery may further the expeditious settlement of disputes, the potential for abuse is great.
v. Lando, 441

u.s.

See Herbert

153, 179 (1979}; id., at 179 (Powell, J. con-

curring}; Comments of the Advisory Committee on the 1983 Amendments

to Fed.

Rule Civ.

Proc.

26.

The discovery rules do not

distinguish between public and private information.

Nor do they

These limitations had the practical effect of leading to
prolonged trials that were filled with surprises for all
concerned.
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place limits on the amount of discovery that a party may attempt.
Moreover, the rules do not apply only to the parties to the litigation;

relevant

information

equally

subject

to

uncareful

use of

producing party

discovery.

the power
to at

invasion of privacy.

in

least

the hands of
Clearly,

to force

the

third parties

is

unscrupulous

or

discovery may subject the

inconvenience and

at most a gross

Just as a sovereign has an interest in corn-

pelling discovery to ensure the fair adjudication of civil disputes, it has a substantial interest in seeing that its processes
are

not

abused. 23

See

Herbert

v.

Lando,

supra,

at

176-177;

23 This consideration alone prompted Judge Friendly
state in International Products Co. v. Koons:
"[W]e
entertain
no
doubt
as
to
the
constitutionality of a rule allowing a federal
court to forbid the publicizing, in advance of
trial, of information obtained by one party from
another
by
use
of
the
court's
processes.
Whether or not the Rule itself authorizes so
much of the order as also seals all affidavits
subrni tted by defendants on various motions, we
have no question as to the court's jurisdiction
to do this under the inherent 'equitable powers
of courts of law over their own process, to
prevent abuses, oppression, and injustices,"
••• or as to the propriety of the exercise of
discretion here."
Id., at 407-408 (citations
omitted).
---

to
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Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124
for

u.s.

145-146 (1888).

liberal discovery for

settlement of disputes;

A government provides

the sole purpose of assisting in the
any other use of discovered information

may constitute abuse.
The second governmental interest that is furthered by pretrial protective orders is the protection of the rights of those who
must produce information. 24

As stated above, the civil rules in

24 Although not commonplace in civil litigation, the facts
of
this
case
illustrate
the potential conflict of
interests that may arise.
The Aquarian Foundation is a
small, unorthodox and apparently unpopular religion.
The
trial court's decision to grant the protective order was
based on affidavits of Foundation members. The affidavits
stated that each time the Foundation received publicity,
members
received
physical
threats
and
suffered
harrassment.
Under
the
order
compelling discovery,
respondents are required to produce a list of all
donations
for
the
five
year
period
preceding
the
institution of this suit, along with the names and
addresses of all donors. Because all members are required
to make donations, and very few donors are not members,
the list of donors effectively comprises the members of
the Foundation.
As a result, respondents understandably
are concerned as to the likely detrimental effect that
dissemination might have on this unpopular religious sect
and its members.
Petitioners do not deny their intent to
publish discovered information that is not subject to a
protective order. Therefore, petitioners, in the exercise
of their First Amendment right to freedom of the press,
may penalize respondents for the exercise of their First
Amendment right to freedom of religion.
Release of the
names of donors also potentially would infringe the
donors' freedom of association.
See Brown v. Socialist
Workers '74 Campaign Committee, 103 S.Ct. 416, 420 (1982).
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most

jurisdictions

allow

extensive

and

intrusive

information held by litigants and third parties.

discovery of
If the statu-

tory prerequisites are met,

the subject of a discovery request

must produce

risk being found

information or

in contempt.

The

threat that discovered information will be disclosed may implicate several
and foremost,

fundamental

rights

of

the producing party.

First

discovery and dissemination is an invasion of the

producing party's right to privacy. 25

Second, a party who wishes

to file a suit but anticipates an adversary's discovery and dissemination of sensitive information may be deterred from exercising his right of access to the courts. 26 Finally, although less
of a problem in civil litigation than in criminal trials, wide
dissemination of pretrial materials could
gant's right to a fair trial.

jeopardize

the

li ti-

Publicity could make it difficult

to impanel an impartial jury or might induce a litigant to accept

25 see Whalen v. Roe, 429 u.s. 589, 599 (1977):
Broadcasting v. Cohn;-420 u.s. 469, 488 (1974).

Cox

26 see
California
Motor
Transport
Co.
v.
Trucking
Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972): NAACP v. Button, 371
u.s. 415, 428-429 (1963).
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an unfavorable and unjust settlement.

In short, several legiti-

mate and substantial governmental interests are served by giving
trial courts a mechanism by which they may limit the dissemination of discovered information.
3

We also find that the provision for protective orders in the
Washington civil rules is "no greater than necessary" to protect
these interests.

In order to properlyj~anage the wide range of

situations that may arise and the ever-varying interests of those
involved, a trial court must have broad discretion to control the
uses to which the fruits of discovery will be put.
provides for
shown."

Rule 26 (c)

the issuance of a protective order "for good cause

The rule implies that the good cause standard is satis-

fied if an order is necessary "to protect a party or person from
annoyance,
expense."

embarrassment,

27

oppression,

or

undue

burden

or

By requiring a showing of good cause, the state has

27 In

its decision
in
this case,
Supreme Court of
Washington stated that "'good cause' is established if the
Footnote continued on next page.

page 36.

established a

low threshold of necessity for

protective order.

The rule thereby gives

the issuance of a

the trial court much

latitude to prevent abuse and encourage broad and liberal discovery. 28

More importantly, Rule 26(c)

rizing

restraints

processes. 29

on

information

is construed as only autho-

obtained

through

the

court's

These features of the rule indicate that it is in-

tended to further

significant governmental interests and there-

fore is compatible with the First Amendment. 30

(

moving party shows that any of the harms spoken of in the
rule is threatened and can be avoided without impeding the
discovery process."
28 The "good cause" requirement is not, however, some sort
of
magical
formula
that
creates
a
shield
from
constitutional attack.
In this context, the important
inquiry is whether the party seeking the protective order
has
shown
to
the
satisfaction of
the
court
that
dissemination will have an adverse effect on a legitimate
interest.
Once this standard is satisfied, the First
Amendment does not limit the trial court's discretion to
issue
a
protective
order
designed
to
protect
the
governmental interests that discovery implicates.
29 see Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 536 F.2d
1001, 1007 (CA3 1976) •
The Supreme Court of Washington
assumed without discussion that a litigant who obtains
information covered by a
protective order by means
independent of the court's processes would be entitled to
disseminate that information. 654 P.2d, at 689.
30 Petrs contend that the First Amendment mandates a more
stringent inquiry.
In their view, a trial court should
predicate a protective order on a specific finding that
the absence of such an order would "immediately imperil a
Footnote continued on next page.
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v
In light of the substantial governmental interests served by pretrial protective orders and the limited impact that such orders
have on First Amendment interests, we hold that the provision for
protective orders contained in Washington Super. Ct.

c.

R. 26(c)

does not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.

The judgment accordingly is
Affirmed.

compelling state interest." This standard, at best, would
be difficult for a party seeking a protective order to
satisfy. A potential lit1gant would have little assurance
that he could exercise his right to bring suit without
risking discovery and disclosure.
In a similar vien,
petitioners' standard virtually ignores the privacy rights
of those who must produce information.
Also,
the
burden
on
judicial
resources
that
petitioners suggested standard would require would be
immense.
Each time a party moved for a protective order,
the trial court would have to conduct a painstaking
examination of each i tern for which the order is sought.
See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529
F. Supp. 866 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
Furthermore, many trial
courts might find it preferable to deny discovery requests
rather than risking reversal of a decision to grant a
protective order.
In short, petitioners' rule likely
would not protect many of the same legitimate state
interests that generate the need for protective orders in
the first place.
We hold that the First Amendment does
not require this result.

rmc

i

No. 82-1721
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case, we consider the extent of the First Amendment )

~

right of a party to civil litigation to disseminate,

~r ~trial,

in

advance~~

information gained through the pretrial discovery

pro~-

~ ~ ess.
~

I

Respondent Rhinehart is the spiritual leader of a religious
group,

the

Aquar ian Foundation.

The Foundation has fewer

than

1,000 members, most of whom are located in the State of Washington.

Aquarian beliefs include life after death and the ability

to communicate with the dead through a medium.

Rhinehart is the

primary Aquarian medium •
Over

.~-ryears,
t~

the Seattle Times and the Walla Walla Union-

Bulletin have published stories about Rhinehart and the Foundation.

/

Altogether 11 articles appeared in the newspapers during

)
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the years 1973, 1978, 1979.

The five articles that appeared in

1973 focused on Rhinehart and the manner in which he operated the
Foundation.

They

described

seances

conducted

by

Rhinehart

in

which people paid him to put them in touch with deceased relaThe articles also stated that Rhinehart had

tives and friends.
sold
One

magical
article

for sodomy.

"stones"
referred

that had

been

"expelled"

to Rhinehart's conviction,

from his
later

body.

vacated,

The four articles that appeared in 1978 concentrated

on an "extravaganza" sponsored by Rhinehart at the Walla Walla
State

Penitentiary.

1,100 inmates to a

The

articles

stated

6-hour-long show,

that

he

had

treated

during which he gave away

between $35,000 and $50,000 in cash and prizes.

One article de-

scribed a "chorus line of girls [who] shed their gowns and bikinis and sang ... "

App.

25a.

The two articles that appeared in

1979 referred to a purported connection between Rhinehart and Lou
Ferrigno, star of the popular television program, "The Incredible
Hulk."
II
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Rhinehart

brought

this

action

in

the

Washington

Superior

Court on behalf of himself and the Foundation against the Seattle
Times,

the Walla Walla Union-Bulletin,

cles and the spouses of the authors.

the authors of the arti-

Five female members of the

Foundation who had participated in the presentation at the peni-

~ntiary joined the suit as plaintiffs. 1

The complaint alleges

that the articles contained statements that were "fictional and
untrue,"
should

and
have

that

the

defendants--petitioners

here--knew,

According

known,

to

or

the com-

plaint, the articles "did and were calculated to hold [Rhinehart]
up to public scorn, hatred and ridicule, and to impeach his honesty,

integrity,

virtue,

religious

philosophy,

reputation as

person and in his profession as a spiritual leader."

App.

a

Sa.

With respect to the Foundation, the complaint also states: "[T]he
articles have, or may have had, the effect of discouraging con-

1 The record is unclear as to whether all five of the
female
plaintiffs participated
in the
"chorus line"
described in the 1978 articles.
The record also does not
disclose whether any of the
female plaintiffs were
mentioned by name in the articles.
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tributions

by

the membership and public and

thereby diminished

the financial ability of the Foundation to pursue its corporate
purposes."

App. 9a. The complaint alleges that the articles rnis-

represented the role of the Foundation's "choir" and falsely irnplied that female members of the Foundation had "stripped off all
their clothes and wantonly danced naked .••• "

App. 6a.

The corn-

plaint requests $14,100,000 in damages for the alleged defamation
.
2
.
.
an d Invasions
o f privacy.

Petitioners filed an answer, denying many of the allegations
of the complaint and asserting affirmative defenses.

3

' Petition-

2 Although

the complaint does not allege specifically
that the articles caused a decline in membership of the
Foundation,
respondents'
answers
to
defendants
interrogatories
raised
this
issue.
In
response
to
petitioners request that respondents' explain the damages
they are seeking, respondents' claimed that the Foundation
had experienced a drop in membership in Hawaii and
Washington "from about 300 people to about 150 people, and
[a] concurrent drop in contributions." Record 503.
3Affirrnative
defenses
included
contentions
that
the
articles were substantially true and accurate, that they
were privileged under the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
and that the statute of limitations had run as to the 1973
articles, that the individual respondents had consented to
any invasions of privacy, and that respondents had no
reasonable expectation of privacy when performing before
1,100 prisoners.
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ers

promptly

Rhinehart,
financial

initiated

requested
affairs

of

extensive

production of documents
Rhinehart

and

They

discovery.

the

pertaining

Foundation,

and

deposed
to

the

served

extensive interrogatories on Rhinehart and the other respondents.
Respondents turned over a number of financial documents, including several of Rhinehart's income tax returns.
fused,

however,

identity

of

to disclose certain financial

the

Foundation's

donors

during

Respondents reinformation,
the

4

preceding

the
10

years, and a list of its members during that period.

~~~!'~~
Petitioners filed a motion under the State's Civil Rule 37
requesting an order compelling discovery. 5

In their supporting

memorandum, petitioners recognized that the principal issue as to

4 Rhinehart also refused to reveal the current address of
his residence.
He submitted an affidavit stating that he
had relocated out of fear for his safety and that
disclosure of his current address would subject him to
risks of bodily harm.
Petitioners promptly moved for an
order compelling Rhinehart to give his address and the
trial cour~ granted the motion.
Swash. Super. Ct. c. R. 37 provides in relevant part: "A
party, upon reasonable notice to other parties and all
persons affected thereby, may apply to the court in the
county where the deposition was taken, or in the county
where the action is pending, for an order compelling
discovery •.. "

page 6.

discovery was respondents "refusal[]
quiry into their
donations,

to permit any effective in-

financial affairs, such as the source of their

their financial transactions,

uses of wealth and as-

sets and their financial condition in general."

Record 350.

Re-

spondents opposed the motion arguing i-ft< !=JB: tie-ulaor that compelled
production of the identities of the Foundation's donors and members

would

violate

rights to privacy,
tion.

~ members~nd
freedom of religion, and freedom of associa-

Respondents also moved for a protective order preventing

petitioners

from

disseminating

discovery.

Respondents noted

any

information

gained

through

that petitioners had stated their

intention to continue publishing articles about respondents and
this

litigation,

and

their

intent

to

use

information

gained

through discovery in future articles.
In a lengthy ~r ruling, the trial court initially granted
the motion to compel and ordered respondents to identify all donors who made contributions during the five years preceding the
date of the complaint, along with the amounts donated.

The court
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also required petitioners to divulge enough membership information to substantiate any claims of diminished membership.

Rely-

ing on In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (CADC 1979), 6 the court refused
to issue a protective order.

It stated that the facts alleged by

respondents in support of their motion for such an order were too
conclusory to warrant a
Wash.

Super. Ct.

c.

R.

finding of
26(c). 7

"good cause" as required by

The court stated, however, that

6 The

Halkin decision was debated by the courts below.
Prior to Halkin, the only federal court of appeals to
consider the question directly had understood that the
First Amendment did not affect a trial court's authority
to restrict dissemination of information produced during
pretrial discovery.
See International Paper Products v.
Koons,
325
F. 2d
403,
407-408
(CA2
1963) .
Halkin
considered
the
issue
at
length.
Characterizing
a
protective order as a "paradigmatic prior restraint,"
Halkin held that such orders require close scrutiny.
The
court also held that before a court should issue a
protective order that restricts expression, it must be
satisfied that "the harm posed by dissemination must be
substantial and serious; the restraining order must be
narrowly drawn and precise;
and
there must be no
alternative means of protecting the public interest which
intrudes less directly on expression." Id., at 191.
?wash. Super. Ct.

c.

R. 26(c) provides:

"Protective Orders. Upon moton by a party or by
the person from whom discovery is sought, and
for good cause shown, the court in which the
action is pending or alternatively, on matters
relating to a deposition, the court in the
county where the deposition is to be taken may
make any order which justice requires to protect
a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression,
or
undue
burden
or
expense,
Footnote continued on next page.

page 8.

the denial of petitioners' motion was "without prejudice to [respondents']

right

to move

for

a protective order

in respect to

specifically described discovery materials and a factual showing
of good cause for
materials."

restraining defendants

in their use of those

Record 16.

Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration in which they
renewed their motion for a protective order.

They submitted af-

fidavits of several Foundation members to support their request.

including one or more of the following: (1) that
the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery
may
be
had
only
on
specified
terms
and
conditions, including a designation of the time
or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only
by a method of discovery other than that
selected by the party seeking discovery; (4)
that certain matters not be inquired into, or
that the scope of the discovery be limited to
certain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted
with no one present except persons designated by
the court; ( 6) that a deposition after being
sealed be opened only by order of the court; (7)
that a
trade secret or other confidential
research, development, or commercial information
not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a
designated
way;
(8)
that
the
parties
simultaneously
file
specified
documents
or
information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be
opened as directed by the court . . . . "
Rule 26 (c)
states.

is typical of

the provisions adopted

in many

page 9.

The

affidavits

~

averred

that public release of

the donor

lists

would adversely affect Foundation membership and in-

come and would subject its members to harassment and reprisals.
Persuaded by these affidavits, the trial court issued a pro~

tective order covering any information obtained through the discovery process

that pertained to "the financial affairs of

the

various plaintiffs, the names and addresses of Aquarian Foundation members,

contributors,

or clients,

and

the

names

and

ad-

dresses of those who have been contributors, clients, or donors
to any of the various plaintiffs."

tioners from

The order prohibited peti-

publishing)~ disseminatin~t~rmation

in any

way except where necessary to prepare for and try the case.

By

its terms, the order did not apply to information gained by means
other than the discovery process. 8

In an accompanying opinion,

relevant portions of the protective order state:
"2. Plaintiffs' motion for a protective order is
granted with respect to information gained by
the defendants through the use of all of the
discovery processes
regarding
the
financial
affairs of the various plaintiffs, the names and
addresses
of
Aquarian
Foundation
members,
contributors, or clients, and the names and
Footnote continued on next page.

?
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the trial court recognized that the protective order would restrict petitioners' right to publish information obtained by discovery, but the court reasoned that the restriction was necessary
to avoid the "chilling effect"

that dissemination would have on

"a party's willingness to bring his case to court."
Respondents appealed from the trial court's production order
and petitioners appealed from the protective order.
Court of Washington affirmed both.

654 P.2d 673

The Supreme
(1982).

With

respect to the protective order, the court reasoned:
"Assuming then that a protective order may fall, ostensibly, at least, within the definition of a 'prior restralnt of free expression', we are convinced that the
interest of the judiciary in the integrity of its discovery processes is suff1cient to meet the 'heavy buraddresses of those who have been contributors,
clients,
or donors to any of the various
plaintiffs.
3. The defendants and each of them shall make no
use of and shall not disseminate the information
defined in paragraph 2 which is gained through
discovery, other than such use as is necessary
in order for_ the discovering party to prepare
and try the case.
As a result, information
gained by a defendant through the discovery
process may not be published by any of the
defendants or made available to any news media
for
publication
or
dissemination.
This
protective order has no application except to
information gained by the defendants through the
use of the discovery processes.
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den' of justification.
The need to preserve that integrity is adequate to sustain a rule like Rule 26 (c)
which authorizes a trial court to protect the confidentiality of information g~ven for purposes of litigation." 654 P.2d, at 690.
~e

court noted that "the information to be discovered concerned

the financial affairs of the plaintiff Rhinehart and his organization, in which he and his associates had a recognizable privacy
interest: and the giving of publicity to these matters would allegedly and understandably result in annoyance, embarrassment and
even oppression."

Joint App.

130a-13la.

Therefore,

the court

concluded, the trial court had not abused its discretion in issuing the protective order. lO

9 Although

the Washington Supreme Court assumed arguendo
that a protective order could be viewed as an infringement
on First Amendment rights, the court also stated:
"A persuasive argument can be made that when
persons are required to give ;information which
they would otherwise be entitled to keep to
themselves, in order to secure a government
benefit
or
perform an obligation
to
that
government,
those receiving that information
waive the right to use it for any purpose except
those which are authorized by the agency of
government which exacted the information." 654
P. 2d , at 6 81 •
10 The

Washington Supreme Court also held that, because
the protective order shields respondents from "abuse of
the discovery privilege," respondents could not object to
the order compelling production.
We do not consider here
that aspect or the Washington Supreme Court's decision.
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The Supreme Court of Washington recognized that its holding
conflicts with the holdings of the United States Court of Appeals
for

the

District

of

Columbia

in

In

re

Halkin,

598

F.2d

176

(1979) , 11 and applies a different standard from that of the Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit in In re San Juan Star Co., 662
108

(1981). 12

flict. 13

We affirm.

F.2d

We granted certiorari

to resolve

the con-

III
Most

states,

including

Washington,

have

adopted

discovery

provisions modeled on Rules 26 through 37 of the Federal Rules of

1 1 see note 11 supra.
12 In San Juan Star, the Co rt of Appeals for the First
Circuit
considered
and
ejected
Halkin's
stringent
ayproach to the con tituti nality of protective orders.
A though the San Jua
court held that protective orders
~ rfiqldi:re. iaQm.Q-First Am ndment s.r~1siny, the court reasoned
that Riuat :AHUiHlGH\.Qnt interests are somewhat lessened in
the civil discovery context.
The court stated:
"In
·
general, then, we find the appropriate measure of such
limitations
in
a
standard
of
'good
cause'
that
incorporates a
'heightened sensitivity' to the First
Amendment concerns at stake, .•. " 662 F.2d, at 116.

~

13 The

holding of the Supreme Court of Washington is
consistent with the decision of the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in International Products Corp. v.
Koons, 325 F.2d 403, 407-408 (1963).
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Civil
(1977) •

Procedure.
14

Rule

F.

James and G.

26 (b) (1),

by

its

Hazard,
terms,

Civil Procedure 179

provides

that

a

party

"may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which
is

relevant

action, ... "

to

the

subject

matter

involved

in

the

pending

It further provides that discovery is not limited to

matters that will be admissible at trial so long as the information sought "appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."

Wash.

Super.

Ct.

Trust Fund Services v. Aro Glass Co. , 89 Wash.

C.

R.

2d 758,

26 (b) ( 1) ;
5 75 P. 2d

716, 719 (1978); cf. c. Wright and A. Miller, 8 Federal Practice
and Procedure §2008 (1970) . 15

14 see Bushman v. New Holland Division, 88 Wash. 2d 429,
518 P.2d 1078, 1080 (1978).
The Washington Supreme Court
has stated that when the language of a Washington rule and
its federal counterpart are the same, courts should look
to decisions interpreting the federal rule when trying to
construe the Washington rule.
American Discount Corp. v.
o a West
Inc., 81 Wash. 2d 34, 499 . P. 2d 869,
. 871
.
this ga~~ beea1:1oc
he washington rule that provides for
scope of civil discovery and the issuance of protective
orders is virtuall~ identical to its counterpart in the
Federal Rules of C1vil Procedure.
Compare Wash. Super.
Ct. c. R. 26(b) and (c) with Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(b)
and (c) .

15 cR 26 (b) (1),
identical
to Federal
Rule of Civil
Procedure 26 (b) (1) in effect at the time, provides in
Footnote continued on next page.
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The

rules do not differentiate between information that is

private or
tach.

intimate and that to which no privacy interests at-

Under the rules, the only express limitations are that the

information sought is not privileged, and is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action.

Thus, the rules often allow

extensive intrusion into the affairs of both litigants and third
parties. 16

If a litigant fails to comply with a request for dis-

full:
"In
General.
Parties
may
obtain discovery
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action, whether it relates to the claim
or defense of the party seeking discovery or to
the claim or defense of any other party,
including the existence, description, nature,
custody, condition and location of any books,
documents, or other tangible things and the
identity
and
location
of
persons
having
knowledge of any discoverable matter.
It is not
ground for objection that the information sought
will be
inadmissible at the trial if the
information sought appears reasonably calculated
to
lead
to
the
discovery
of
admissible
evidence."
16 under

Rules 30 and 31, a litigant may depose a third
party by oral or written examination.
The litigant can
compel the third party to submit to the deposition and to
produce tanqible evidence at the deposition by serving the
third party with a subpoena persuant to Rule 45.
Rule 45
authorizes a trial court to quash or modify a request for
tangible evidence in a subpoena "if it is unreasonable or
oppressive."
Rule 45 also provides: "Failure by any
person without adequate excuse to obey a subpoena served
upon him may be deemed a contempt of the court from which
Footnote continued on next page.
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covery, the Court may issue an order directing compliance that is
enforceable by the Court's contempt powers.

Wash. Super. Ct. R.

37(b). 17
Petitioners

argue

that

the

First

limits on the availability of any
effect of restricting expression.

Amendment

imposes

judicial order

strict

that has the

They contend that civil dis-

covery is not different from other sources of

information, and

therefore the information is "protected speech" for First Amendment purposes.

Petitioners assert the right in this case to dis-

seminate any information gained through discovery.

They do rec-

~f~l-h

.t..e..

ognize that in limited circumstances, not present here, some in-\
formation may be restrained.

They submit, however, that:

"When a protective order seeks to limit expression, it
may do so only if the proponent shows a compelling governmental interest.
Mere speculation and conjecture
are insufficient.
Any restraining order, moreover,
must be narrowly drawn and precise.
Finally, before
issuing such an order a court must determine that there
are no alternatives which intrude less directly on exthe subpoena issued."

Wash. Super. Ct.

c.

R. 45(f).

17rn addition to its contempt power,
Rule 37(b) (2)
authorizes a trial court to enforce an order compelling
discovery by other means including, for example, regarding
designated facts as taken to be established for purposes
of tlie action. Cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 37 (b) (2) (A).
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pression."

Petitioners' Brief, at 10.

We decline to adopt the stringent rule urged by petitioners.
IV
The protections

afforded

by

the First Amendment are encom-

passed within the term "liberty" as contained in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore
to

the

action

Bellotti, 435
art,

427

343

u.s.

of

u.s.

u.s.

539,

495,

Amendment seems

the

states.

See

First

National

Bank

v.

765, 779 (1978); Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stu556

(1975):

500-501

(1952).

Joseph Burstyn,
The

broad

Inc.

sweep

v. Wilson,

of

the

First

to prohibit all restraints on free expression,

but this Court has

declined

literal interpretation.

to give

that

language an entirely

In Miller v. California, 43

u.s.

15, 23

(1973), we observed that "[f]reedom of speech . . . does not comprehend the right to speak on any subject at any time."
American Communications
(1950).
classes

There
of

are

speech"

Assn.

v.

"certain well
whose

benefit

Douds,
defined
to

339
and

society

u.s.

See also

382,

394-395

narrowly

limited

is

"clearly out-

-/
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weighed

by

the

Hampshire, 315

social

u.s.

We think

interest

in

Chaplinsky

order."

v.

New

568, 572-573 (1942). 18
it clear, however,

that information obtained

through civil discovery authorized by modern Rules of Civil Procedure may be information protected by the First Amendment.
deed,

we do not doubt

that only rarely would such

In-

information

fall within the classes of unprotected speech identified by decisions of this Court.

In this case, as petitioners argue, there

certainly is a public interest in knowing more about respondents
Rhinehart and

the

Aquarian Foundation.

This

interest may well

include most--and possibly all--of what has been discovered as a
result of the Court's order under Rule 26 (b) (1).
The critical question therefore becomes:

whether the Court's

.~-Y

18 Included

J

_.,...

among the classes of unprotected s eech are
utterances that are likely to cause breaches of ~ e peace
and speech that is obscene.
See Chapl ins ky,
at
573; Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 44 7 ( 1969)
And
in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 u.s. 323, 340 (1974)
we recognized the absence ~of any social interest in
falsehoods.
M~ ~he Court also has held that 7f
certain kinds of commercial ~ speech are entitled only to
limited First Amendment protection.
See Central Hudson
C..a.s & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447
u.s. 557, 562-563 (1980).
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protective order issued under Rule 26(c)
on that protected speech.

is an invalid restraint

This requires us to decide whether the

"practice in question [furthers] an important or substantial governmental

interest unrelated

to

the

suppression of expression"

and whether "the limitation of First Amendment freedoms

~ grea~er

than is necessary or essential to the protection of the

particular governmental interest involved."
nez, 416

u.s.

A

At the outset, it is important
impairment of

Procunier v. Marti-

396, 413 (1974); see Brown v. Glines, 444

354-355 (1980); Buckley v. Valeo, 424

First Amendment

such as the one at issue
tion,

[is] no

petitioners

u.s.

348,

1, 25 (1976).

~~~~
o recognize the extent of
t

rights

here~usej ·
d~ f

u.s.

a

-~~~,

~
protective order ~

i,,,,
civil litiga-

As

~
b

.
.
ga1ne
A 1n ormat1on'\
y

v1.

ue

of

the

Jfi

~

trial

court's discovery processes. 19

19 Although
litigants
do
not
"surrender
their
First
Amendment rights at the courthouse door," In re Halkin,
598 F.2d, at 186, those rights may be subordinated to
other interests that arise in this setting.
For instance,
on several occasions this Court has approved restriction
Footnote continued on next page.
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legislative grace.
access

A litigant has no First Amendment right of
2

to

information

~t ~or

purposes of

trying

his

suit.

~ Zemel v. Rusk, 381 u.s. 1, 16-17 (1965) ~ Houchins v. KQED,
Inc.,

438

u.s.

1,

11

(1978)

(opinion of

Burger, C.J.).

Thus,

continued court control over the discovered information does not
raise the same spectre of government censorship that such controls might suggest in other situations.

See In re Halkin, 598

F.2d, at 206-207 (Wilkey, J. dissenting).

~pretrial

F~,

. componen t s o f
pu bl 1c

/l_);,.,

J<.A""'

,.I,

r~

~'.~j
~~-

~

~~

M;;;:;v

~ ..~77
,_~K ·
~ &Jl ,,vJ

ur~ ~~

depositions and interrogatories are not

. . 1 t r1a
. 1 • 20
a c1v1

Such proceedings were not

on
the
communications
of
trial
participants
where
necessary to ensure a fair trial for a criminal defendant.
See Nebraska Press, 427 u.s., at 563~ id., at 601 and n.
27 (BRENNAN, J., concurring)~ Oklahoma--"Press Publishing
..a:u_ v. District Court
430 u.s. 308, 310-311 (1977) ~
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 3S4 U.S. 333, 361 ( 1966) •
"In the
conduct of a case, a court often finds it necessary to
restrict the free expression of participants, including
counsel, witnesses, and jurors." Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard,
452 u.s. 89, 104 n. 21 (1981}.
20In a concurring opinion in Gannett, CHIEF JUSTICE
BURGER stated:
"During the last 40 years in which the pretrial
processes have been enormously expanded, it has
never occurred to anyone, so far as I am aware,
that
a
pretrial
deposition
or
pretrial
interrogatories were other than wholly private
to the litigants.
A . pretrial deposition does
not become part of a 1 trial 1 unti 1 and unless
Footnote continued on next page.

~V/~~lq

1
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open

to

the

public

at

common law,

Gannett Co.,

supra,

at

389

(1979}, and, in general, they are conducted in private as a matter of modern practice.

See id., at 390: Marcus, Myth and Reali-

ty in Protective Order Litigation, 69 Cornell L.

Rev. 1

(1983}.

Much of the information that surfaces during pretrial discovery
may be unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying
cause of action.

Therefore, restraints placed on discovered, but

not yet admitted,

information is not a restriction on a tradi-

tionally accessible source of information.
Finally,

it is significant to note that an order prohibiting

dissemination of discovered information before trail is not the
kind

of

classic

prior

Amendment scrutiny.
399

restraint

that

requires

exacting

See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443

(Powell, J. concurring}.

First

u.s.,

at

As in this case, such a protective

order prevents a party from disseminating only that information

the contents of
evidence." 443

the deposition are offered
at 368.

u.s.,

in
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obtained through use of the discovery process.

Thus, the party

may disseminate the identical information covered by the protective order

as

long

as

the

information

other than the court 1 s processes.
on

a

party 1 s

advance

of

ability

trial

In sum,

to disseminate

implicates

the

is gained through means
judicial limitations

information discovered

First Amendment

rights

of

in
the

restricted party to a far lesser extent than would the same restraint in a different context.

Therefore, our consideration of

the provision for protective orders contained in the Washington
Civil Rules takes into account the unique position that such orders occupy in relation to the First Amendment.
B

Rule 26(c} furthers a substantial governmental interest.

/1

Washington Civil

Rules

enable

parties

to

information "relevant to the subject matter

The

litigation

to obtain

involved"

that they

believe will be helpful in the preparation and trial of the case.
incl~adif'lEj

t:Se"""'R-a~&Wil'\9

-ef-

e~H~

issues i:R

ever, must be viewed in its entirety.

dis~te.

Rule 26, how-

Liberal discovery is pro-
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Because of

th~

liberality of pretrial discovery permitted

by Rule 26(b) (1), it is necessary for the trial court to have the
authority to issue protective orders conferred by Rule 26(c).

It

is clear from experience that pretrial discovery by depositions
and

interrogatories

has

a

significant

potential

for

abuse.

21

This abuse is not limited to matters of delay and expense; dis-

~ ~~ ~1--.t.?~
covery also may seriously implicate the
third parties. 22

p~iv~) of

litigants and

The Rules do not distinguish between public and

private information.

litigation ~~~~nt

Nor do they apply only to parties to the
information

in

the hands of

third parties

21 see

Comments of the Advisory Committee on the 1983
Amendments to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26.
It may be
acknowledged that the civil rules of discovery, first
adopted in 1938 for federal courts, have not uniformly
furthered
the
interests
of
speedy
and
inexpensive
resolution of disputes.
The disappointment in this
respect does not, however, imply any lessening of the
governmental interest and purpose.
22 cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 u.s.
589, 599 (1977); Cox
Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 u.s. 469, 488 (1974).
Rule
26(c) includes among its express purpose the protection of
a
"party
or
person
from
annoyance,
embarrassment,
oppression or undue burden or expense • • • " Although the
Rule contains no specific reference to privacy or to other
rights or interests that may be implicated, such matters
are implicit in the broad purpos(
~

:::;_e

,___.-
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may be subject to discovery.
There is an opportunity, ther

for litigants to obtain-only is

m _).~
:::;.·
tion* a r privac~

~~eventing
rando,
(1888) •

this sort of abuse of its processes.

supra,
As

at

176-177:

Gumbel

v.

Pitkin,

See Herbert v.

124

u.s.

145-146

stated by Judge Friendly in International Products

ea. v. Koons,

325 F.2d 403, 407-408,

"(w]hether or not the Rule

~/.u.t&a..t
itself authorizes [a particular order]

"\

as

to

the

court's

jurisdiction to do

'equitable powers of courts of

• . • we have · no question
this

law over

under

their

prevent abuses, oppression, and injustices . .

the

inherent

own process,
I II

to

The preven-

tion of the abuse that can attend the coerced production of information under a state's discovery rule is

~~~~

cation for a

~rou i~iO'fl

£EH

~sufficient

protective orders.

"'

c

justifi-

~
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We also find that the scope of the provision for protective
~ LL...4

.

orders 1n the Washington rules
be sure,

Rule 26(c)

~..,~
p~s
""\

constitutional

~·
m~~te~.
-1

To

confers broad discretion on the trial court

to decide when a protective order is appropriate and what degree

/
of protection is requir j ' - Tfie !e<j1slature has determined that

-

such discretion is

~

necessar ~ l'w!ve ~

and we agree.

The trial

~

" a:;

is in the best position to weigh ~ly the competing
"'

eeds

and. interests of

~~ Amendment
would

those affected by discovery.

Moreover,

scrutiny of each request for a protective

n~gessita~e

burdensome

evidentiary

findings 2 3

and

might lead to time-consuming interlocutory appeals--a result in-

~ ~1£~-f,...;Lu..

imical to

the~goal

of securing "the just, speedy, and inexpensive

determipation of every action."

Wash. Super. Ct. C.

R. 1.

The

unique character of the discovery process requires
court have substantial latitude to fashion protective orders.

We

therefore hold that where, as in this case, a protective order is

23 see, e.g.,
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita
Indus. Co., 529 F.Supp. 866 (E.D. Pa. 1981).

Elec.

25.

limited
does

1:-o

~

1\

not

pretrial civil discovery and

the

a~t: em%

t-o

restrict

gained from other sources,

the

dissemination of

information

it does not offend the First Amend-

ment.

v
'llle

facts

illustrate the concerns that justifiably may prompt a court to

~ 4/wf-/&A~- ~

issue a protective order.

I~
i....<:! ~ "'"'"" .
~·~

1

the trial cou r t' s or d er

~he

p-'~lA/

:

~~

!#.,..

~

t;t¥'~

.. [) ,

, ~
'J,~

Aquarian Foundation is a
apparently unpopular religion. The tria court's
to grant the protective order was based on
Foundation members.
The affidavits stat d
the
Foundation
received
publicity,
m
ers
received
physical threats and suffered harra m nt.
Under the
order compelling discovery, respond ts ~ required to
produce a list of all donations
r the five year period ,..__ _
preceding the institution of
1 s suit, a J. ORS w1
k ...
names and addresses of all onors.
Because all member t::j,L~
are required to make dona · ons, and ~ few donors ar e-" - -not members, the list o donors effectively comprises the ~
members of the Foun
ion.
As a result, respondents
understandably are
ncerned as to the likely detrimental
effect that disse nation might have on this unpopular
religious sect
d its members.
Petitioners do not deny
their intent t publish discovered information that is not
subject to
protective order. Therefore, petitioners, in
the exerci e of their First Amendment right to freedom of
the. pre s, may penalize respondents for the exercise of
the1r
irst Amendment right to freedom of religion.
~el . se of the names of . donors al~o potentially would
1
1nge the donors' freedom of assoc1ation. See Brown v.
Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee, 103 S.Ct. 416,
420 (1982) •

/t --

J''

~

,/
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s;. ••

~uw<:,zc•l-; w--·p£;2!~

allowing discovery was extremely broad.

?

It compelled respondents

- among other things - to identify all persons who had made donations over a five-year period to Rhinehart and the Aquarian Foundation,

together with

the amounts donated.

In effect the order

~ .#.:u ;a , ( '•s•t,.,
would compel disclosure of membership as well as sources of fi-

..:;:

rder

~t~p~s==ion

"violate

~

~otlld

elig~

of thi:Cc.

their First Amendment rights to privacy,
court

ef

and

was

it--that such an order
necessary

to

important

~
rights ) and to ensure
1

t:k./.u-

discovery does

9
~'-'\ ~See

)-

not l\ gbse-I=-t:~et:

~

~~~

note 8 supra (quoting the terms
f the protective
order). The Supreme Court of Washington the importance of
ensuring that potential litigants have unimpeded access to
the courts: "[A]s the trial court rightly observed, rather
than e~pose themselves to unwanted publicity, individuals
may( well forego the pursuit of their just claims.
The
judicial system will thus have made the utilization of its
remedies so onerous that the people will be reluctant or
unwilling to use it, resulting in frustration of a right
as valuable as that of speech itself." 654 P.2d, at 689.
Cf. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,
Footnote continued on next page.
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ermined that the trial court's decision met t
requirement's
order.

of

Having

state

found

law

that

for

the

issuance

of

the State's provi

orders satisfies the Uflit ~ eatas Con
the state courts' construction o

protective

itution, we are bound by

state law.

VI~
We hold

the provisioR

~o.r

protective orderl
does

First

Fourteenth

Amendments.

The

judgment

not violate t e
accordingly

----Affirmed

-------

404 U.S. 508, 510
428-429 (1963).

(1972); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.

415,

j (
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The Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart

No. 82-1721
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the issue whether parties to civil litigation have a First Amendment right to disseminate, in advance of
trial, information gained through the pretrial discovery process.
I

Respondent Rhinehart is the spiritual leader of a religious

, ,.

.

group,

the

Aquar ian Foundation.

The Foundation has

fewer than

1,000 members, most of whom are located in the State of Washington.

Aquarian beliefs include life after death and the ability

to communicate with the dead through a medium.

Rhinehart is the

primary Aquarian medium.
Over the years, the Seattle Times and the Walla Walla UnionBulletin have published stories about Rhinehart and the Foundation. 1

13~

Feef4flg th 1 t these articles cast him and his followers in

Footnote(s) 1 will appear on following pages.
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/)
a

~ight,

/~

y~-vv1~

~

Rhinehart brought this action on behalf of himself
~

1\

md-the

Found~tiun.

lj

Four other members of the Foundation joined

the suit as plaintiffs.

The complaint seeks $14,100,000 in darn-

~
~es

for defamation and invasion of privacy.

The complaint al-

leges that the newspapers and the authors of the articles, all
~titioners

here, defamed Rhinehart by referring to him as a "Jim

Jones Guyana-like leader of 'a bizarre Seattle cult.'"
plaint

also

objects

to

several

passages

in

the

articles

challenged the legitimacy of Rhinehart's activities
plied that Rhinehart
supporters.

The

c~ ~ly

complaint

The cornthat

a~

im-

had defrauded his followers and

alleges

that

tj he

articles

injured

Rhinehart's reputation and impeded the Foundation's fund-raising
efforts. 2

With

respect

to

the

oundation who joined the suit,

four

individual members of

the

the complaint alleges that the

1 At issue in this case are 11 articles published in
1973, 1978, and 1979. The record does not contain a copy
of the articles, but Rhinehart appended excerpts from the
articles to his original complaint. See App. 20a-29a.
2 The complaint implies that disparaging remarks in the
articles had made the retention of old members and the
recruitment of new ones more difficult.

7Cd--

:;

~-1-~-~
/..~

/>?~

~ ~~~. .......,.....""7:/"._

'4

?
articles

r.l

page 3.

. I-~

1na~~u~~teiy

in the

nude during a Foundation presentation at a prison.

According to

'?

the complaint,

the publication of these misrepresentations and

inaccuracies, and petitioners' conduct in gathering information

L-d4c!. /
a ~ actionable

for the articles, constituted

")

z , (.

invasion of privacy.

7

1\

-~.).~.~--1-AA·:~
Petitioners filed an answer to the complaint and began t-fte
-(

discovery

I

p.racQBS.

the production of

Petitioners deposed Rhinehart and requested
certain documents.

Respondents

turned over

some financial information, including Rhinehart's income tax returns for several years,

3

but r~~"de"ts refused to produce re-

quested documents containing the names and addresses of donors to
and members

of

the

Foundation.

They

also refused

to divulge

Rhinehart's current address.

3 Respondents contend that petitioners assured them in
the early stages of discovery that any information that
respondents produced would not be published.
Respondents
argue that petitioners thereby waived their right to
object to any protective order subsequently issued by the
trial court.
The Washington Supreme Court apparently did
not cons ide r t h i s argument • Ow:~~::I:-Q.J..+l~_Q,fiiiiiiiiQ~t;L-l~e.cc.u;I.CI..f~--~~

page 4 .

.
Petitioners

viewed

respondents'

initial

requests for information as inadequate.
questing

an

order

compelling

discovery

response

to

their

They filed a motion repersuant

to washington

z &(.?Jl' (

Superior Court Civil Rule 26(c~. 4

Respondents opposed the motion

on the ground that compelled production of the identities of its

4 cR 26(c) provides:
"Protective Orders. Upon moton by a party or by
the person from whom discovery is sought, and
for good cause shown, the court in which the
action is pending or alternatively, on matters
relating to a deposition, the court in the
county where the deposition is to be taken may
make any order which justice requires to protect
a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression,
or
undue
burden
or
expense,
including one or more of the following: (1) that
the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery
may
be
had
only
on
specified
terms
and
conditions, including a designation of the time
or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only
by a method of discovery other than that
selected by the party seeking discovery; (4)
that certain matters not be inquired into, or
that the scope of the discovery be limited to
certain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted
with no one present except persons designated by
the court; (6) that a deposition after being
sealed be opened only by order of the court; (7)
that a
trade secret or other confidential
research, development, or commercial information
not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a
designated
way;
(8)
that
the
parties
simultaneously
file
specified
documents
or
information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be
opened as directed by the court.
"
CR 26(c) is identical to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(c) and is
typical of the provisions adopted in many states.

page 5.

donors and members would violate the members' and donors' First
Amendment rights to privacy, freedom of religion, and freedom of
association.

The trial court rejected this argument and ordered

respondents to identify all donors who made contributions during
the five years preceding the date of the complaint, along with
the amounts donated.
to

divulge

enough

' l court a 1 so requ1re
.
Th e t r1a

membership

information

to

d~
PQ elel BRers

substantiate

any

claims of diminished membership.

w~

~

y~~M

Respondents then ~A th e trial court to issue a protective

~ order

~

covering any information gained by petitioners

through~

~~/

discovery process and prohibiting petitioners from disclosing the
-'\

information to third parties.

Initially, the

~1

court refused

to grant the protective order, stating that such an order would
have
speech

"the effect of

.---

and

/ . t e r . the

of

the

imposing prior restraint on the freedom of
press

guaranteed

~

trial

court's

i rri tia:l

by

ruling,

the

first

amendment."

respondents

affidavits of several members of the Foundation.

submitted

The affidavits

averred that public release of the donor lists potentially would

~

.?

:

.') . J

#

,

~

JJ. ~--( page 6.
~/);'(...
~~

·~tv a~ ..

YUrv
Lb~~~~~
~~~~ :j ~~If
,
v

.

cause a drop in Foundation membership and income and would subject Foundation members

to harassment and repr isa~ Based on

these affidavits, the trial court issued an order, as autAeFtBeo

;1--! 9:~)

A¥ Waahington

Ci sri 1

obtained

through

financial

affairs of

Rule

the

2e'(b) (:l:i'r.

discovery

protecting . any

process

that

the various plaintiffs,

information

pertained

to

"the

the names and ad-

dresses of Aquarian Foundation members, contributors, or clients,
and the names and addresses of those who have been contributors,
clients, or donors to any of the various plaintiffs."
proh 1'b't
1 e d pe t't'
1 1oner s

·~
d'1 ssem1na
' . ·t.1ng

f rom us lf't9
. .It or

The order

th e 1n
. f orma-

tion in any way except where necessary to prepare for and try the
case.

By

its

terms,

the

order

did

not

apply

to

gained by means other than the discovery process. 5

information
In an accom-

5 The relevant portions of the protective order state:
"2. Plaintiffs' motion for a protective order is
granted with respect to information gained by
the defendants through the use of all of -tnediscovery processes
regarding
the
financial
affairs of the various plaintiffs, the names and
addresses
of
Aquarian
Foundation
members,
contributors, or clients, and the names and
addresses of those who have been contributors,
clients,
or donors to any of the various
plaintiffs.
Footnote continued on next page.
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~~,,~\)~

r-W-'a.e..~~'

~~~f.

~~}-~~~·

panying opinion,

1\

the trial court recognized that the protective

order would restrict petitioners' right to publish information in
their possession, but the court reasoned that the restriction was
\\

necessary to avoid

the

'~hilling effect that dissemination would

have on "a party's willingness to bring his case to court."
Respondents appealed from the trial court's production order
and petitioners appealed from the protective order.
~ Supreme

The ~

lY(W~f-w..
Court \ affirmed both.

654 P.2d 673 (1982).

WL--14v ~1RegardiAg

k

the protective order, the court reasoned:
"Assuming then that a protective order may fall, ostensibly, at least, within the definition of a 'prior restraint of free expression', we are convinced that the
interest of the judiciary in the integrity of its discovery processes is sufficient to meet the 'heavy burden' of justification.
The need to preserve that integrity is adequate to sustain a rule like CR 26 (c)
which authorizes a trial court to protect the confiden-

3. The defendants and each of them shall make no
use of and shall not disseminate the information
defined in paragraph 2 which is gained throug n-- ~
discovery, other than such use as is necessary
in order for the ·discovering party to prepare
and try the case.
As a result, information
gained by a defendant through the discovery
process may not be published by any of the
defendants or made available to any news media
for
publication
or
dissemination.
This
protective order has no application except to
information gained by the defendants through the
use of the discovery processes.

page 8.

tiali ty of information
tion." 654 P.2d, at 690.

c.r ven

for

purposes of li tiga-

The court noted that a predicate to a protective order under CR
26 (c)

is a finding by the trial court that the movant has "good

cause" for objecting to dissemination of the information and that
the protective order is needed to "protect a party or person from
annoyance,
expense."

embarrassment,

oppression,

According to the court

or

undue

burden

or

~~

'Athese

findings erdinar ily ar e;;--

~ justif~he ; :..!::t~•~J:h~

7

•ights

7&?-d..d~~

\.1

of
The

6 Although the Washington Supreme Court assumed arguendo
that a protective order could be viewed as an infringement
on First Amendment rights, the court also stated:
"A persuasive argument can be made that when
persons are required to give information which
they would otherwise be entitled to keep to
themselves, in order to secure a government
benefit
or
perform an
obligation
to that
government,
those receiving that information
waive the right to use it for any purpose except
those which are authorized by the agency of
government which exacted the information." CITE
~etition, at 20a)
7The

Washington Supreme Court also held that, because
the protective order shields respondents from "abuse of
the discovery privilege," respondents could not object to
the order compelling production.
We do not consider here
that aspect of the Washington Supreme Court's decision.
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holdings of the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of

Columbia

in

In

re Halkin,

598 F.2d 176

(1979), 8 the United

States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in In re San Juan
Star Co., 662 F.2d 108 (1981), 9 and the Supreme Court of Georgia
in Georgia Gazette Publishing Co.

v.

Ramsey,

248 Ga.

528,

284

8 The Halkin decision was a
atershed in this area of the
law.
Until a panel of th
Court of Appeals for the
mstrict of Columbia decided Halkin, the federal courts of
appeals that had consider d the question had assumed
without substantial discussi n that the First Amendment
did not affect a trial c urt's authority to restrict
dissemination of informati
produced during pretrial
discovery.
See Rodgers v. U ited States Steel Cor ., 536
F. 2d 1001, 1006 (CA3 1976) ; International Paper Products
v. Koons, 325 F. 2d 403, 407 408 (CA2 1963) •
The Halk in
court considered the issue in de~.
Referring to a
protective order as a "paradigmatic prior restraint," t~
~ court determined
that such orders require close
First Amendment scrutiny.
The court held that before a
trial court should issue a protective order that restric~
expression, it must be satisfied that three criteria have
been met--"the harm posed by dissemination must be
substantial and serious; the restraining order must be
narrowly drawn and precise;
and
there must be no
alternative means ~protecting the public interest which
intrudes less directly on expression." Id., at 191.
9 In San Juan Star, the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit considered the rule propounded in Halkin and
rejected that stringent approach to the constitutionality
of protective orders.
Although the San Juan court held
that protective orders require some First Amendment
scrutiny,
the
court
reasoned
that
First
Amendment
interests are somewhat lessened in the civil discovery
context. The court stated: "In general, then, we find the
appropriate measure of such limitations in a standard of
'good cause' that incorporates a 'heightened sensitivity'
to the First Amendment concerns at stake, ••• " 662 F.2d,
at 116.

page 10.

S.E.2d 386 (1981).

We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict

1-k_
on t~~ First Amendment issue.
II

~~~~~

A 'the

First Amendment states:

"Congress shall make no law •••

abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for

a

redress of grievances."

The protections afforded by the

First Amendment are encompassed within the term "liberty" as contained in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and

~ applicable

to

the action of state legislatures

and courts.

See First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435

779

Nebraska

( 1978) ;

Press Assn.

Burstyn,

Inc.

v.

v.

Stuart,

(1975);

Joseph

Wilson,

343

(1952).

The broad sweep of the First Amendment

u.s.

42 7 U.S.

u.s.

495,

539,

765,
556

500-501

~.t-<-~
s~ms to prohibit

"'

all restraints on free expression, but this Court has declined to
t}...-

give that language

aR -eQ.t;;k:.eq

"

literal interpretation.

"Freedom

of speech ••. does not comprehend the right to speak on any subject at any time."

American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339

U
u.s.

382,

J

~ ~~

~OJ~~~

~. ~.(~~ ~#'t:~·'
q~i 5~;_ ''F.~~

(1950).

394
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Today,

we

consider

whether

the

First

.JZk ·

7?
• 1
Amendment protects a party to a civil suit who wishes to dissemi-

A

for the peaceful resolution of disputes.
rality of Law 55

(1977):

K.

Llewellyn,

See L. Fuller, The MoBramble Bush 12

(1962).

:a~

As a means of accomplishing this goal, all states, and the United
States, provide a

judicial system responsible for civil matters

and designed to facilitate dispute resolution.
_.~,_j t

~

One common ele-

t .).( , /

ment in all of these systems is a provision for civil discovery.
'\

The washington civil rules, like their federal counterparts,

-

~ ~·~
to secure
~~we~l9Reu

h
.
d.
d .
.
d
t e JUSt, spee y, an 1nexpens1ve eter-

1\

mination of every action."

CR 1: Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 1.

common to both the Washington and
for exterisive pretrial discovery.
140,

142

(Wash.

1969) •

federal

Also

rules are provisions

McGugart v. Bromback, 463 P.2d

Under those rules, a party "may obtain

discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant

1-~F:)
J

page 12.

to the subject matter involved in the pending action."
(1983-1984 Supp.) .

The rule also states

CR 26(b)

that discovery

limited to matters that will be admissible at trial.

is not

Instead, a

party may seek any information that "appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
(1983-1984
Wash.

Supp.); 10 Trust

Fund Services v.

CR 26(b) (1)

Aro Glass Co.,

89

2d 758, 575 P.2d 716, 719 (1978); Bushman, supra, at 1081.

The broad scope of these provisions necessarily allows for discovery of much information that is only tangentially relevant to
the

litigation.

See

4 Moore's

Federal

Practice and

Procedure

26 (b) (1) provides in full:
"In
General.
Parties
may
obtain
discovery
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action, whether it relates to the claim
or defense fo the party seeking discovery or to
the claim or defense of any other party,
including the existence, description, nature,
custody, condition and location of any books,
documents, or other tangible things and the
identity
and
location
of
persons
having
knowledge of any discoverable matter.
It is not
ground for objection that the information sought
will be
inadmissible at the trial if the
information sought appears reasonably calculated
to
lead
to
the
discovery
of
admissible
evidence."

page 13.

,[26.56[1].

If a

litigant fails

to cooperate with requests for

1
~

discovery, the requesting party may seek an order from the trial
court compelling discovery.

CR 37 (a)

(1983-1984 Supp.).

If the

I

trial court issues the requested order, and a party fails to comply,

t:fl(

the trial court can enforce the order through exercise of

its contempt powers.

CR 37 (b)

(1983-1984 Supp.).

)

)~
lA--"-'

The Washington Supreme Court has recognized that the same
policy considerations that led to adoption of the Federal Rules
of

Civil

Procedure

underlie

McGugart, supra, at 143. 11

the

Washington

Civil

Rules.

The purpose of such liberal discovery

11 In the State of Washington, as in many states, the
rules of civil procedure are modeled on the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
Bushman v. New Holland Division, 88
Wash. 2d 429, 518 P.2d 1078, 1080 (1978); Moore v. Wentz,
11 Wash. App. 796, 525 P.2d 290,
(Wash. App. 1974).
The drafters of the Washington Civil Rules prefaced the
rules with the comment that the format and numbering of
the rules was intended to mirror that of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
The drafters hoped that this would
facilitate use of federal materials in the research of the
Washington rules.
In addition, the Washington Supreme
Court has stated that when the language of a Washington
rule and its federal counterpart are the same, courts
should look to decisions interpreting the federal rule
when trying to construe the Washington rule.
American
Discount Corp. v. Saratoga West, Inc., 81 Wash. 2d 34, 499
P.2d 869, 871 (1972); see In the Matter of Johns-Manville
Corp., 99 Wash. 2d 193, 660 P.2d 271,
(1983).
This
rule of statutory construction applies--in this case
because the Washington rule that provides for scope of J
Footnote continued on next page.
~

~
Vf~
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rules

is to make civil trials "less a game of blindman's bluff

and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed
to the fullest practicable extent."
Gamble Co.,
to

all

356

relevant

discovery rules

u.s.

677, 682

unprivileged

United States v.

(1958).

Proctor

&

By giving parties access

information

before

trial,

modern

~~
~e to narrow the issues that need to be liti-

gated and allow • the parties to obtain and organize evidence for

\

~~~~~~~k.,J.~-1-o

use

at

s.

trial

1\

trial. '\ Di scaveqr thereh;r.I\ expedi te;t-- the conduct: of -the

alld

Miller,

bel ps

Federal

to el imiRate

surprise.

Practice

Procedure

and

knowledge of all the relevant facts

I essential

(

to proper litigation ... -

ing Hickman v. Taylor, 329

u.s.

See C.
§2001

Wright
(1970).

and

j

A.

"Mutual

_atherea by both parties is

McGugart 1 supra, at 143 (quot-

495, 507 (1947)). 12

_)
--

civil discovery and the issuance of protective orders is
virtually identical to its counterpart in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Compare CR 26(b) and (c) with
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(b) and (c).

12 In Hickman, the Court emphasized the~~
~impert~~ce
of
pretrial discovery:
1'The pre-trial deposition-discovery mechanism
established by Rules 26 to 37 is one of the most
significant innovations of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Under
the
prior
federal
Footnote continued on next page.
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It is important to emphasize that broad discovery rules are
intended to further

the state's interest in expediting and fa-

cilitating the administration of justice, not to provide a source
of public information.

Pretrial access to information in civil

trials is not a result mandated by the First Amendment guarantee
of freedom of expressio • 13

This Court has long held that the

l-.~

~

practice, the pre-trial functions of noticegiving, issue-formulation and fact-revelation
were performed primarily and inadequately by the
pleadings.
Inquiry into the issues and the
facts before trial was narrowly ~ nfined and was
often cumbersome in method. ~ The new rules,
however, restrict the pleadings to the task of
general notice-giving and invest the depositiondiscovery process with a vital role in the
preparation for trial.
The various instruments
of discovery now serve (1) as a device, along
with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 16, to
narrow and clarify the basic issues between the
parties, and ( 2) as a device for ascertaining
the facts, or information as to the existence o
whereabouts of facts, relative to those issues.
us civil trials in the federal courts no
longer need be carried on in the dark.
The way
is
now
clear,
consistent
with
recognized
privileges,
for
the parties to obtain the
fu lest possible knowl~~~~~~~--~~~~~~
ts before trial."
29 u.s.,
13 Pretrial proceedings were not open to the public at
common law, Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 u.s. 368, 389
(1979), and pretrial discovery ordinarily is conducted in
private as a matter of modern practice.
See generally
Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation,
69 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1983).

First Amendment does not create a
Pell v.

u.s.

Procunier,

1, 16-17

417

(1965).

u.s.

right to gather

817, 834

(1974):

information.

Zemel v.

(

Rusk, 381

As a result, a state legislature is free

to enact civil rules that confer no rights to pretrial discovery.
Conversely, a legislature, in the exercise of its sovereign

~

/~.~~
~
~

~

pow-~~?

ers, may confer broad rights of discovery in the civil
In any event, a litigant's right to discovery depends on

~~-·

of the legislature.
Although

proponents

~~-~

of

liberal

discovery

rules

extoll

benefits that can accrue from extensive access to pretrial access
to information, they also acknowledge that the rules are susceptible to abuse.

See Herbert v.

(POWELL, J., concurring). 14

Lando,

441

u.s.

153, 179

(1979)

It would be impossible for a legis-

lature to anticipate every abuse that can occur.

As a result, it

is common practice in many jurisdictions to allow the trial court

14 one of the most commonly v iced objections to current
civil practice is the tende cy of parties to abuse the
POWELL, 446 u.s. 997 (1980):
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(c).

fl-lr(JI

tU.L

omma~

to 1983 Amendment of

~ ~ ~.

wide

iscretion in fashioning the protection that is appropriate

in a

case.

See

c.

Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice

(1970).

thorize

In Washington,

the civil rules au-

court, upon a showing of "good cause," to issue
~

order wRere

a protect

/\

nee,

~-

.

~

~u~

n~y to ~

embarrassment,

oppression,

~I

or

party or person

undue

burden or

~r

J(s in this case, such an order may ~t the recipA

expense."

ient of discovered information not to use or disseminate the information except to the extent necessary to prepare for trial.

lba-~~~

~t,

a protective order, such as that under consid-

5f.b'f-

"a~~Rt; .t"'~ the discovering party's
W~ ~ ~e-..,.J1 ~~ ~ .<<(; )@¢;Mf >~ ~

eration

here,

freedom

of

is

an

expression.

IR

tl:l:i:--et---- cen-ts-ext ,---fl.Qweve.r,

the

Eirst

~~~--~
~t

1\

does not operate to lessen the trial court's power to

, 1#--f~~
the l1t1gant's right

restr1ct
~

~

The power

·~~
~1
power

to

disseminate

~
~
information.
~

to order such a restriction derives from the state's

to deny access altogether.

If a party chooses to take ad-

vantage of the court's processes to gain access to information,

k

~)...

~

s~J
-.
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are designed
ensure that the information is used only for the purposes for
access is intended. Accord Snepp v. United States, 444

~

u.s.

r

.J~

a.,_
(1980).

..

-~
~

If the First Amendment does not prevent the trial

~4/-tA...

from

refusing
prevent

to provide any discovery

the court

it ~~

to litigants,

from granting only

4~

access. ~

limited

~.~

!£~

In re Halkin, 598 F.2d, at 208 (Wilkey, J., dissenting)./

/U.4-I- ,1.()
C!--c.'A t./-.

B

Petitioners argue that the source of information should make
no difference in determining whether the First Amendment protects
parties who want to disseminate that information.
ery,

7 ( .d

I·

I

~~

./1

I

I

in petitioners' view, is just another source

ith no constitutional significance'j

Civil discov#

ol

)

"

'

'

I

information A

They contend that the pub-

lie has as much interest in, and will benefit as much from,

in-

formation generated by civil discovery as that gathered in other
ways.

Thus,

the argument continues, we should employ the same

First Amendment

analysis. ~~!,~~~~~,;..
""'

~~~a-1-~.

c:ere limited outside the pretrial discovery context and requirej
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respondents to overcome the ordinarily heavy presumption favoring
First

Amendment

protection. 15

Petitioners

contend

that

under

that analysis, a protective order should issue "[o]nly after the
court adequately weighs all the interests and concludes that the
harm posed by dissemination of specific documents is so substantial and serious that the denial of such an order would immediII

ately imperil a compelling state interest
tioners,
order

at

is

restrict

42.

Petitioners also submit that

warranted,

it should

dissemination by

the

be narrowly
least

Brief of Petiif a

protective

/;:::.t:;:e1

and should

intrusive means available.

Id • , at 4 3-4 5 •
Petitioners'

argument overlooks the fact that their posses-

£";h~~rder

~

~

~v"-~

,JA

~~ ~ ~
~

15 Petitioners would have us vi ....
as
the kind of "prior retraint" k-~QhemQQtl.¥ 4- de~OQHCed in
Near v. Minnesota, 283 u.s. 697 (1931), and its progeny.
We reject petitioners' contention that a protective order
requires traditional "prior restraint" analysis.
Unlike
the
classic
prior
restraint,
see
Gannett
Co.
v.
PePasguale, 443 u.s., at 399 (POWELL, J., concurring), the
protective
order
at
issue
here
does
not
preclude
petitioners
from
publishing
any
information
about
respondents or other members of the foundation.
Instead,
the order only prohibits pretrial dissemination of certain

categories of information gained through discovery.

~~~t:
~9
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sion

of

grace,
rules,

information

not

is

a

constitutional

the

Washington

~ deeply

matter
right.

of

legislative

Through

legislature

has

its

and

civil

enabled

judicial
discovery

petitioners

to

into the private affairs of others and to enforce

~

~
~

inquiries with the contempt power of the courts.

"
covery is
one

of

~ mos~trusive

the

A

least

method of

resistable.

Civil dis-

~nformation

nhate'lle-f -ttre---pubH c- iut~t

and
in

~~~~~
di~~~ww~wu~~~~-w~~~~~~~e-~·~h

petitioners contention

A.

that civil discovery
tion.

~s

are just another source of informa-

~k~~-

A

Petitioners'

argument also ignores the adverse effects that

..
~h ~ _ _//i~11k
dissemination might have on the rights of the 1 1t1gant w ; -~~
-1

produce information under the discovery rules.

First, this Court

has recognized that the First Amendment guarantees the right of
access to the courts.
Unlimited,

u.s.

404

u.s.

California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking
508,

510

(1972);

see

NAACP v.

Button,

371

Ck~~~~~~
A rule restricting ~e availability of

415, 428-429 (1963).

~ ~~,1-o~~~~~~
protective orders might have a chilling effect on the exercise of
~~~-~

~ ~ ~~~ ~~V"~4e=e.e•--z.....-h ~

~-

~~~~

1"~L~~, ~-~- -~ , -~·
~,.3

w/()

~-~ .
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this right of access. 16

~
asem l Halron o f
~~itant

A potential litigant faced with possible

information

~

~ocuc-ed

during pretrial discovery

to bring suit if discovery might uncover per-

"\

sonally

embarrassing,

politically

sensitive,

or

commercially

valuable information. 1?
Second, although less of a problem in the civil context than
in

criminal

trials,

wide

dissemination

of

pretrial

materials

could jeopardize the ability of the court to afford the litigants
a fair trial.

Publicity could make

it ~ to

impanel an

~

16 The trial cour ~in this case based the protective order
on the
·
·
e.ffect that dissemination would have on
respondents' exercise of their right of access to the
courts.
The preamble to the order states that the trial
court issued the order after "having considered that the
absence of protective orders would have a chilling effect
on a person's willingness to bring a case to court and
that this would have the effect of denying persons access
to the courts, ••• "
~ ?
~.$
17 under the rule proposed
y petitioners, a pr tective
order would not survive a Fi st Amendment challeng unless
the party requesting the
rder ~ demonstrate
that
denial
of
the
order
"wo ld
immediately
imperil
a
compelling state interest."
wrry t e ~ if a ~ private
litigants would be able to meet this exacting standard.
Moreover, the subjective nature of the recommended test
would make it difficult for any litigant to predict the
outcome of his re uest for protection.
·
·
· ght
ave a subs tan
e feet
ecision whether to
cti

l

n.,.----_.;;.--
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I

~(.~~

impartial jury or might
settlement.
flict

~

a litigant to accept an unfavorable

Thus, petitioners proposed rule could create a con-

between

the

rights of

freedom of expression and the due

process right to a fair trial.
Third,

petitioners

(ii,.{' ~H\eflt

over looks

the substantial

inva-

sion of privacy rights that may result from application of liberal

discovery

(1977).

rules. 18

Liberal

See

discovery

Whalen

v.

Roe,

429

rules do not make

u.s.

589,

599

an exception for

1"~~~
18 The

a.~~~~~

case illustrate the ~ conflict of
interests ~ t
p.
The Aquarian Foundation is a
small, unorthodox religion.
The trial court's decision to
grant the protective order was based on affidavits of
Foundation members.
The affidavits stated that each time
the
Foundation
received
publicity,
members
received
physical threats and suffered harrassment.
Under the
/.LJ...L
~
order compelling discovery, respondents A wj JJ ba~e to
~-- · 6 · ·
produce a list of all donations for the five year period
preceding the institution of this suit, along with the
names and addresses of all donors.
Because all members
are required to make donations, and very few donors are
not members, the list of donors effectively comprises the
members of the Foundation.
As a result, respondents
J L _ .~ ~ •..o .1...... ~ .L.L£.
ightfl:illy _f~ ta-t j f ~ ~n caJ) ad fOf' tlnde-r,~-~ t
d
the
~
Foundation will suffer for no reason ....J'J:.her ,_than their
~
choice of religion.
Petitioners h.av8 ~ e~denied ehere~
tG.-t- ~ ~
intent to publish .3![¥:! discovered information that is not
subject to a protective order. Therefore, petitioners, in
·
~
the exercise of their First Amendment right to freedom of
·
~f-IJ'1;<the press, may penalize respondents for the exercise of
~I'A-A.~~, their
First Amendment right to freedom of religion.
/1i.A.-·~ Release of the names of donors ..(would ~ infringe the
~ ~- donors' freedom of association.
See Brown v. Socialist
~I'(~
Workers '74 Campaign Committee, 103 S.Ct. 416, 420 (1982).
f

this

J

t

~~

~~-~~(1./AA-c(} ~~J
( 1~ ,/ ~
~

~~~

J

df-~~-~-~

1

J..-.1-<. ,_

1
~-At~~~~

~~/~rA~~

~~~~~/;d
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intimate or embarrassing

information.~e

possibility of

disclo~

sure of such private matters underscores the inequity of forcing )

6
a litigant to "bear his soul" under threat of contempt, only to
'

deny the court the power to control the dissemination of the re- ,
sulting information.
Petitioners' argument that discovery is just "another source
of information" also fails to acknowledge decisions in which this
Court has recognized the special status that trial participants
occupy in relation to the First Amendment.
not

"surrender
re

their
Halkin,

First Amendment

door,"

In

598

F.2d,

at

viewed

from a different perspective.

Although litigants do

rights
186,
For

at

those

the

courthouse

rights

instance,

must

be

this Court

has approved restriction of the communications of trial participants where necessary to further

the administration of justice.

"In the conduct of a case, a court often finds it necessary to
restrict the free expression of participants, including counsel,
witnesses,
104

n. 21

and

jurors."

(1981).

We

Gulf Oil Co.

v.

Bernard,

also have suggested such

452

u.s.

89,

restrictions as

acceptable alternatives to restraints on observers of court proceedings and

the press.

Nebraska Press,

also Oklahoma Press Publishing Co.
308, 310-311 (1977);
(BRENNAN,
361

J.,

(1966).

v.

427 u.s.,

at 563;

District Court,

see

430 U.S.

Nebraska Press, 427 u.S., at 601 and n. 27

concurring);

Sheppard

v.

Maxwell,

384 U.S.

333,

These statements necessarily imply that the First

Amendment rights of a trial participant in some situations may be
subordinate

to

other

First

Amendment

considerations

and

the

court's interest in the administration of justice.
Finally, we note that the rule petitioners' urge would under- ~
mine the supervisory powers of trial courts.

Courts 'O f

law ~-

herently have extensive equitable powers over their own processes
to prevent abuse, oppression, and injustice.
124 u.s. 131, 144 (1888).

Gumbel v.

Pitkin,

As discussed above, liberal discovery

~~..

~f~

rules create the risk of abuse and may be used to t~ the fair
'1

\nistration of justice. 19

-

f

A protective order designed to pre-

~

whic~~

19we are not unmindful of the investigative uses to
\l!t~;srupulou.s
members of the media could put a court's
~)
Footnote continued on next page.
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vent such abuse and based on a showing of good cause is a reason- ~~
able and necessary exercise of a trial court's inherent powers.
By

limiting

cause

trial

a

trial

courts

abuse is likely.

court's
to

deny

powers

in

discovery

this

context,

requests

in

{

we might

cases

where

In that event, recognition of a First Amendment

right to disseminate discovered information would discourage the
salutory practice of liberal pretrial discovery.

That result, as

suggested by the widespread enactment of liberal discovery procedures,

is not conducive to the effective and efficient adminis-

tration of justice.
III
In light of the minimal First Amendment rights implicated by
pretrial
that

protective

petitioners'

orders

proposed

and
rule

the

substantial

would

have

on

adverse
other

impact

important

discovery processes.
Such offensive use of discovery for
nonlitigious purposes would turn the courts into tools of
the press.
We have never adopted the position that
freedom of the press is so important that the press should
be
able
to
use
the
judicial
processes
to gather
information.
See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834
(1974); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 u.s. 1, 16-17 (1965).
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:;

rights, we hold that the trial court's protective order did not
violate the First Amendment. 20

The judgment accordingly is
Affirmed.

20 our holding today is limited to pretrial proceedings in
a civil trial.
Respondents concede that any information
that is admitted at trial is presumptively public.
See
Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 u.s. 555, 576
(1980) (plurality op.)

04/20

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

/

(

{'

I

Justice Powell

Circulated: _ _ __ _ _ __ _ _
Recirculated: _ __ _ _ __ __

.

1st CHAMBERS DRAFT

i..

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

3

No. 82-1721

SEATTLE TIMES COMPANY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
KEITH MILTON RHINEHART ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF WASHINGTON
[April - , 1984]

delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the issue whether parties to civil litigation have a First Amendment right to disseminate, in advance of trial, information gained through the pretrial discovery process.
I
Respondent Rhinehart is the spiritual leader of a religious
group, the Aquarian Foundation. The Foundation has fewer
than 1,000 members, most of whom live in the State ofWashington. Aquarian beliefs include life after death and the
ability to communicate with the dead through a medium.
Rhinehart is the primary Aquarian medium.
In recent years, the Seattle Times and the Walla Walla
Union-Bulletin have published stories about Rhinehart and
the Foundation. Altogether 11 articles appeared in the
newspapers during the years 1973, 1978 and 1979. The five
articles that appeared in 1973 focused on Rhinehart and the
manner in which he operated the Foundation. They described seances conducted by Rhinehart in which people paid
him to put them in touch with deceased relatives and friends.
The articles also stated that Rhinehart had sold magical
"stones" that had been "expelled" from his body. One article
referred to Rhinehart's conviction, later vacated, for sodomy.
The four articles that appeared in 1978 concentrated on an
"extravaganza" sponsored by Rhinehart at the Walla Walla
JuSTICE POWELL
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~
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State Penitentiary. The articles stated that he had treated
1,100 inmates to a 6-hour-long show, during which he gave
away hetween ~~5 . 000 and $50,000 in cash and prizes. One
article described a ,;chorus line of girls [who] shed their
gowns and bikinis and sang.... " App. 25a. The two articles that ~ppeared in ~979 referred to a purported connection ·
between Rhinehart and Lou Ferrigno, star of the popular
television program, "The Incredible Hulk."
II
Rhinehart brought this action in the Washington Superior
Court on behalf of himself and the Foundation against the Seattle Times, the Walla Walla Union-Bulletin, the authors of
the articles and the spouses of the authors. Five female
members of the Foundation who had participated in the presentation at the penitentiary joined the suit as plaintiffs. 1
The complaint alleges that the articles contained statements
that were "fictional and untrue," and that the defendantspetitioners here-knew, or should have known, they were
false. According to the complaint, the articles "did and were
calculated to hold [Rhinehart] up to public scorn, hatred and
ridicule, and to impeach his honesty, integrity, virtue, religious philosophy, reputation as a person and in his profession
as a spiritual leader." App. 8a. With respect to the Foundation, the complaint also states: "[T]he articles have, or may
have had, the effect of discouraging contributions by the
membership and public and thereby diminished the financial
ability of the Foundation to pursue its corporate purposes."
App. 9a. The complaint alleges that the articles misrepresented the role of the Foundation's "choir" and falsely implied
that female members of the Foundation had "stripped off all
their clothes and wantonly danced naked .... " App. 6a.
The record is unclear as to whether all five of the female plaintiffs participated in the "chorus line" described in the 1978 articles. The record
mentioned
also does not disclose whether any of the female plaintiffs
by name in the articles.
1

wre
c6
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The complaint requests $14,100,000 in damages for the alleged defamation and invasions of privacy. 2
Petitioners filed an answer, denyhb" f"'"ny of t!"le ~ll:::g-:
tions of the complaint and asserting affirmativ~ ddenses. 3
Petitioners promptly initiated extensive discovery. They
deposed Rhinehart, requested production of documents per- ·
taining to the financial affairs of Rhinehart and the Foundation, and served extensive interrogatories on Rhinehart and
the other respondents. Respondents turned over a number
of financial documents, including several of Rhinehart's income tax returns. Respondents refused, however, to disclose certain financial information, 4 the identity of the Foundation's donors during the preceding 10 years, and a list of its
members during that period.
Petitioners filed a motion under the State's Civil Rule 37
requesting an order compelling discovery. 5 In their sup2

-

n.t.--k ~'?
/
1

. ,

Although the complaint does not allege specifically that the articles

~a~se~ a ~ecline in membership of the Foundation, respondents' answers to
.... ~s interrogatories raised this issue.
In response to petitioners re-

":\

quest that respondents' explain the damages they are seeking, respondents' claimed that the Foundation had experienced a drop in membership in
Hawaii and Washington "from about 300 people to about 150 people, and [a]
concurrent drop in contributions." Record 503.
3
Affirmative defenses included contentions that the articles were substantially true and accurate, that they were privileged under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, and that the statute of limitations had run as to
the 1973 articles, that the individual respondents had consented to any invasions of privacy, and that respondents had no reasonable expectation of
privacy when performing before 1,100 prisoners.
'Rhinehart also refused to reveal the current address of his residence.
He submitted an affidavit stating that he had relocated out of fear for his
safety and that disclosure of his current address would subject him to risks
of bodily harm. Petitioners promptly moved for an order compelling
Rhinehart to give his address and the trial court granted the motion.
6
Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 37 provides in relevant part: "A party, upon
reasonable notice to other parties and all persons· affected thereby, may
apply to the court in the county where the deposition was taken, or in the
county where the action is pending, for an order compelling discovery.

"
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porting memorandum, petitioners recognized that the principal issue as to discovery was respondents "refusal[] to permit
any effecti•re i:rrmiry into their f1Y)~""'dal affairs, such as the
source of tiH::.lr donations, tla~ir tinancial transactions, uses of
wealth and assets, and their financial condition in general."
Record 350. Respondents opposed the motion arguing in ·
particular that compelled production of the identities of the
Foundation's donors and members would violate the First
Amendment rights of members and donors to privacy, freedom of religion, and freedom of association. Respondents
also moved for a protective order preventing petitioners from
disseminating any information gained through discovery.
Respondents noted that petitioners had stated their intention
to continue publishing articles about respondents and this litigation, and their intent to use information gained through
discovery in future articles.
In a lengthy ruling, the trial court initially granted the motion to compel and ordered respondents to identify all donors
who made contributions during the five years preceding the
date of the complaint, along with the amounts donated. The
court also required petitioners to divulge enough membership information to substantiate any claims of diminished
membership. Relying on In re Halkin, 598 F. 2d 176
(CADC 1979), 6 the court refused to issue a protective order.
6

The Halkin decision was debated by the courts below. Prior to
H alkin, the only federal court of appeals to consider the question directly
had understood that the First Amendment did not affect a trial court's authority to restrict dissemination of information produced during pretrial
discovery. See International Paper Products v. Koons, 325 F. 2d 403,
407-408 (CA21963). Halkin considered the issue at length. Characterizing a protective order as a "paradigmatic prior restraint," Halkin held that
such orders require close scrutiny. The court also held that before a court
should issue a protective order that restricts expression, it must be satisfied that "the harm posed by dissemination must be substantial and serious; the restraining order must be narrowly drawn and precise; and there
must be no alternative means of protecting the public interest which intrudes less directly on expression." I d., at 191.
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It stated that the facts alleged by respondents in support of
their motion for such an order were too conclusory to warrant
a findinl! of "good cause" as required by Wash. Super. Ct
C R. ~o(c). The court stated, however, that the denial of
petitioners' motion was "without prejudice to [respondents']
right to move for a pr_otective order in respect to specifically ·
described discovery materials and a factual showing of good
cause for restraining defendants in their use of those materials." Record 16.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration in which
they renewed their motion for a protective order. They submitted affidavits of several Foundation members to support
their request. t\ The affidavits averred that public release of
the donor lists would adversely affect Foundation membership and income and would subject its members .to~ harassment and reprisals.
o..~J
Persuaded by these affidavits, the trial court issued a protective order covering all information obtained through the
7

Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(c) provides:
"Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom
discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the
court in the county where the deposition is to be taken may make any order
which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more
of the following: (1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery
may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation
of the time or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of
discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) that
certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be
limited to certain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted with no one
present except persons designated by the court; (6) that a deposition after
being sealed be opened only by order of the court; (7) that a trade secret or
other confidential research, development, or commercial information not
be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way; (8) that the parties
simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed
envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.... "
Rule 26(c) is typical of the provisions adopted in many states.
7
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discovery process that pertained to "the financial affairs of
the various plaintiffs, the names and addresses of Aquarian
Foundation members, contributo:rP n... cl;Pnts, ., ... d +"~... ,... ..,~.,~s
and addresses of those who have been contributors, clients,
or donors to any of the various plaintiffs." App. 65a. The
order prohibited petit-ioners from publishing, disseminating,
or using the information in any way except where necessary
to prepare for and try the case. By its terms, the order did
not apply to information gained by means other than the discovery process. 8 In an accompanying opinion, the trial
court recognized that the protective order would restrict petitioners' right to publish information obtained by discovery,
but the court reasoned that the restriction was necessary to
avoid the "chilling effect" that dissemination would have on
"a party's willingness to bring his case to court." Record 63.
Respondents appealed from the trial court's production
order and petitioners appealed from the protective order.
The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed both. 654 P. 2d
673 (1982). With respect to the protective order, the court
reasoned:
The relevant portions of the protective order state:
"2. Plaintiffs' motion for a protective order is granted with respect to information gained by the defendants through the use of all of the discovery
processes regarding the financial affairs of the various plaintiffs, the names
and addresses of Aquarian Foundation members, contributors, or clients,
and the names and addresses of those who have been contributors, clients,
or donors to any of the various plaintiffs.
3. The defendants and each of them shall make no use of and shall not disseminate the information defined in paragraph 2 which is gained through
discovery, other than such use as is necessary in order for the discovering
party to prepare and try the case. As a result, information gained by a
defendant through the discovery process may not be published by any of
the defendants or made available to any news media for publication or dissemination. This protective order has no application except to information
gained by the defendants through the use of the discovery processes.
App. 65a.
8
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"Assuming then that a protective order may fall, ostensibly, at least, within the definition of a 'prior restraint of
free lw~rePf:'iOn,' we ., ..~ "(ln"inced that the interest Of
the judiciary in the integrity of its discovery processes is
sufficient to meet the 'heavy burden' of justification.
The need to preserve that integrity is adequate to sustain a rule like Rule 26(c) which authorizes a trial court
to protect the confidentiality of information given for
purposes of litigation." I d., at 690. 9
The court noted that "[t]he information to be discovered concerned the financial affairs of the plaintiff Rhinehart and his
organization, in which he and his associates had a recognizable privacy interest; and the giving of publicity to these
matters would allegedly and understandably result in annoyance, embarrassment and even oppression." Ibid. Therefore, the court concluded, the trial court had not abused its
discretion in issuing the protective order. 10
The Supreme Court of Washington recognized that its
holding conflicts with the holdings of the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia in In re H alkin, 598
F. 2d 176 (1979),u and applies a different standard from that
of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in In re San
Although the Washington Supreme Court assumed arguendo that a
protective order could be viewed as an infringement on First Amendment
rights, the court also stated:
"A persuasive argument can be made that when persons are required to
give information which they would otherwise be entitled to keep to themselves, in order to secure a government benefit or perform an obligation to
that government, those receiving that information waive the right to use it
for any purpose except those which are authorized by the agency of government which exacted the information." 654 P. 2d, at 681.
10
The Washington Supreme Court also held that, because the protective
order shields respondents from "abuse of the discovery privilege," respondents could not object to the order compelling production. We do not
consider here that aspect of the Washington Supreme Court's decision.
11
See note 11 supra.
9
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Juan Star Co., 662 F. 2d 108 (1981). 12 We granted certiorari
to resolve the conflict. 13 We affirm.
III
Most states, including Washington, have adopted discovery provisions modeled on Rules 26 through 37 of the Federal .
Rules of Civil Proceaure. F. James and G. Hazard, Civil
Procedure 179 (1977). 14 Rule 26(b)(1) provides that a party
"may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action. . .. " It further provides that discovery is not
limited to matters that will be admissible at trial so long as
the information sought "appears reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence." Wash. Super. Ct.
C. R. 26(b)(1); Trust Fund Services v. Aro Glass Co., 89
Wash. 2d 758, 575 P. 2d 716, 719 (1978); cf. C. Wright and A.
Miller, 8 Federal Practice and Procedure § 2008 (1970). 15
In San Juan Star, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit considered and rejected Halkin's ~inge1~t approach to the constitutionality of
protective orders. Although the San Juan court held that protective orders may implicate First Amendment interests, the court reasoned that
such interests are somewhat lessened in the civil discovery context. The
court stated: "In general, then, we find the appropriate measure of such
limitations in a standard of 'good cause' that incorporates a 'heightened
sensitivity' to the First Amendment concerns at stake .... " 662 F. 2d, at
12

116.

The holding of the Supreme Court of Washington is consistent with the
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in International
Products Corp. v. Koons, 325 F. 2d 403, 407-408 (1963).
14
See Bushman v. New Holland Division, 88 Wash. 2d 429, 518 P. 2d
1078, 1080 (1974). The Washington Supreme Court has stated that when
the language of a Washington rule and its federal counterpart are the
same, courts should look to decisions interpreting the federal rule for guidance. American Discount Corp. v. Saratoga West, Inc., 81 Wash. 2d 34,
499 P. 2d 869, 871 (1972). The Washington rule that provides for the
scope of civil discovery and the issuance of protective orders is virtually
identical to its counterpart in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Compare Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(b) and (c) with Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(b)
and (c).
15
CR 26(b)(1), identical to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) in
effect at the time, provides in full:
13
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The rules do not differentiate between information that is
private or intimate and that to which no privacy interests attach. Under the ruh"' . th~ only eJCp-r~se J1 ..... ~+ ... tions are that
the information sougl1t is not privil.:!g·ect, and is relevant to
the subject matter of the pending action. Thus, the rules
often allow extensive_intrusion into the affairs of both liti- ·
gants and third parties. 16 If a litigant fails to comply with a
request for discovery, the Court may issue an order directing
compliance that is enforceable by the Court's contempt powers. Wash. Super. Ct. R. 37(b). 17
Petitioners argue that the First Amendment imposes strict
limits on the availability of any judicial order that has the effect of restricting expression. They contend that civil discovery is not different from other sources of information, and
therefore the information is "protected speech" for First
Amendment purposes. Petitioners assert the right in this
case to disseminate any information gained through discov"In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the
existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any
books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of
persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground
for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if
the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
16
Under Rules 30 and 31, a litigant may depose a third party by oral or
written examination. The litigant can compel the third party t. d\'§:i:ili~~::i
--__.:~..ae:pe~~~!tfte, to produce tangible evidence at tae ael'esiti9n by serving the third party with a subpoena persuant to Rule 45. Rule 45(b)(l)
authorizes a trial court to quash or modify a subpoena of tangible evidence
"if it is unreasonable or oppressive." Rule 45 also provides: "Failure by
any person without adequate excuse to obey a subpoena served upon him
may be deemed a contempt of the court from which the subpoena issued."
Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 45(f).
17
In addition to its contempt power, Rule 37(b)(2) authorizes a trial court
to enforce an order compelling discovery by other means including, for example, regarding designated facts as taken to be established for purposes
of the action. Cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 37(b)(2)(A).
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ery. They do recognize that in limited circumstances, not
thought to be present here, some information may be restrained. They submit, however, that:
''When f! prv~.ci.!Live order seeks to limit expression, it
may do so only if the proponent shows a compelling governmental interest. Mere speculation and conjecture ·
are insufficient. - Any restraining order, moreover,
must be narrowly drawn and precise. Finally, before issuing such an order a court must determine that there
are no alternatives which intrude less directly on expression." Petitioners' Brief, at 10.

f\We deeliHe-t-o-ru:lopt ~~~nt :rule arged by petitiea~
The protections afforded by the First Amendment are encompassed within the term "liberty" as contained in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore
are applicable to the action of the states. See First National
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 779 (1978); Nebraska Press
Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539, 556 (1976); Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 500-501 (1952). The broad
sweep of the First Amendment seems to prohibit all restraints on free expression, but this Court has declined to
give that language an entirely literal interpretation. In
American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382,
394-395 (1950), 'W# observed that "[f]reedom of speech ...
does not comprehend the right to speak on any subject at any
time." See also Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 23 (1973).
There are "certain well defined and narrowly limited classes
of speech" whose benefit to society is "clearly outweighed by
the social interest in order." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 571, 572 (1942). 18
18
Included among the classes of unprotected speech are utterances that
are likely to cause breaches of the peace and speech that is obscene. See
Chaplinsky, supra, at 573; Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444, 447
(1969); Miller v. California, supra. And in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc .,

lfp/ss 04/21/84

Rider A, p. 10 (Seattle)

SEAlO SALLY-POW
We think the rul~ urged by petitioners would impose an
unwarranted restriction on the duty and discretion of a
trial court to oversee the discovery process.

..

.
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information obtained
through civif discovery authorized by modern Rules of Civil
Procedure may be information protectprl 1-Jy the ~irp~
Amendment. Indeed, we do not doubt that only rarely
would such information fall within the classes of unprotected
speech identified by decisions of this Court. In this case, as
petitioners argue, there certainly is a public interest in knowing more about respondents Rhinehart and the Aquarian
Foundation. This interest may well include most-and possibly all-of what has been discovered as a result of the
Court's order under Rule 26(b)(1).
The critical question therefore be~ whether the
Court's protective order issued under Rule 26(c) is an invalid
restraint on that protected speech. This requires us to decide whether the "practice in question [furthers] an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the
suppression of expression" and whether "the limitation of
First Amendment freedoms [is] no greater than is necessary
or essential to the protection of the particular governmental
interest involved." Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396,
413 (1974); see Brown v. Glines, 444 U. S. 348, 354-355
(1980); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25 (1976).
A

At the outset, it is important to recognize the extent of the
impairment of First Amendment rights that a protective
order, such as the one at issue here, may cause. As in all
civil litigation, petitioners gained the information they wish
to disseminate only by virtue of the trial court's discovery
418 U. S. 323, 340 (1974) we stated that "there is no constitutional value in
false statements of fact." The Court also has held that certain kinds of
commercial speech are entitled only to limited First Amendment protection. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U. S. 557, 562-563 (1980).

~
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processes. 19 As the rules authorizing discovery were
adopted by the state legislature, the processes thereunder
are a matter of legislative grace. A litigant has no Fir~1:,
Amendment right of access to information sought for purposes of trying his suit. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 16-17
(1965); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U. S. 1, 11 (1978) (opinion of BURGER, C. J.). Thus, continued court control over
the discovered information does not raise the same spectre of
government censorship that such control! might suggest in
other situations. See In re Halkin, 598 F. 2d, at 206-207
(Wilkey, J. dissenting).
Moreover, pretrial depositions and interrogatories are not
public components of a civil trial. 20 Such proceedings were
not open to the public at common law, Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368, 389 (1979), and, in general, they
are conducted in private as a matter of modern practice.
See id., at 390; Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective
Order Litigation, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1983). Much of the
information that surfaces during pretrial discovery may be
unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying
19
Although litigants do not "surrender their First Amendment rights at
the courthouse door," In re Halkin, 598 F. 2d, at 186, those rights may be
subordinated to other interests that arise in this setting. For instance, on
several occasions this Court has approved restriction on the communications of trial participants where necessary to ensure a fair trial for a criminal defendant. See Nebraska Press, 427 U. S., at 563; id., at 601 and n. 27
(BRENNAN, J ., concurring); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. District
Court, 430 U. S. 308, 310-311 (1977); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333,
361 (1966). "In the conduct of a case, a court often finds it necessary to
restrict the free expression of participants, including counsel, witnesses,
and jurors." Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U. S. 89, 104 n. 21 (1981).
20
In a concurring opinion in Gannett, CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER stated:
"[D]uring the last 40 years in which the pretrial processes have been enormously expanded, it has never occurred to anyone, so far as I am aware,
that a pretrial deposition or pretrial interrogatories were other than wholly
private to the litigants. A pretrial deposition does not become part of a
'trial' until and unless the contents of the deposition are offered in evidence." 443 U. S., at 396.

~
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cause of action. Therefore, restraints placed on discovered,
but not yet admitted, information is not a restriction on a traditionally accessible source of information.
Finall:r, ; c is significant t '-' note that an order prohibiting
dissemination of aiscovered information before trial is not the
kind of classic prior r~straint that requires exacting First
Amendment scrutiny. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443
U. S., at 399 (POWELL, J. concurring). As in this case, such
a protective order prevents a party from disseminating only
that information obtained through use of the discovery process. Thus, the party may disseminate the identical information covered by the protective order as long as the information is gained through means other than the court's
processes. In sum, judicial limitations on a party's ability to
disseminate information discovered in advance of trial implicates the First Amendment rights of the restricted party to a
far lesser extent than would the same restraint in a different
context. Therefore, our consideration of the provision for
protective orders contained in the Washington Civil Rules
takes into account the unique position that such orders occupy in relation to the First Amendment.
B

Rule 26(c) furthers a substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression. Procunier, 416
U. S., at 413. The Washington Civil Rules enable parties to
litigation to obtain information "relevant to the subject matter involved" that they believe will be helpful in the preparation and trial of the case. Rule 26, however, must be viewed
in its entirety. Liberal discovery is provided for the sole
purpose of assisting in the
of litigated disputes. Because of the liberality of pretrial discovery permitted by Rule 26(b)(1), it is necessary for the trial court to have
the authority to issue protective orders conferred by Rule
26(c). It is clear from experience that pretrial discovery by
depositions and interrogatories has a significant potential for
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abuse. 21 This abuse is not limited to matters of delay and expense; discovery also may seriously implicate privacy intereF~to. nf Utigantc:: !\I"r1 t h~-rrl rarties. 22 The Rules do not distinguish between public and private information. Nor do they
apply only to parties to the litigation, as relevant information
in the hands of third parties may be subject to discovery.
There is an opportunity, therefore, for litigants to obtainincidentally or purposefully-information that in fact not only
is irrelevant but if publicly released could be damaging to
reputation and privacy. The government clearly has a substantial interest in preventing this sort of abuse of its processes. See Cf. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 153, 176-177
(1979); Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U. S. 131, 145-146 (1888). As
stated by Judge Friendly in International Products Co. v.
Koons, 325 F. 2d 403, 407-408, "[w]hether or not the Rule
itself authorizes [a particular protective order] . . . we have
no question as to the court's jurisdiction to do this under the
inherent 'equitable powers of courts of law over their own
process, to prevent abuses, oppression, and injustices ... "'.
(citing Gumbel v. Pitkin, supra). The prevention of the
abuse that can attend the coerced production of information
under a state's discovery rule is sufficient justification for the
authorization of protective orders.
21
See Comments of the Advisory Committee on the 1983 Amendments
c1 ·
es o
to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26.
scovery, first adopte m 1938 for federal courts, have not uniformly furthered the interests of speedy and inexpensive resolution of disputes. The
-l---+-'disappointment in this respect does not, however, imply an l
·
the OV
Cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589, 599 (1977); Cox Broadcasting Corp.
v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 488-491 (1975). Rule 26(c) includes among its express purpose the protection of a "party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense ... " Although the
Rule contains no specific reference to privacy or to other rights or interests
that may be implicated, such matters are implicit in the broad purpose and
language of the Rule.
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c
We also find that the scope of the provision for protective
orders in th.. ; Washington rules poses, in itself, no constit~
tional concern. To be sure, Rule 26(c) confers broad discretion on the trial court to decide when a protective order is appropriate and what degree of protection is required. The
legislature of the State of Washington, following the example
of the Congress in its approval of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, has determined that such discretion is necessary,
and we find no reason to disagree. The trial court is in the
best position to weigh fairly the competing needs and interests of parties affected by discovery. 23 The unique character
of the discovery process requires that the trial court have
substantial latitude to fashion protective orders. We therefore hold that where, as in this case, a protective order is limited to the narrow context of pretrial civil discovery and does
not restrict the dissemination of" information gained from
other sources, it does not offend the First Amendment.

v
The facts in this case illustrate the concerns that justifiably
may prompt a court to issue a protective order. As we have
noted, the trial court's order allowing discovery was extremely broad. It compelled respondents-among other
things-to identify all persons who had made donations over
a five-year period to Rhinehart and the Aquarian Foundation, together with the amounts donated. In effect the order
would compel disclosure of membership as well as sources of
financial support. The Supreme Court of Washington found
that dissemination of this information would "result in annoyance, embarrassment and even oppression." 654 P. 2d, at
In addition, heightened First Amendment scrutiny of each request for
a protective order would necessitate burdensome evidentiary findings and
_
J.l ~t lead to time-consuming interlocutory appeal§/ See, e. g., Zemlh
~....
Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866 (ED Pa.
1981).
23
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690. 24 It is sufficient for purposes of our decision that the
highest court in the state found no abuse of discretion in the
t-rio:tJ court's decision to issue a protective order f.~?rsuant to a
constitutional state law. The judgment accodingly is
Affirmed

24

~- ~..,;.

See note 8 supra (quoting t t
s of e otective order). The
1
~
Supreme Court of Washington the importance of ensuring that potential/
litigants have unimpeded acces to the courts: "[A]s the trial court rightly\__
observed, rather than expose themselves to unwanted publicity, individ- - - - - - - uals may well forego the pursuit of their just claims. The judicial system
will thus have made the utilization of its remedies so onerous that the people will be reluctant or unwilling to use it, resulting in frustration of a right
as valuable as that of speech itself." 654 P. 2d, at 689. Cf. California
Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U. S. 508, 510 (1972);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 429-431 (1963).
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OF WASHINGTON
[April - , 1984]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the issue whether parties to civil litigation have a First Amendment right to disseminate, in advance of trial, information gained through the pretrial discovery process.
I
Respondent Rhinehart is the spiritual leader of a religious
group, the Aquarian Foundation. The Foundation has fewer
than 1,000 members, most of whom live in the State of Washington. Aquarian beliefs include life after death and the
ability to communicate with the dead through a medium.
Rhinehart is the primary Aquarian medium.
In recent years, the Seattle Times and the Walla Walla
Union-Bulletin have published stories about Rhinehart and
the Foundation. Altogether 11 articles appeared in the
newspapers during the years 1973, 1978 and 1979. The five
articles that appeared in 1973 focused on Rhinehart and the
manner in which he operated the Foundation. They described seances conducted by Rhinehart in which people paid
him to put them in touch with deceased relatives and friends.
The articles also stated that Rhinehart had sold magical
"stones" that had been "expelled" from his body. One article
referred to Rhinehart's conviction, later vacated, for sodomy.
The four articles that appeared in 1978 concentrated on an
"extravaganza" sponsored by Rhinehart at the Walla Walla
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State Penitentiary. The articles stated that he had treated
1,100 inmates to a 6-hour-long show, during which he gave
away between $35,000 and $50,000 in cash and prizes. One
article described a "chorus line of girls [who] shed their
gowns and bikinis and sang.... " App. 25a. The two articles that appeared in 1979 referred to a purported connection
between Rhinehart and Lou Ferrigno, star of the popular
television program, "The Incredible Hulk."
II
Rhinehart brought this action in the Washington Superior
Court on behalf of himself and the Foundation against the Seattle Times, the Walia Walia Union-Bulletin, the authors of
the articles and the spouses of the authors. Five female
members of the Foundation who had participated in the presentation at the penitentiary joined the suit as plaintiffs. 1
The complaint alleges that the articles contained statements
that were "fictional and untrue," and that the defendantspetitioners here-knew, or should have known, they were
false. According to the complaint, the articles "did and were
calculated to hold [Rhinehart] up to public scorn, hatred and
ridicule, and to impeach his honesty, integrity, virtue, religious philosophy, reputation as a person and in his profession
as a spiritual leader." App. 8a. With respect to the Foundation, the complaint also states: "(T]he articles have, or may
have had, the effect of discouraging contributions by the
membership and public and thereby diminished the financial
ability of the Foundation to pursue its corporate purposes."
App. 9a. The complaint alleges that the articles misrepresented the role of the Foundation's "choir" and falsely implied
that female members of the Foundation had "stripped off all
their clothes and wantonly danced naked .... " App. 6a.
' The record is unclear as to whether all five of the female plaintiffs participated in the "chorus line" described in the 1978 articles. The record
also does not disclose whether any of the female plaintiffs was mentioned
by name in the articles.
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The complaint requests $14,100,000 in damages for the alleged defamation and invasions of privacy. 2
Petitioners filed an answer, denying many of the allegations of the complaint and asserting affirmative defenses. a
Petitioners promptly initiated extensive discovery. They
deposed Rhinehart, requested production of documents pertaining to the financial affairs of Rhinehart and the Foundation, and served extensive interrogatories on Rhinehart and
the other respondents. Respondents turned over a number
of financial documents, including several of Rhinehart's income tax returns. Respondents refused, however, to disclose certain financial information, • the identity of the Foundation's donors during the preceding 10 years, and a list of its
members during that period.
Petitioners filed a motion under the State's Civil Rule 37
requesting an order compelling discovery. 5 In their sup'Although the complaint does not allege specifically that the articles
caused a decline in membership of the Foundation, respondents' answers to
petitioners interrogatories raised this issue. In response to petitioners request that respondents' explain the damages they are seeking, respondents' claimed that the Foundation had experienced a drop in membership in
Hawaii and Washington ''from about 300 people to about 150 people, and [a]
concurrent drop in contributions." Record 503.
1
Affirmative defenses included contentions that the articles were substantially true and accurate, that they were privileged under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, and that the statute of limitations had run as to
the 1973 articles, that the individual respondents had consented to any invasions of privacy, and that respondents had no reasonable expectation of
privacy when performing before 1,100 prism1ers.
• Rhinehart also refused to reveal the current address of his residence.
He submitted an affidavit stating that he had relocated out of fear for his
safety and that disclosure of his current address would subject him to risks
of bodily harm. Petitioners promptly moved for an order compelling
Rhinehart to give his address and the trial court granted the motion.
'Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 37 provides in relevant part: "A party, upon
reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may
apply to the court in the county where the deposition was taken, or in the
county where the action is pending, for an order compelling
discovery .... "
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porting memorandum, petitioners recognized that the principal issue as to discovery was respondents "refusal[] to permit
any effective inquiry into their financial affairs, such as the
source of their donations, their financial transactions, uses of
wealth and assets, and their financial condition in general."
Record 350. Respondents opposed the motion arguing in
particular that compelled production of the identities of the
Foundation's donors and members would violate the First
Amendment rights of members and donors to privacy, freedom of religion, and freedom of association. Respondents
also moved for a protective order preventing petitioners from
disseminating any information gained through discovery.
Respondents noted that petitioners had stated their intention
to continue publishing articles about respondents and this litigation, and their intent to use information gained through
discovery in future articles.
In a lengthy ruling, the trial court initially granted the motion to compel and ordered respondents to identify all donors
who made contributions during the five years preceding the
date of the complaint, along with the amounts donated. The
court also required petitioners to divulge enough membership information to substantiate any claims of diminished
membership. Relying on In re Balkin, 598 F. 2d 176
(CADC 1979), 6 the court refused to issue a protective order.
'The Halkin decision was debated by the courts below. Prior to
H alkin, the only federal court of appeals to consider the question directly
had understood that the First Amendment did not affect a trial court's authority to restrict dissemination of infonnation produced during pretrial
discovery. See International Paper Products v. Koons, 325 F. 2d 403,
407-408 (CA2 1963). Halkin considered the issue at length. Characterizing a protective order as a ''paradigmatic prior restraint," Halkin held that
such orders require close scrutiny. The court also held that before a court
should issue a protective order that restricts expression, it must be satisfied that ''the harm posed by dissemination must be substantial and serious; the restraining order must be narrowly drawn and precise; and there
must be no alternative means of protecting the public interest which intrudes less directly on expression." Id., at 191.
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It stated that the facts alleged by respondents in support of
their motion for such an order were too conclusory to warrant
a finding of "good cause" as required by Wash. Super. Ct.
C. R. 26(c). 7 The court stated, however, that the denial of
petitioners' motion was "without prejudice to [respondents']
right to move for a protective order in respect to specifically
described discovery materials and a factual showing of good
cause for restraining defendants in their use of those materials." Record 16.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration in which
they renewed their motion for a protective order. They submitted affidavits of several Foundation members to support
their request. The affidavits detailed a series of letters and
telephone calls defaming the Foundation, its members, and
Rhinehart-including several that threatened physical harm
to those associated with the Foundation. The affiants also
described incidents at the Foundation's headquarters involving attacks, threats, and assaults directed at Foundation
7

Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(c) provides:
"Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom
discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the
court in the county where the deposition is to be taken may make any order
which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more
of the following: (1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery
may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation
of the time or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of
discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) that
certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be
limited to certain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted with no one
present except persons designated by the court; (6) that a deposition after
being sealed be opened only by order of the court; (7) that a trade secret or
other confidential research, development, or commercial information not
be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way; (8) that the parties
simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed
envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.... "
Rule 26(c) is typical of the provisions adopted in many states.
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members by anonymous individuals and groups. In general,
the affidavits averred that public release of the donor lists
would adversely affect Foundation membership and income
and would subject its members to additional harassment and
reprisals.
Persuaded by these affidavits, the trial court issued a protective order covering all information obtained through the
discovery process that pertained to ''the financial affairs of
the various plaintiffs, the names and addresses of Aquarian
Foundation members, contributors, or clients, and the names
and addresses of those who have been contributors, clients,
or donors to any of the various plaintiffs." App. 65a. The
order prohibited petitioners from publishing, disseminating,
or using the information in any way except where necessary
to prepare for and try the case. By its terms, the order did
not apply to information gained by means other than the discovery process. 8 In an accompanying opinion, the trial
court recognized that the protective order would restrict petitioners' right to publish information obtained by discovery,
but the court reasoned that the restriction was necessary to
avoid the "chilling effect" that dissemination would have on
"a party's willingness to bring his case to court." Record 63.
The relevant portions of the protective order state:
''2. Plaintiffs' motion for a protective order is granted with respect to infonnation gained by the defendants through the use of all of the discovery
processes regarding the financial affairs of the various plaintiffs, the names
and addresses of Aquarian Foundation members, contributors, or clients,
and the names and addresses of those who have been contributors, clients,
or donors to any of the various plaintiffs.
"3. The defendants and each of them shall make no use of and shall not disseminate the information defined in paragraph 2 which is gained through
discovery, other than such use as is necessary in order for the discovering
party to prepare and try the case. As a result, information gained by a
defendant through the discovery process may not be published by any of
the defendants or made available to any news media for publication or dissemination. This protective order has no application except to information
gained by the defendants through the use of the discovery processes."
App. 65a.
8
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Respondents appealed from the trial court's production
order and petitioners appealed from the protective order.
The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed both. 654 P. 2d
673 (1982). With respect to the protective order, the court
reasoned:
"Assuming then that a protective order may fall, ostensibly, at least, within the definition of a 'prior restraint of
free expression,' we are convinced that the interest of
the judiciary in the integrity of its discovery processes is
sufficient to meet the 'heavy burden' of justification.
The need to preserve that integrity is adequate to sustain a rule like Rule 26(c) which authorizes a trial court
to protect the confidentiality of information given for
purposes of litigation." Id., at 690. 9
The court noted that "[t]he information to be discovered concerned the financial affairs of the plaintiff Rhinehart and his
organization, in which he and his associates had a recognizable privacy interest; and the giving of publicity to these
matters would allegedly and understandably result in annoyance, embarrassment and even oppression." Ibid. Therefore, the court concluded, the trial court had not abused its
discretion in issuing the protective order. 10
The Supreme Court of Washington recognized that its
holding conflicts with the holdings of the United States Court
• Although the Washington Supreme Court assumed arguendo that a
protective order could be viewed as an infringement on First Amendment
rights , the court also stated:
"A persuasive argument can be made that when persons are required to
give information which they would otherwise be entitled to keep to themselves, in order to secure a government benefit or perform an obligation to
that government, those receiving that information waive the right to use it
for any purpose except those which are authorized by the agency of government which exacted the information." 654 P. 2d, at 681.
10
The Washington Supreme Court also held that, because the protective
order shields respondents from "abuse of the discovery privilege," respondents could not object to the order compelling production. We do not
consider here that aspect of the Washington Supreme Court's decision.
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of Appeals for the District of Columbia in In re Balkin, 598
F. 2d 176 (1979), 11 and applies a different standard from that
of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in In re San
Juan Star Co., 662 F. 2d 108 (1981).u We granted certiorari
to resolve the conflict. 13 We. affirm.

III
Most states, including Washington, have adopted discovery provisions modeled on Rules 26 through 37 of the Federal
Rules 'of Civil Procedure. F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure 179 (1977). 14 Rule 26(b)(l) provides that a party "may
obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which
is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action." It further provides that discovery is not limited to
matters that will be admissible at trial so long as the information sought "appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Wash. Super. Ct. C. R.
11

See note 11 supra.
In San Juan Star, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit considered and rejected Balkin's approach to the constitutionality of protective
orders. Although the San Juan court held that protective orders may implicate First Amendment interests, the court reasoned that such interests
are somewhat lessened in the civil discovery context. The court stated:
"In general, then, we find the appropriate measure of such limitations in a
standard of 'good cause' that incorporates a 'heightened sensitivity' to the
First Amendment concerns at stake.... " 662 F. 2d, at 116.
11
The holding of the Supreme Court of Washington is consistent with the
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in International
Products Corp. v. Koons, 325 F. 2d 403, 407·-408 (1963).
"See Bushman v. New Holland Division, 88 Wash. 2d 429, 518 P. 2d
1078, 1080 (1974). The Washington Supreme Court has stated that when
the language of a Washington rule and its federal counterpart are the
same, courts should look to decisions interpreting the federal rule for guidance. American Discount Corp. v. Saratoga West, Inc., 81 Wash. 2d 34,
499 P. 2d 869, 871 (1972). The Washington rule that provides for the
scope of civil discovery and the issuance of protective orders is virtually
identical to its counterpart in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Compare Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(b) and (c) with Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(b)
and (c).
u
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26(b)(l); Trust Fund Services v. Aro Glass Co., 89 Wash. 2d
758, 575 P. 2d 716, 719 (1978); d. C. Wright & A. Miller, 8
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2008 (1970). 15
The rules do not differentiate between infonnation that is
private or intimate and that to which no privacy interests attach. Under the rules, the only express limitations are that
the information sought is not privileged, and is relevant to
the subject matter of the pending action. Thus, the rules
often allow extensive intrusion into the affairs of both litigants and third parties. 16 If a litigant fails to comply with a
request for discovery, the Court may issue an order directing
compliance that is enforceable by the Court's contempt powers. Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 37(b). 17
uwash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(b)(l), identical to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) in effect at the time, provides in full:
"In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books,
documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for
objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence."
''Under Rules 30 and 31, a litigant may depose a third party by oral or
,...~-"""'i""'tten examination. The litigant can compel the third party to be depose
and to produce tangible evidence at the deposition by
serving the third party with a subpoena pursuant to Rule 45. Rule
45(b)(1) authorizes a trial court to quash or modify a subpoena of tangible
evidence "if it is unreasonable or oppressive." Rule 45 also provides:
"Failure by any person without adequate excuse to obey a subpoena served
upon him may be deemed a contempt of the court from which the subpoena
issued." Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 45(f).
17
In addition to its contempt power, Rule 37(b)(2) authorizes a trial court
to enforce an order compelling discovery by other means including, for example, regarding designated facts as established for purposes of the action.
Cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 37(b)(2)(A).
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Petitioners argue that the First Amendment imposes strict
limits on the availability of any judicial order that has the effect of restricting expression. They contend that civil discovery is not different from other sources of information, and
therefore the information is "protected speech" for First
Amendment purposes. Petitioners assert the right in this
case to disseminate any information gained through discovery. They do recognize that in limited circumstances, not
thought to be present here, some information may be restrained. They submit, however, that:
''When a protective order seeks to limit expression, it
may do so only if the proponent shows a compelling governmental interest. Mere speculation and conjecture
are insufficient. Any restraining order, moreover,
must be narrowly drawn and precise. Finally, before issuing such an order a court must determine that there
are no alternatives which intrude less directly on expression." Petitioners' Brief 10.
We think the rule urged by petitioners would impose an unwarranted restriction on the duty and discretion of a trial
court to oversee the discovery process.
IV
It is, of course, clear that information obtained through
civil discovery authorized by modern Rules of Civil Procedure may be information protected by the First Amendment.
Indeed, we do not doubt that only rarely would such information fall within the classes of unprotected speech identified by
decisions of this Court. In this case, as petitioners argue,
there certainly is a public interest in knowing more about respondents Rhinehart and the Aquarian Foundation. This interest may well include most-and possibly all--of what has
been discovered as a result of the Court's order under Rule
26(b)(l).
The critical question therefore is: whether protective orders issued under Rule 26(c) are invalid restraints on pro-
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tected speech. 18 This requires us to decide whether the
''practice in question [furthers] an important or substantial
governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression" and whether "the limitation of First Amendment
freedoms [is] no greater than is necessary or essential to the
protection of the particular governmental interest involved."
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 413 (1974); see Brown
v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354-355 (1980); Buckley v. Valeo,
424 u. s. 1, 25 (1976).
A
At the outset, it is important to recognize the extent of the
impairment of First Amendment rights that a protective
order, such as the one at issue here, may cause. As in all
civil litigation, petitioners gained the information they wish
to disseminate only by virtue of the trial court's discovery
processes. As the rules authorizing discovery were adopted
by the state legislature, the processes thereunder are ~ mat~ /
~&
ter of legislative grace. A litigant has no First Am~ 1 ~ t:..fJ
:£.
r~ght access to information i9\lgfit or purposes of trying (
._ _'(__' A. 1
his swt. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 16-17. (~965); _,.-(A.t rVt...f fflT f-0
--.---,.__.,. TJ'fleh:t"rn • 1{~438'-B:-S. 1,1-1 (1978) (oplillon of
/?.h.~~~.. ~
BURGER, G~ J.). Thus, continued court control over the dis;;_r~
covered information does not raise the same spectre of gov'- -u
ernment censorship that such control might suggest in other
~~
situations. See In re Balkin, 598 F. 2d, at 206-207 (Wilkey,
C~ J..t,~
J. dissenting). 19
t-1 1 "tt.(_

e·-

o!

18

Although the broad sweep of the First Amendment seems to prohibit
all restraints on free expression, this Court has observed that "[f)reedom of
speech ... does not comprehend the right to speak on any subject at any
time." American Communications Assn. v. Dmuis, 339 U.S. 382,
394-395 (1950).
18
Although litigants do not "surrender their First Amendment rights at
the courthouse door," In re Balkin, 598 F. 2d, at 186, those rights may be
subordinated to other interests that arise in this setting. For instance, on
several occasions this Court has approved restriction on the communications of trial participants where necessary to ensure a fair trial for a criminal defendant. See Nebraska Press v. Stuart, 427 U. S., 539, 563 (1976;

t/,1

~J

~Lito
1aH~

lA-y~-

·~ ~).
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Moreover, pretrial depositions and interrogatories are not
public components of a civil trial .., Such proceedings were
not open to the public at common law, Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368, 389 (1979), and, in general, they
are conducted in private as · a matter of modern practice.
See id., at 390; Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective
Order Litigation, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1983). Much of the
information that surfaces during pretrial discovery may be
unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying
cause of action. Therefore, restraints placed on discovered,
but not yet admitted, information are not a restriction on a
traditionally accessible source of information.
Finally, it is significant to note that an order prohibiting
dissemination of discovered information before trial is not the
kind of classic prior restraint that requires exacting First
Amendment scrutiny. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443
U. S., at 399 (POWELL, J. concurring). As in this case, such
a protective order prevents a party from disseminating only
that information obtained through use of the discovery process. Thus, the party may disseminate the identical information covered by the protective order as long as the information is gained through means independent of the court's
processes. In sum, judicial limitations on a party's ability to
id. , at 601 and n. 27 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); Oklalwma Press Publishing Co. v. District Court , 430 U. S. 308, 310-311 (1977); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333, 361 (1966). "In the conduct of a case, a court often
finds it necessary to restrict the free expression of participants, including
counsel, witnesses, and jurors." Gulf Oil Co . v. Bernard, 452 U. S. 89,
104 n. 21 (1981) .
., In a concurring opinion in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U. S., 368
(1979), CmEF JUSTICE BURGER stated:
"[D]uring the last 40 years in which the pretrial processes have been enormously expanded, it has never occurred to anyone, so far as I am aware,
that a pretrial deposition or pretrial interrogatories were other than wholly
private to the litigants. A pretrial deposition does not become part of a
'trial' until and unless the contents of the deposition are offered in evidence." 443 U. S., at 396.
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disseminate information discovered in advance of trial implicates the First Amendment rights of the restricted party to a
far lesser extent than would restraints on desemination of information in a different context. Therefore, our consideration of the provision for protective orders contained in the
Washington Civil Rules takes into account the unique position that such orders occupy in relation to the First
Amendment.
B
Rule 26(c) furthers a substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression. Procunier, 416
U. S., at 413. The Washington Civil Rules enable parties to
litigation to obtain information ''relevant to the subject matter involved" that they believe will be helpful in the preparation and trial of the case. Rule 26, however, must be viewed
in its entirety. Liberal discovery is provided for the sole
purpose of assisting in the preparation and trial, or the settlement, of litigated disputes. Because of the liberality of pretrial discovery permitted by Rule 26(b)(l), it is necessary for
the trial court to have the authority to issue protective orders
conferred by Rule 26(c). It is clear from experience that
pretrial discovery by depositions and interrogatories has a
significant potential for abuse. 21 This abuse is not limited to
matters of delay and expense; discovery also may seriously
n See Comments of the Advisory Committee on the 1983 Amendments
to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26. In Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 153, 176
(1979), the Court observed: "[T]here have been repeated expressions of
concern about undue and uncontrolled discovery, and voices from this
Court have joined the chorus. But until and unless there are major
changes in the present Rules of Civil Procedure, reliance must be had on
what in fact and in law are ample powers of the district judge to prevent
abuse." ld., at 176, 177 (citations omitted); see also id., at 179 (POWELL,
J., concurring). But abuses of the Rules by litigants, and sometimes the
inadequate oversight of discovery by trial courts, do not in any respect
lessen the importance of discovery in civil litigation and the government's
substantial interest in protecting the integrity of the discovery process.
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implicate privacy interests of litigants and third parties. 22
The Rules do not distinguish between public and private infonnation. Nor do they apply only to parties to the litigation, as relevant infonnation in the hands of third parties may
be subject to discovery.
There is an opportunity, therefore, for litigants to obtainincidentally or purposefully-infonnation that not only is irrelevant but if publicly released could be damaging to reputation and privacy. The government clearly has a substantial
interest in preventing this sort of abuse of its processes. Cf.
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 153, 176-177 (1979); Gumbel v.
Pitkin, 124 U. S. 131, 14&-146 (1888). Ai3 stated by Judge
Friendly in International Products Co. v. Koons, 325 F. 2d
403, 407~08 (CA21963), "[w]hether or not the Rule itself authorizes [a particular protective order] ... we have no question as to the court's jurisdiction to do this under the inherent
'equitable powers of courts of law over their own process, to
prevent abuses, oppression, and injustices.'" (citing Gumbel
v. Pitkin, supra). The prevention of the abuse that can attend the coerced production of infonnation under a state's
discovery rule is sufficient justification for the authorization
of protective orders. 23
Cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589, 599 (1977); Cox Broadcasting Corp.
v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 488-491 (1975). Rule 26(c) includes among its express purposes the protection of a "party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense." Although the
Rule contains no specific reference to privacy or to other rights or interests
that may be implicated, such matters are implicit in the broad purpose and
language of the Rule.
Zl The Supreme Court of Washington properly emphasized the importance of ensuring that potential litigants have unimpeded access to the
courts: "[A]s the trial court rightly observed, rather than expose themselves to unwanted publicity, individuals may well forego the pursuit of
their just claims. The judicial system will thus have made the utilization
of its remedies so onerous that the people will be reluctant or unwilling to
use it, resulting in frustration of a right as valuable as that of speech itself." 654 P. 2d, at 689. Cf. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking
21
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We also find that the provision for protective orders in the
Washington rules requires, in itself, no heightened First
Amendment scrutiny. To be sure, Rule 26(c) confers broad
discretion on the trial court to decide when a protective order
is appropriate and what degree of protection is required.
The legislature of the State of Washington, following the example of the Congress in its approval of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, has determined that such discretion is necessary, and we find no reason to disagree. The trial court is
in the best position to weigh fairly the competing needs and
interests of parties affected by discovery.u The unique character of the discovery process requires that the trial court
have substantial latitude to fashion protective orders. We
therefore hold that where, as in this case, a protective order
is limited to the narrow context of pretrial civil discovery and
does not restrict the dissemination of the information gained
from other sources, it does not offend the First Amendment.

v
The facts in this case illustrate the concerns that justifiably
may prompt a court to issue a protective order. As we have
noted, the trial court's order allowing discovery was extremely broad. It compelled respondents-among other
things-to identify all persons who had made donations over
a five-year period to Rhinehart and the Aquarian Foundation, together with the amounts donated. In effect the order
would compel disclosure of membership as well as sources of
financial support. The Supreme Court of Washington found
that dissemination of this information would ''result in annoyUnlimited, 404 U. S. 508, 510 (1972); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415,
429-431 (1963).
M In addition, heightened First Amendment scrutiny of each request for
a protective order would necessitate burdensome evidentiary findings and
could lead to time-consuming interlocutory appeals, as this case illustrates.
See, e. g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F.
Supp. 866 (ED Pa. 1981).
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ance, embarrassment and even oppression." 654 P. 2d, at
690. It is sufficient for purposes of our decision that the
highest court in the state found no abuse of discretion in the
trial court's decision to issue a protective order persuant to a
constitutional state law. The judgment accordingly is

A
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JUSTICE PoWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the issue whether parties to civil litigation have a First Amendment right to disseminate, in advance of trial, information gained through the pretrial discovery process.
I
Respondent Rhinehart is the spiritual leader of a religious
group, the Aquarian Foundation. The Foundation has fewer
than 1,000 members, most of whom live in the State of Washington. Aquarian beliefs include life after death and the
ability to communicate with the dead through a medium.
Rhinehart is the primary Aquarian medium.
In recent years, the Seattle Times and the Walla Walla
Union-Bulletin have published stories about Rhinehart and
the Foundation. Altogether 11 articles appeared in the
newspapers during the years 1973, 1978 and 1979. The five
articles that appeared in 1973 focused on Rhinehart and the
manner in which he operated the Foundation. They described seances conducted by Rhinehart in which people paid
him to put them in touch with deceased relatives and friends.
The articles also stated that Rhinehart had sold magical
"stones" that had been "expelled" from his body. One article
referred to Rhinehart's conviction, later vacated, for sodomy.
The four articles that appeared in 1978 concentrated on an
"extravaganza" sponsored by Rhinehart at the Walla Walla
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State Penitentiary. The articles stated that he had treated
1,100 inmates to a 6-hour-long show, during which he gave
away between $35,000 and $50,000 in cash and prizes. One
article described a "chorus line of girls [who] shed their
gowns and bikinis and sang.... " App. 25a. The two articles that appeared in 1979 referred to a purported connection
between Rhinehart and Lou Ferrigno, star of the popular
television program, "The Incredible Hulk."

II
Rhinehart brought this action in the Washington Superior
Court on behalf of himself and the Foundation against the Seattle Times, the Walla Walla Union-Bulletin, the authors of
the articles and the spouses of the authors. Five female
members of the Foundation who had participated in the presentation at the penitentiary joined the suit as plaintiffs. 1
The complaint alleges that the articles contained statements
that were "fictional and untrue," and that the defendantspetitioners here-lmew, or should have known, they were
false. According to the complaint, the articles "did and were
calculated to hold [Rhinehart] up to public scorn, hatred and
ridicule, and to impeach his honesty, integrity, virtue, religious philosophy, reputation as a person and in his profession
as a spiritual leader." App. 8a. With respect to the Foundation, the complaint also states: "[T]he articles have, or may
have had, the effect of discouraging contributions by the
membership and public and thereby diminished the financial
ability of the Foundation to pursue its corporate purposes."
App. 9a. The complaint alleges that the articles misrepresented the role of the Foundation's "choir" and falsely implied
that female members of the Foundation had "stripped off all
their clothes and wantonly danced naked .... " App. 6a.
1
The record is unclear as to whether all five of the female plaintiffs participated in the "chorus line" described in the 1978 articles. The record
also does not disclose whether any of the female plaintiffs was mentioned
by name in the articles.
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The complaint requests $14,100,000 in damages for the alleged defamation and invasions of privacy. 2
Petitioners filed an answer, denying many of the allegations of the complaint and asserting affirmative defenses. 8
Petitioners promptly initiated extensive discovery. They
deposed Rhinehart, requested production of documents pertaining to the financial affairs of Rhinehart and the Foundation, and served extensive interrogatories on Rhinehart and
the other respondents. Respondents turned over a number
of financial documents, including several of Rhinehart's income tax returns. Respondents refused, however, to disclose certain financial information, • the identity of the Foundation's donors during the preceding 10 years, and a list of its
members during that period.
Petitioners filed a motion under the State's Civil Rule 37
requesting an order compelling discovery. 5 In their supz Although the complaint does not allege specifically that the articles
caused a decline in membership of the Foundation, respondents' answers to
petitioners interrogatories raised this issue. In response to petitioners request that respondents' explain the damages they · are seeking, respondents' claimed that the Foundation had experienced a drop in membership in
Hawaii and Washington "from about 300 people to about 150 people, and [a]
concurrent drop in contributions." Record 503.
1
Affirmative defenses included contentions that the articles were substantially true and accurate, that they/were privileged under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, and that the statute of limitations had run as to
the 1973 articles, that the individual respondents had consented to any invasions of privacy, and that respondents had no reasonable expectation of
privacy when performing before 1,100 prisoners.
• Rhinehart also refused to reveal the current address of his residence.
He submitted an affidavit stating that he had relocated out of fear for his
safety and that disclosure of his current address would subject him to risks
of bodily harm. Petitioners promptly moved for an order compelling
Rhinehart to give his address and the trial court granted the motion.
5
Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 37 provides in relevant part: "A party, upon
reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may
apply to the court in the county where the deposition was taken, or in the
county where the action is pending, for an order compelling
discovery .... "
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porting memorandum, petitioners recognized that the principal issue as to discovery was respondents ''refusal[] to permit
any effective inquiry into their financial affairs, such as the
source of their donations, their financial transactions, uses of
wealth and assets, and their financial condition in general."
Record 350. Respondents opposed the motion arguing in
particular that compelled production of the identities of the
Foundation's donors and members would violate the First
Amendment rights of members and donors to privacy, freedom of religion, and freedom of association. Respondents
also moved for a protective order preventing petitioners from
disseminating any information gained through discovery.
Respondents noted that petitioners had stated their intention
to continue publishing articles about respondents and this litigation, and their intent to use information gained through
discovery in future articles.
In a lengthy ruling, the trial court initially granted the motion to compel and ordered respondents to identify all donors
who made contributions during the five years preceding the
date of the complaint, along with the amounts donated. The
court also required petitioners to divulge enough membership information to substantiate any claims of diminished
membership. Relying on In re Balkin, 598 F. 2d 176
(CADC 1979), 6 the court refused to issue a protective order.
'The Balkin decision was debated by the courts below. Prior to
Balkin, the only federal court of appeals to consider the question directly
had understood that the First Amendment did not affect a trial court's authority to restrict dissemination of infonnation produced during pretrial
discovery. See International Paper Products v. Koons, 325 F. 2d 403,
407-408 (CA21963). Balkin considered the issue at length. Characterizing a protective order as a ''paradigmatic prior restraint," Balkin held that
such orders require close scrutiny. The court also held that before a court
should issue a protective order that restricts expression, it must be satisfied that "the harm posed by dissemination must be substantial and serious; the restraining order must be narrowly drawn and precise; and there
must be no alternative means of protecting the public interest which intrudes less directly on expression." Id., at 191.

I
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It stated that the facts alleged by respondents in support of
their motion for such an order were too conclusory to warrant
a finding of "good cause" as required by Wash. Super. Ct.
C. R. 26(c). 7 The court stated, however, that the denial of
petitioners' motion was "without prejudice to [respondents']
right to move for a protective order in respect to specifically
described discovery materials and a factual showing of good
cause for restraining defendants in their use of those materials." Record 16.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration in whlch
they renewed their motion for a protective order. They submitted affidavits of several Foundation members to support
their request. The affidavits detailed a series of letters and
telephone calls defaming the Foundation, its members, and
Rhinehart-including several that threatened physical harm
to those associated with the Foundation. The afflantS. also
described incidents at the Foundation's headquarters involving attacks, threats, and assaults directed at Foundation
7

Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(c) provides:
"Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom
discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the
court in the county where the deposition is to be taken may make any order
which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more
of the following: (1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery
may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation
of the time or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of
discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) that
certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be
limited to certain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted with no one
present except persons designated by the court; (6) that a deposition after
being sealed be opened only by order of the court; (7) that a trade secret or
other confidential research, development, or commercial information not
be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way; (8) that the parties
simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed
envelopes to be opened as directed by the court. . . ."
Rule 26(c) is typical of the provisions adopted in many states.

I
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members by anonymous individuals and groups. In general,
the affidavits averred that public release of the donor lists
would adversely affect Fo~dation mell!be~hip and .income
and would subject itS members to additional harassment and
reprisals.
Persuaded by these affidavits, the trial court issued a protective order covering all information obtained through the
discovery process that pertained to ''the financial affairs of
the various plaintiffs, the names and addresses of Aquarian
Foundation members, contributors, or clients, and the names
and addresses of those who have been contributors, clients,
or donors to any of the various plaintiffs." App. 65a. The
order prohibited petitioners from publishing, disseminating,
or using the information in any way except where necessary
to prepare for and try the case. By its terms, the order did
not apply to information gained by means other than the discovery process. 8 In an accompanying opinion, the trial
court recognized that the protective order would restrict petitioners' right to publish information obtained by discovery,
but the court reasoned that the restriction was necessary to
avoid the "chilling effect" that dissemination would have on
"a party's willingness to bring his case to court." Record 63.
8

The relevant portions of the protective order state:
"2. Plaintiffs' motion for a protective order is granted with respect to information gained by the defendants through the use of all of the discovery
processes regarding the financial affairs of the various plaintiffs, the names
and addresses of Aquarian Foundation members, contributors, or clients,
and the names and addresses of those who have been contributors, clients,
or donors to any of the various plaintiffs.
"3. The defendants and each of them shall make no use of and shall not disseminate the information defined in paragraph 2 which is gained through
discovery, other than such use as is necessary in order for the discovering
party to prepare and try the case. As a result, information gained by a
defendant through the discovery process may not be published by any of
the defendants or made available to any news media for publication or dissemination. This protective order has no application except to information
gained by the defendants through the use of the discovery processes."
App. 65a.
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Respondents appealed from the trial court's production
order and petitioners appealed from the protective order.
The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed both. 654 P. 2d
673 (1982). With respect to the protective order, the court
reasoned:
"Assuming then that a protective order may fall, ostensibly, at least, within the definition of a 'prior restraint of
free expression,' we are convinced that the interest of
the judiciary in the integrity of its discovery processes is
sufficient to meet the 'heavy burden' of justification.
The need to preserve that integrity is adequate to sustain a rule like Rule 26(c) which authorizes a trial court
to protect the confidentiality of information given for
purposes of litigation." /d., at 690. 9
The court noted that "[t]he information to be discovered concerned the financial affairs of the plaintiff Rhinehart and his
organization, in which he and his associates had a recognizable privacy interest; and the giving of publicity to these
matters would allegedly and understandably result in annoyance, embarrassment and even oppression." Ibid. Therefore, the court concluded, the trial court had not abused its
discretion in issuing the protective order. 10
The Supreme Court of Washington recognized that its
holding conflicts with the holdings of the United States Court
• Although the Washington Supreme Court assumed arguendo that a
protective order could be viewed as an infringement on First Amendment
rights, the court also stated:
"A persuasive argument can be made that when persons are required to
give information which they would otherwise be entitled to keep to themselves, in order to secure a government benefit or perform an obligation to
that government, those receiving that information waive the right to use it
for any purpose except those which are authorized by the agency of government which exacted the information." 654 P. 2d, at 681.
10
The Washington Supreme Court also held that, because the protective
order shields respondents from "abuse of the discovery privilege," respondents could not object to the order compelling production. We do not
consider here that aspect of the Washington Supreme Court's decision.
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of Appeals for the District of Columbia in In re Balkin, 598
F. 2d 176 (1979), 11 and applies a different standard from that
of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in In re San
Juan Star Co., 662 F. 2d 108 (1981). 12 We granted certiorari
to resolve the conflict. 13 We.affirm.

III
Most states, including Washington, have adopted discovery provisions modeled on Rules 26 through 37 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure 179 (1977). 14 Rule 26(b)(l) provides that a party "may
obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which
is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action." It further provides that discovery is not limited to
matters that will be admissible at trial so long as the infonnation sought "appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Wash. Super. Ct. C. R.
11

See note 11 supra.
In San Juan Star, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit considered and rejected Balkin's approach to the constitutionality of protective
orders. Although the San Juan court held that protective orders may implicate First Amendment interests, the court reasoned that such interests
are somewhat lessened in the civil discovery context. The court stated:
"In general, then, we find the appropriate measure of such limitations in a
standard of 'good cause' that incorporates a 'heightened sensitivity' to the
First Amendment concerns at stake .... " 662 F. 2d, at 116.
a The holding of the Supreme Court ofWashington is consistent with the
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in International
Products Corp. v. Koons, 325 F. 2d 403, 407-408 (1963).
14
See Bushman v. New Holland Division, 88 Wash. 2d 429, 518 P. 2d
1078, 1080 (1974). The Washington Supreme Court has stated that when
the language of a Washington rule and its federal counterpart are the
same, courts should look to decisions interpreting the federal rule for guidance. American Discount Corp. v. Saratoga West, Inc., 81 Wash. 2d 34,
499 P. 2d 869, 871 (1972). The Washington rule that provides for the
scope of civil discovery and the issuance of protective orders is virtually
identical to its counterpart in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Compare Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(b) and (c) with Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(b)
and (c).
11
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26(b)(l); Trust Fund Services v. Aro Glass Co., 89 Wash. 2d
758, 575 P. 2d 716, 719 (1978); cf. C. Wright & A. Miller, 8
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2008 (1970). 16
The rules do not differentiate between infonnation that is
private or intimate and that to which no privacy interests attach. Under the rules, the only express limitations are that
the infonnation sought is not privileged, and is relevant to
the subject matter of the pending action. Thus, the rules
often allow extensive intrusion into the affairs of both litigants and third parties. 16 If a litigant fails to comply with a
request for discovery, the Court may issue an order directing
compliance that is enforceable by the Court's contempt powers. Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 37(b). 17
Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(b)(1), identical to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(l) in effect at the time, provides in full:
"In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books,
documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for
objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence."
18
Under Rules 30 and 31, a litigant may depose a third party by oral or
v-~o..::.:it:.:::ten examination. The litigant can compel the third party to be depose
and to produce tangible evidence at the deposition by
serving the third party with a subpoena pursuant to Rule 45. Rule
45(b)(1) authorizes a trial court to quash or modify a subpoena of tangible
evidence ''if it is unreasonable or oppressive." Rule 45 also provides:
"Failure by any person without adequate excuse to obey a subpoena served
upon him may be deemed a contempt of the court from which the subpoena
issued." Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 45({).
17
In addition to its contempt power, Rule 37(b)(2) authorizes a trial court
to enforce an order compelling discovery by other means including, for example, regarding designated facts as established for purposes of the action.
Cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 37(b)(2)(A).
16
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Petitioners argue that the First Amendment imposes strict
limits on the availability of any judicial order that has the effect of restricting expression. They contend that civil discovery is not different from other sources of information, and
therefore the information is "protected speech" for First
Amendment purposes. Petitioners assert the right in this
case to disseminate any information gained through discovery. They do recognize that in limited circumstances, not
thought to be present here, some information may be restrained. They submit, however, that:
"When a protective order seeks to limit expression, it
may do so only if the proponent shows a compelling governmental interest. Mere speculation and conjecture
are insufficient. Any restraining order, moreover,
must be narrowly drawn and precise. Finally, before issuing such an order a court must determine that there
ar~ no alternatives which intrude less directly on expression." Petitioners' Brief 10.
We think the rule urged by petitioners would impose an unwarranted restriction on the duty and discretion of a trial
court to oversee the discovery process.
IV
It is, of course, clear that information obtained through
civil discovery authorized by modern Rules of Civil Procedure may be information protected by the First Amendment.
Indeed, we do not doubt that only rarely would such information fall within the classes of unprotected speech identified by
decisions of this Court. In this case, as petitioners argue,
there certainly is a public interest in knowing more about respondents Rhinehart and the Aquarian Foundation. This interest may well include most-and possibly all-of what has
been discovered as a result of the Court's order under Rule
26(b)(l).
The critical question therefore is: whether protective orders issued under Rule 26(c) are invalid restraints on pro-
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tected speech. 18 This requires us to decide whether the
''practice in question [furthers] an important or substantial
governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression" and whether ''the limitation of First Amendment
freedoms [is] no greater than is necessary or essential to the
protection of the particular governmental interest involved."
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974); see Broum
v. Glines, 444 U. S. 348, 354-355 (1980); Buckley v. Valeo,
424 u. s. 1, 25 (1976).
A

At the outset, it is important to recognize the extent of the
impairment of First Amendment rights that a protective
order, such as the one at issue here, may cause. As in all
civil litigation, petitioners gained the information they wish
to disseminate only by virtue of the trial court's discovery
processes. As the rules authorizing discovery were adopted
by the state legislature, the processes thereunder are a matter of legislative grace. A litigant has no First Amendment
right of access to information sought for purposes of trying
his suit. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 16-17 (1965);
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U. S. 1, 11 (1978) (opinion of
BURGER, C. J.). Thus, continued court control over the discovered information does not raise the same spectre of government censorship that such control might suggest in other
situations. See In re Balkin, 598 F. 2d, at 206-207 (Wilkey,
J. dissenting). 19
18
Although the broad sweep of the First Amendment seems to prohibit
all restraints on free expression, this Court has observed that "[f)reedom of
speech ... does not comprehend the right to speak on any subject at any
time." American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382,

394-395 (1950).
11

Although litigants do not "surrender their First Amendment rights at
the courthouse door," In re Balkin, 598 F. 2d, at 186, those rights may be
subordinated to other interests that arise in this setting. For instance, on
several occasions this Court has approved restriction on the communications of trial participants where necessary to ensure a fair trial for a criminal defendant. See Nebraska Press v. Stuart, 427 U. S., 539, 563 (1976;
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Moreover, pretrial depositions and interrogatories are not
public components of a civil trial. 31 Such proceedings were
not open to the public at common law, Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368, 389 (1979), and, in general, they
are conducted in private as· a matter of modern practice.
,. See id., at 390; Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective
Order Litigation, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1983). Much of the
information that surfaces during pretrial discovery may be
unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying
cause of action. Therefore, restraints placed on discovered,
but not yet admitted, information are not a restriction on a
traditionally accessible source of information.
Finally, it is significant to note that an order prohibiting
dissemination of discovered information before trial is not the
kind of classic prior restraint that requires exacting First
Amendment scrutiny. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443
U. S., at 399 (POWELL, J. concurring). As in this case, such
a protective order prevents a party from disseminating only
that information obtained through use of the discovery process. Thus, the party may disseminate the identical information covered by the protective order as long as the information is gained through means independent of the court's
processes. In sum, judicial limitations on a party's ability to
id., at 601 and n. 2:7 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); Oklahoma Press Publish·
ing Co. v. District Court, 430 U. S. 308, 310-311 (1977); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333, 361 (1966). "In the conduct of a case, a court often
finds it necessary to restrict the free expression of participants, including
counsel, witnesses, and jurors." Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U. S. 89,
104 n. 21 (1981).
20
In a concurring opinion in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U. S., 368
(1979), CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER stated:
"[D]uring the last 40 years in which the pretrial processes have been enormously expanded, it has never occurred to anyone, so far as I am aware,
that a pretrial deposition or pretrial interrogatories were other than wholly
private to the litigants. A pretrial deposition does not become part of a
'trial' until and unless the contents of the deposition are offered in evidence." 443 U. S., at 396.
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disseminate infonnation discovered in advance of trial implicates the First Amendment rights of the restricted party to a
far lesser extent than would restraints on desemination of infonnation in a different context. Therefore, our consideration of the provision for protective orders contained in the
Washington Civil Rules takes into account the unique position that such orders occupy in relation to the First
Amendment.
B
Rule 26(c) furthers a substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression. Procunier, 416
U. S., at 413. The Washington Civil Rules enable parties to
litigation to obtain infonnation ''relevant to the subject matter involved" that they believe will be helpful in the preparation and trial of the case. Rule 26, however, must be viewed
in its entirety. Liberal discovery is provided for the sole
purpose of assisting in the preparation and trial, or the settlement, of litigated disputes. Because of the liberality of pretrial discovery permitted by Rule 26(b)(l), it is necessary for
the trial court to have the authority to issue protective orders
conferred by Rule 26(c). It is clear from experience that
pretrial discovery by depositions and interrogatories has a
significant potential for abuse. 21 This abuse is not limited to
matters of delay and expense; discovery also may seriously
n See Comments of the Advisory Committee on the 1983 Amendments
to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26. In Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 153, 176
(1979), the Court observed: "[T]here have been repeated expressions of
concern about undue and uncontrolled discovery, and voices from this
Court have joined the chorus. But until and unless there are major
changes in the present Rules of Civil Procedure, reliance must be had on
what in fact and in law are ample powers of the district judge to prevent
abuse." /d., at 176, 177 (citations omitted); see also id., at 179 (PoWELL,
J., concurring). But abuses of the Rules by litigants, and sometimes the
inadequate oversight of discovery by trial courts, do not in any respect
lessen the importance of discovery in civil litigation and the government's
substantial interest in protecting the integrity of the discovery process.
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implicate privacy interests of litigants and third parties. 22
The Rules do not distinguish between public and private information. Nor do they apply only to parties to the litigation, as relevant infonnation in the hands of third parties may
be subject to discovery.
There is an opportunity, therefore, for litigants to obtainincidentally or purposefully-information that not only is irrelevant but if publicly released could be damaging to reputation and privacy. The government clearly has a substantial
interest in preventing this sort of abuse of its processes. Cf.
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 153, 17~177 (1979); Gumbel v.
Pitkin, 124 U. S. 131, 14~146 (1888). As stated by Judge
Friendly in International Products Co. v. Koons, 325 F. 2d
403, 407-408 (CA21963), "[w]hether or not the Rule itself authorizes [a particular protective order] ... we have no question as to the court's jurisdiction to do this under the inherent
'equitable powers of courts of law over their own process, to
prevent abuses, oppression, and injustices."' (citing Gumbel
v. Pitkin, supra). The prevention of the abuse that can attend the coerced production of infonnation under a state's
discovery rule is sufficient justification for the authorization
of protective orders. 23
12

Cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589, 599 (1977); Cox Broadcasting Corp.
v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 488--491 (1975). Rule 26(c) includes among its express purposes the protection of a "party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense." Although the
Rule contains no specific reference to privacy or to other rights or interests
that may be implicated, such matters are implicit in the broad purpose and
language of the Rule.
"The Supreme Court of Washington properly emphasized the importance of ensuring that potential litigants have unimpeded access to the
courts: "[A]s the trial court rightly observed, rather than expose themselves to unwanted publicity, individuals may well forego the pursuit of
their just claims. The judicial system will thus have made the utilization
of its remedies so onerous that the people will be reluctant or unwilling to
use it, resulting in frustration of a right as valuable as that of speech itself." 654 P. 2d, at 689. Cf. California Motar Transpart Co. v. Trucking
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,('

c __ .,.,we also find that the prOVISion for protective orders in the
Washington rules requires, in itself, no heightened First
Amendment scrutiny. To be sure, Rule 26(c) confers broad
discretion on the trial court to decide when a protective order
is appropriate and what degree of protection is required.
The legislature of the State of Washington, following the example of the Congress in its approval of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, has determined that such discretion is necessary, and we find no reason to disagree. The trial court is
in the best position to weigh fairly the competing needs and
interests of parties affected by discovery. 24 The unique character of the discovery process requires that the trial co~
have substantial latitude to fashion protective ord~rs.
e
therefore hold that where, as in this case, a protective order
is limited to the narrow context of pretrial civil discovery and
does not restrict the dissemination of the information gained
<5fir'Other sourc s, it,qoes ~t offend the First Amendment.!

J

v
The facts in this case illustrate the concerns that justifiably
may prompt a court to issue a protective order. As we have
noted, the trial court's order allowing discovery was extremely broad. It compelled respondents-among other
things-to identify all persons who had made donations over
a five-year period to Rhinehart and the Aquarian Foundation, together with the amounts donated. In effect the order
would compel disclosure of membership as well as sources of
financial support. The Supreme Court of Washington found
that dissemination of this information would "result in annoyUnlimiwt, 404 U. S. 508, 510 (1972); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415,
429-431 (1963).
u In addition, heightened First Amendment scrutiny of each request for
a protective order would necessitate burdensome evidentiary findings and
could lead to time-consuming interlocutory appeals, as this case illustrates.
See, e. g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F.
Supp. 866 (ED Pa. 1981).
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ance, embarrassment and even oppression." 654 P. 2d,, at
690. It is sufficient for purposes of our decision that the
highest court in the state found no abuse of discretion in the
trial court's decision to issue a protective order persuant to a
constitutional state law. The judgment accordingly is
Affirmed
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JUSTICE PoWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the issue whether parties to civil litigation have a First Amendment right to disseminate, in ad·vance of trial, information gained through the pretrial discovery process.
I
Respondent Rhinehart is the spiritual leader of a religious
group, the Aquarian Foundation. The Foundation has fewer
than 1,000 members, most of whom live in the State of Washington. Aquarian beliefs include life after death and the
ability to communicate with the dead through a medium.
Rhinehart is the primary Aquarian medium.
In recent years, the Seattle Times and the Walla Walla
Union-Bulletin have published stories about Rhinehart and
the Foundation. Altogether 11 articles appeared in the
newspapers during the years 1973, 1978 and 1979. The five
articles that appeared in 1973 focused on Rhinehart and the
manner in which he operated the Foundation. They described seances conducted by Rhinehart in which people paid
him to put them in touch with deceased relatives and friends.
The articles also stated that Rhinehart had sold magical
"stones" that had been "expelled" from his body. One article
referred to Rhinehart's conviction, later vacated, for sodomy.
The four articles that appeared in 1978 concentrated on an
"extravaganza" sponsored by Rhinehart at the Walla Walla
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State Penitentiary. The articles stated that he had treated
1,100 inmates to a 6-hour-long show, during which he gave
away between $35,000 and $50,000 in cash and prizes. One
article described a "chorus line of girls [who] shed their
gowns and bikinis and sang.... " App. 25a. The two articles that appeared in 1979 referred to a purported connection
between Rhinehart and Lou Ferrigno, star of the popular
television program, "The Incredible Hulk."
II
Rhinehart brought this action in the Washington Superior
Court on behalf of himself and the Foundation against the Seattle Times, the Walla Walla Union-Bulletin, the authors of
the articles and the spouses of the authors. Five female
members of the Foundation who had participated in the presentation at the penitentiary joined the suit as plaintiffs.'
The complaint alleges that the articles contained statements
that were "fictional and untrue," and that the defendantspetitioners here-knew, or should have known, they were
false. According to the complaint, the articles "did and were
calculated to hold [Rhinehart] up to public scorn, hatred and
ridicule, and to impeach his honesty, integrity, virtue, religious philosophy, reputation as a person and in his profession
as a spiritual leader." App. 8a. With respect to the Foundation, the complaint also states: "[T]he articles have, or may
have had, the effect of discouraging contributions by the
membership and public and thereby diminished the financial
ability of the Foundation to pursue its corporate purposes."
App. 9a. The complaint alleges that the articles misrepresented the role of the Foundation's "choir" and falsely implied
that female members of the Foundation had "stripped off all
their clothes and wantonly danced naked. . . ." App. 6a.
' The record is unclear as to whether all five of the female plaintiffs participated in the "chorus line" described in the 1978 articles. The record
also does not disclose whether any of the female plaintiffs was mentioned
by name in the articles.
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The complaint requests $14,100,000 in damages for the alleged defamation and invasions of privacy. 2
Petitioners filed an answer, denying many of the allegations of the complaint and asserting affirmative defenses. 3
Petitioners promptly initiated extensive discovery. They
deposed Rhinehart, requested production of documents pertaining to the financial affairs of Rhinehart and the Foundation, and served extensive interrogatories on Rhinehart and
the other respondents. Respondents turned over a number
of financial documents, including several of Rhinehart's income tax returns. Respondents refused, however, to disclose certain financial information, 4 the identity of the Foundation's donors during the preceding 10 years, and a list of its
members during that period.
Petitioners filed a motion under the State's Civil Rule 37
requesting an order compelling discovery. 5 In their sup2

Although the complaint does not allege specifically that the articles
caused a decline in membership of the Foundation, respondents' answers to
petitioners interrogatories raised this issue. In response to petitioners request that respondents' explain the damages they are seeking, respondents' claimed that the Foundation had experienced a drop in membership in
Hawaii and Washington "from about 300 people to about 150 people, and [a]
concurrent drop in contributions." Record 503.
3
Affirmative defenses included contentions that the articles were substantially true and accurate, that they were privileged under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, and that the statute of limitations had run as to
the 1973 articles, that the individual respondents had consented to any invasions of privacy, and that respondents had no reasonable expectation of
privacy when performing before 1,100 prisoners.
' Rhinehart also refused to reveal the current address of his residence.
He submitted an affidavit stating that he had relocated out of fear for his
safety and that disclosure of his current address would subject him to risks
of bodily harm. Petitioners promptly moved for an order compelling
Rhinehart to give his address and the trial court granted the motion.
5
Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 37 provides in relevant part: "A party, upon
reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may
apply to the court in the county where the deposition was taken, or in the
county where the action is pending, for an order compelling
discovery .. .. "
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porting memorandum, petitioners recognized that the principal issue as to discovery was respondents "refusal[] to permit
any effective inquiry into their financial affairs, such as the
source of their donations, their financial transactions, uses of
wealth and assets, and their financial condition in general."
Record 350. Respondents opposed the motion arguing in
particular that compelled production of the identities of the
Foundation's donors and members would violate the First
Amendment rights of members and donors to privacy, freedom of religion, and freedom of association. Respondents
also moved for a protective order preventing petitioners from
disseminating any information gained through discovery.
Respondents noted that petitioners had stated their intention ·
to continue publishing articles about respondents and this litigation, and their intent to use information gained through
discovery in future articles.
In a lengthy ruling, the trial court initially granted the motion to compel and ordered respondents to identify all donors
who made contributions during the five years preceding the
date of the complaint, along with the amounts donated. The
court also required petitioners to divulge enough membership information to substantiate any claims of diminished
membership. Relying on In re Balkin, 598 F. 2d 176
(CADC 1979), 6 the court refused to issue a protective order.
The Halkin decision was debated by the courts below. Prior to
H alkin, the only federal court of appeals to consider the question directly
had understood that the First Amendment did not affect a trial court's authority to restrict dissemination of information produced during pretrial
discovery. See International Paper Products v. Koons, 325 F. 2d 403,
407-408 (CA21963). Halkin considered the issue at length. Characterizing a protective order as a "paradigmatic prior restraint," Halkin held that
such orders require close scrutiny. The court also held that before a court
should issue a protective order that restricts expression, it must be satisfied that "the harm posed by dissemination must be substantial and serious; the restraining order must be narrowly drawn and precise; and there
must be no alternative means of protecting the public interest which intrudes less directly on expression." I d., at 191.
6

..
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It stated that the facts alleged by respondents in support of

..

their motion for such an order were too conclusory to warrant
a finding of "good cause" as required by Wash. Super. Ct.
C. R. 26(c). 7 The court stated, however, that the denial of
petitioners' motion was "without prejudice to [respondents']
right to move for a protective order in respect to specifically
described discovery materials and a factual showing of good
cause for restraining defendants in their use of those materials." Record 16.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration in which
they renewed their motion for a protective order. They submitted affidavits of several Foundation members to support
their request. The affidavits detailed a series of letters and
telephone calls defaming the Foundation, its members, and
Rhinehart-including several that threatened physical harm
to those associated with the Foundation. The affiants also
described incidents at the Foundation's headquarters involving attacks, threats, and assaults directed at Foundation
' Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(c) provides:
"Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom
discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the
court in the county where the deposition is to be taken may make any order
which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more
of the following: (1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery
may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation
of the time or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of
discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) that
certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be
limited to certain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted with no one
present except persons designated by the court; (6) that a deposition after
being sealed be opened only by order of the court; (7) that a trade secret or
other confidential research, development, or commercial information not
be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way; (8) that the parties
simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed
envelopes to be opened as directed by the court. . . ."
Rule 26(c) is typical of the provisions adopted in many states.
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members by anonymous individuals and groups. In general,
the affidavits averred that public release of the donor lists
would adversely affect Foundation membership and income
and would subject its members to additional harassment and
reprisals.
Persuaded by these affidavits, the trial court issued a protective order covering all information obtained through the
discovery process that pertained to "the financial affairs of
the various plaintiffs, the names and addresses of Aquarian
Foundation members, contributors, or clients, and the names
and addresses of those who have been contributors, clients,
or donors to any of the various plaintiffs." App. 65a. The
order prohibited petitioners from publishing, disseminating,
or using the information in any way except where necessary
to prepare for and try the case. By its terms, the order did
not apply to information gained by means other than the discovery process. 8 In an accompanying opinion, the trial
court recognized that the protective order would restrict petitioners' right to publish information obtained by discovery,
but the court reasoned that the restriction was necessary to
avoid the 1'chilling effect" that dissemination would have on
"a party's willingness to bring his.case to court." Record 63.
The relevant portions of the protective order state:
"2. Plaintiffs' motion for a protective order is granted with respect to information gained by the defendants through the use of all of the discovery
processes regarding the financial affairs of the various plaintiffs, the names
and addresses of Aquarian Foundation members, contributors, or clients,
and the names and addresses of those who have been contributors, clients,
or donors to any of the various plaintiffs.
"3. The defendants and each of them shall make no use of and shall not disseminate the information defined in paragraph 2 which is gained through
discovery, other than such use as is necessary in order for the discovering
party to prepare and try the case. As a result, information gained by a
defendant through the discovery process may not be published by any of
the defendants or made available to any news media for publication or dissemination. This protective order has no application except to information
gained by the defendants through the use of the discovery processes."
App. 65a.
8
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Respondents appealed from the trial court's production
order and petitioners appealed from the protective order.
The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed both. 654 P. 2d
673 (1982). With respect to the protective order, the court
reasoned:
"Assuming then that a protective order may fall, ostensibly, at least, within the definition of a 'prior restraint of
free expression,' we are convinced that the interest of
the judiciary in the integrity of its discovery processes is
sufficient to meet the 'heavy burden' of justification.
The need to preserve that integrity is adequate to sustain a rule like Rule 26(c) which authorizes a trial court
to protect the confidentiality of information given for
purposes of litigation." I d., at 690. 9
The court noted that "[t]he information to be discovered concerned the financial affairs of the plaintiff Rhinehart and his
organization, in which he and his associates had a recognizable privacy interest; and the giving of publicity to these
matters would allegedly and understandably result in annoyance, embarrassment and even oppression." Ibid. Therefore, the court concluded, the trial court had not abused its
discretion in issuing the protective order. 10
The Supreme Court of Washington recognized that its
holding conflicts with the holdings of the United States Court

,

9
Although the Washington Supreme Court assumed arguendo that a
protective order could be viewed as an infringement on First Amendment
rights, the court also stated:
"A persuasive argument can be made that when persons are required to
give information which they would otherwise be entitled to keep to themselves, in order to secure a government benefit or perform an obligation to
that government, those receiving that information waive the right to use it
for any purpose except those which are authorized by the agency of government which exacted the information." 654 P. 2d, at 681.
0
' The Washington Supreme Court also held that, because the protective
order shields respondents from "abuse of the discovery privilege," respondents could not object to the order compelling production. We do not
consider here that aspect of the Washington Supreme Court's decision.
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of Appeals for the District of Columbia in In re Halkin, 598
F. 2d 176 (1979), 11 and applies a different standard from that
of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in In re San
Juan Star Co., 662 F. 2d 108 (1981). 12 We granted certiorari
to resolve the conflict. 13 We affirm.

III
Most states, including Washington, have adopted discovery provisions modeled on Rules 26 through 37 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure 179 (1977). 14 Rule 26(b)(1) provides that a party "may
obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which
is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action." It further provides that discovery is not limited to
matters that will be admissible at trial so long as the information sought "appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Wash. Super. Ct. C. R.
See note 11 supra.
In San Juan Star, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit considered and rejected Halkin's approach to the constitutionality of protective
orders. Although the San Juan court held that protective orders may implicate First Amendment interests, the court reasoned that such interests
are somewhat lessened in the civil discovery context. The court stated:
"In general, then, we find the appropriate measure of such limitations in a
standard of 'good cause' that incorporates a 'heightened sensitivity' to the
First Amendment concerns at stake.... " 662 F. 2d, at 116.
13
The holding of the Supreme Court of Washington is consistent with the
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in International
Products Corp. v. Koons, 325 F. 2d 403, 407-408 (1963).
14
See Bushman v. Ne:w Holland Division, 88 Wash. 2d 429, 518 P. 2d
1078, 1080 (1974). The Washington Supreme Court has stated that when
the language of a Washington rule and its federal counterpart are the
same, courts should look to decisions interpreting the federal rule for guidance. American Discount Corp. v. Saratoga West, Inc ., 81 Wash. 2d 34,
499 P. 2d 869, 871 (1972). The Washington rule that provides for the
scope of civil discovery and the issuance of protective orders is virtually
identical to its counterpart in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Compare Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(b) and (c) with Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(b)
and (c).
11

12
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26(b)(l); Trust Fund Services v. Aro Glass Co., 89 Wash. 2d
758, 575 P. 2d 716, 719 (1978); cf. C. Wright & A. Miller, 8
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2008 (1970). 15
The rules do not differentiate between information that is
private or intimate and that to which no privacy interests attach. Under the rules, the only express limitations are that
the information sought is not privileged, and is relevant to
the subject matter of the pending action. Thus, the rules
often allow extensive intrusion into the affairs of both litigants and third parties. 16 If a litigant fails to comply with a
request for discovery, the Court may issue an order directing
compliance that is enforceable by the Court's contempt powers. Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 37(b). 17
Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(b)(1), identical to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) in effect at the time, provides in full:
"In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books,
documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for
objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence."
16
Under Rules 30 and 31, a litigant may depose a third party by oral or
written examination. The litigant can compel the third party to be deposed and to produce tangible evidence at the deposition by serving the
third party with a subpoena pursuant to Rule 45. Rule 45(b)(1) authorizes
a trial court to quash or modify a subpoena of tangible evidence "if it is
unreasonable or oppressive." Rule 45 also provides: "Failure by any person without adequate excuse to obey a subpoena served upon him may be
deemed a contempt of the court from which the subpoena issued." Wash.
Super. Ct. C. R. 45(f).
17
In addition to its contempt power, Rule 37(b)(2) authorizes a trial court
to enforce an order compelling discovery by other means including, for example, regarding designated facts as established for purposes of the action.
Cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 37(b)(2)(A).
15
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Petitioners argue that the First Amendment imposes strict
limits on the availability of any judicial order that has the effect of restricting expression. They contend that civil discovery is not different from other sources of information, and
therefore the information is "protected speech" for First
Amendment purposes. Petitioners assert the right in this
case to disseminate any information gained through discovery. They do recognize that in limited circumstances, not
thought to be present here, some information may be restrained. They submit, however, that:
"When a protective order seeks to limit expression, it
may do so only if the proponent shows a compelling governmental interest. Mere speculation and conjecture
are insufficient. Any restraining order, moreover,
must be narrowly drawn and precise. Finally, before issuing such an order a court must determine that there
are no alternatives which intrude less directly on expression." Petitioners' Brief 10.
We think the rule urged by petitioners would impose an unwarranted restriction on the duty and discretion of a trial
court to oversee the discovery process.
IV
It is, of course, clear that information obtained through
civil discovery authorized by modern rules of civil procedure
would rarely, if ever, fall within the classes of unprotected
speech identified by decisions of this Court. In this case, as
petitioners argue, there certainly is a public interest in knowing more about respondents. This interest may well include
most-and possibly all-of what has been discovered as a result of the court's order under Rule 26(b)(l). It does not necessarily follow, however, that a litigant has an unrestrained
right to disseminate information that has been obtained
through pretrial discovery. For even though the broad
sweep of the First Amendment seems to prohibit all restraints on free expression, this Court has observed that
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"freedom of speech . . . does not comprehend the right to
speak on any subject ·at any time." American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 394-395 (1950).
The critical question that this case presents is whether a
litigant's freedom comprehends the right to disseminate information that he has obtained pursuant to a court order that
both granted him access to that information and placed restraints on the way in which the information might be used.
In addressing that question it is necessary to conisder
whether the "practice in question [furthers] an important or
substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression" and whether "the limitation of First
Amendment freedoms [is] no greater than is necessary oressential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved." Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 413
(1974); see Brown v. Glines, 444 U. S. 348, 354-355 (1980);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25 (1976).
A

At the outset, it is important to recognize the extent of the
impairment of First Amendment rights that a protective
order, such as the one at issue here, may cause. As in all
civil litigation, petitioners gained the information they wish
to disseminate only by virtue of the trial court's discovery
processes. As the rules authorizing discovery were adopted
by the state legislature, the processes thereunder are a matter of legislative grace. A litigant has no First Amendment
right of access to information made available only for purposes of trying his suit. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 16-17~
(1965) ("The right to speak and publish does not carry with it
the unrestrained right to gather information."). Thus, continued court control over the discovered information does not
raise the same spectre of government censorship that such
control might suggest in other situations. See In re Halkin,
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598 F. 2d, at 206-207 (Wilkey, J. dissenting). 18
Moreover, pretrial depositions and interrogatories are not
public components of a civil trial. 19 Such proceedings were
not open to the public at common law, Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368, 389 (1979), and, in general, they
are conducted in private as a matter of modern practice.
See id., at 396 (BURGER, C. J., concurring); Marcus, Myth \
and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 Cornell L.
Rev. 1 (1983). Much of the information that surfaces during
pretrial discovery may be unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action. Therefore, restraints placed on discovered, but not yet admitted, information are not a restriction on a traditionally aeeeesibt source
of information.
/~lAb~
Although litigants do not "surrender their First Amendment rights at
the courthouse door," In re Halkin, 598 F. 2d, at 186, those rights may be
subordinated to other interests that arise in this setting. For instance, on
several occasions this Court has approved restriction on the communications of trial participants where necessary to ensure a fair trial for a criminal defendant. See Nebraska Press v. Stuart, 427 U. S., 539, 563 (1976;
id., at 601 and n. 27 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U. S. 308, 31()...:311 (1977); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333, 361 (1966). "In the conduct of a case, a court often
finds it necessary to restrict the free expression of participants, including
counsel, witnesses, and jurors." Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U. S. 89,
104 n. 21 (1981).
19
Discovery rarely takes place in public. Depositions are scheduled at
times and places most convenient to those involved. Interrogatories are
answered in private. Rules of civil procedure may require parties to file
with the clerk of the court interrogatory answers, responses to requests
for admissions, and deposition transcripts. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 5(d).
Jurisdictions that require filing of discovery materials customarily provide
that trial courts may order that the materials not be filed or that they be
filed under seal. See ibid.; Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(c). Federal district courts may adopt local rules providing that the fruits of discovery are
not to be filed except on order of the court. See, e. g., C. D. Cal. R. 6(d);
SDN. Y. Civ. R. 19. Thus, to the extent that courthouse records could
serve as a source of public information, access to that source customarily is
subject to the control of the trial court.
18
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Finally, it is significant to note that an order prohibiting
dissemination of discovered information before trial is not the
kind of classic prior restraint that requires exacting First
Amendment scrutiny. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443
U. S., at 399 (POWELL, J. concurring). As in this case, such
a protective order prevents a party from disseminating only
that information obtained through use of the discovery process. Thus, the party may disseminate the identical information covered by the protective order as long as the information is gained through means independent of the court's
processes. In sum, judicial limitations on a party's ability to
disseminate information discovered in advance of trial implicates the First Amendment rights of the restricted party to a
far lesser extent than would restraints on desemination of information in a different context. Therefore, our consideration of the provision for protective orders contained in the
Washington Civil Rules takes into account the unique position that such orders occupy in relation to the First
Amendment.
B
Rule 26(c) furthers a substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression. Procunier, 416
U. S., at 413. The Washington Civil Rules enable parties to
litigation to obtain information "relevant to the subject matter involved" that they believe will be helpful in the preparation and trial of the case. Rule 26, however, must be viewed
in its entirety. Liberal discovery is provided for the sole
purpose of assisting in the preparation and trial, or the settlement, of litigated disputes. Because of the liberality of pretrial discovery permitted by Rule 26(b)(1), it is necessary for
the trial court to have the authority to issue protective orders
conferred by Rule 26(c). It is clear from experience that
pretrial discovery by depositions and interrogatories has a
significant potential for abuse. 20 This abuse is not limited to
20

See Comments of the Advisory Committee on the 1983 Amendments
to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26. In Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 153, 176
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matters of delay and expense; discovery also may seriously
implicate privacy interests of litigants and third parties. 21
The Rules do not distinguish between public and private information. Nor do they apply only to parties to the litigation, as relevant information in the hands of third parties may
be subject to discovery.
There is an opportunity, therefore, for litigants to obtainincidentally or purposefully-information that not only is irrelevant but if publicly released could be damaging to reputation and privacy. The government clearly has a substantial
interest in preventing this sort of abuse of its processes. Cf.
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 153, 176--177 (1979); Gumbel v.
Pitkin, 124 U. S. 131, 145-146 (1888). As stated by Judge
Friendly in International Products Co. v. Koons, 325 F. 2d
403, 407-408 (CA2 1963), "[w]hether or not the Rule itself authorizes [a particular protective order] . . . we have no question as to the court's jurisdiction to do this under the inherent
'equitable powers of courts of law over their own process, to
prevent abuses, oppression, and injustices.'" (citing Gumbel
v. Pitkin, supra). The prevention of the abuse that can attend the coerced production of information under a state's
(1979), the Court observed: "[T]here have been repeated expressions of
concern about undue and uncontrolled discovery, and voices from this
Court have joined the chorus. But until and unless there are major
changes in the present Rules of Civil Procedure, reliance must be had on
what in fact and in law are ample powers of the district judge to prevent
abuse." !d., at 176, 177 (citations omitted); see also id., at 179 (POWELL,
J., concurring). But abuses of the Rules by litigants, and sometimes the
inadequate oversight of discovery by trial courts, do not in any respect
lessen the importance of discovery in civil litigation and the government's
substantial interest in protecting the integrity of the discovery process.
21
Cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589, 599 (1977); Cox Broadcasting Corp.
v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 488-491 (1975). Rule 26(c) includes among its express purposes the protection of a "party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense." Although the
Rule contains no specific reference to privacy or to other rights or interests
that may be implicated, such matters are implicit in the broad purpose and
language of the Rule.
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discovery rule is sufficient justification for the authorization
of protective orders. 22

c

We also find that the provision for protective orders in the
Washington rules requires, in itself, no heightened First
Amendment scrutiny. To be sure, Rule 26(c) confers broad
discretion on the trial court to decide when a protective order
is appropriate and what degree of protection is required.
The legislature of the State of Washington, following the example of the Congress in its approval of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, has determined that such discretion is necessary, and we find no reason to disagree. The trial court is
in the best position to weigh fairly the competing needs and
interests of parties affected by discovery. 23 The unique character of the discovery process requires that the trial court
have substantial latitude to fashion protective orders.

v
The facts in this case illustrate the concerns that justifiably
may prompt a court to issue a protective order. As we have
noted, the trial court's order allowing discovery was extremely broad. It compelled respondents-among other
things-to identify all persons who had made donations over
22

The Supreme Court of Washington properly emphasized the importance of ensuring that potential litigants have unimpeded access to the
courts: "[A]s the trial court rightly observed, rather than expose themselves to unwanted publicity, individuals may well forego the pursuit of
their just claims. The judicial system will thus have made the utilization
of its remedies so onerous that the people will be reluctant or unwilling to
use it, resulting in frustration of a right as valuable as that of speech itself." 654 P. 2d, at 689. Cf. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking
Unlimited, 404 U. S. 508, 510 (1972); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415,
429-431 (1963).
23
In addition, heightened First Amendment scrutiny of each request for
a protective order would necessitate burdensome evidentiary findings and
could lead to time-consuming interlocutory appeals, as this case illustrates.
See, e. g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F.
Supp. 866 (ED Pa. 1981).

'
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a five-year period to Rhinehart and the Aquarian Foundation, together with the amounts donated. In effect the order
would compel disclosure of membership as well as sources of
financial support. The Supreme Court of Washington found
that dissemination of this information would "result in annoyance, embarrassment and even oppression." 654 P. 2d, at
690. It is sufficient for purposes of our decision that the
highest court in the state found no abuse of discretion in the
trial court's decision to issue a protective order persuant to a
constitutional state law. We hold that the protective order
issued in this case does not offend the First Amendment. It
was entered by the trial court upon a showing that constituted good cause as required by Rule 26(c). Also, it is limited to the context of pretrial civil discovery, a~d does not restrict dissemination if the information is obtained from other
sources. 24
The judgment accordingly is

•·

Affirmed

24
It is apparent that substantial government interests were implicated.
Respondents, in requesting the protective order, relied upon the rights of
privacy and religious association. Both the trial court and the Supreme
Court of Washington also emphasized that the right of persons to resort to
the courts for redress of grievances would have been 'chilled.' See, supra,
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the issue whether parties to civil litigation have a First Amendment right to disseminate, in aQvance of trial, information gained through the pretrial discovery process.
I
Respondent Rhinehart is the spiritual leader of a religious
group, the Aquarian Foundation. The Foundation has fewer
than 1,000 members, most of whom live in the State ofWashington. Aquarian beliefs include life after death and the
ability to communicate with the dead through a medium.
Rhinehart is the primary Aquarian medium.
In recent years, the Seattle Times and the Walla Walla
Union-Bulletin have published stories about Rhinehart and
the Foundation. Altogether 11 articles appeared in the
newspapers during the years 1973, 1978 and 1979. The five
articles that appeared in 1973 focused on Rhinehart and the
manner in which he operated the Foundation. They described seances conducted by Rhinehart in which people paid
him to put them in touch with deceased relatives and friends.
The articles also stated that Rhinehart. had sold magical
"stones" that had been "expelled" from his body. One article
referred to Rhinehart's conviction, later vacated, for sodomy.
The four articles that appeared in 1978 concentrated on an
"extravaganza" sponsored by Rhinehart at the Walla Walla
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State Penitentiary. The articles stated that he had treated
1,100 inmates to a 6-hour-long show, during which he gave
away between $35,000 and $50,000 in cash and prizes. One
article described a "chorus line of girls [who] shed their
gowns and bikinis and sang.... " App. 25a. The two articles that appeared in 1979 referred to a purported connection
between Rhinehart and Lou Ferrigno, star of the popular
television program, "The Incredible Hulk."
II

Rhinehart brought this action in the Washington Superior
Court on behalf of himself and the Foundation against theSeattle Times, the Walla Walla Union-Bulletin, the authors of
the articles and the spouses of the authors. Five female
members of the Foundation who had participated in the presentation at the penitentiary joined the suit as plaintiffs. 1
The complaint alleges that the articles contained statements
that were "fictional and untrue," and that the defendantspetitioners here-knew, or should have known, they were
false. According to the complaint, the articles "did and were
calculated to hold [Rhinehart] up to public scorn, hatred and
ridicule, and to impeach his honesty, integrity, virtue, religious philosophy, reputation as a person and in his profession
as a spiritual leader." App. 8a. With respect to the Foundation, the complaint also states: "[T]he articles have, or may
have had, the effect of discouraging contributions by the
membership and public and thereby diminished the financial
ability of the Foundation to pursue its corporate purposes."
App. 9a.' The complaint alleges that the articles misrepresented the role of the Foundation's "choir" and falsely implied
that female members of the Foundation had "stripped off all
their clothes and wantonly danced naked .... " App. 6a.
1
The record is unclear as to whether all five of the female plaintiffs participated in the "chorus line" described in the 1978 articles. The record
also does not disclose whether any of the female plaintiffs was mentioned
by name in the articles.
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The complaint requests $14,100,000 in damages for the alleged defamation and invasions of privacy. 2
Petitioners filed an answer, denying many of the allegations of the complaint and asserting affirmative defenses. 3
Petitioners promptly initiated extensive discovery. They
deposed Rhinehart, requested production of documents pertaining to the financial affairs of Rhinehart and the Foundation, and served extensive interrogatories on Rhinehart and
the other respondents. Respondents turned over a number
of financial documents, including several of Rhinehart's income tax returns. Respondents refused, however, to disclose certain financial information, 4 the identity of the Foundation's donors during the preceding 10 years, and a list of its
members during that period.
Petitioners rJed a motion under the State's Civil Rule 37
requesting an order compelling discovery. 5 In their sup2
Although the complaint does not allege specifically that the articles
caused a decline in membership of the Foundation, respondents' answers to
petitioners interrogatories raised this issue. Iri response to petitioners request that respondents' explain the damages they are seeking, respondents' claimed that the Foundation had experienced a drop in membership in ·
Hawaii and Washington "from about 300 people to about 150 people, and [a]
concurrent drop in contributions." Record 503.
3
Affirmative defenses included contentions that the articles were substantially true and accurate, that they were privileged under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, and that the statute of limitations had run as to
the 1973 articles, that the individual respondents had consented to any invasions of privacy, and that respondents had no reasonable expectation of
privacy when performing before 1,100 prisoners.
• Rhinehart also refused to reveal the current address of his residence.
He submitted an affidavit stating that he had relocated out of fear for his
safety and that disclosure of his current address would subject him to risks
of bodily harm. Petitioners promptly moved for an order compelling
Rhinehart to give his address and the trial court granted the motion.
5
Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 37 provides in relevant part: "A party, upon
reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may
apply to the court in the county where the deposition was taken, or in
the county where the action is pending, for an order compelling
discovery.... "
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porting memorandum, petitioners recognized that the principal issue as to discovery was respondents "refusal[] to permit
any effective inquiry into their financial affairs, such as the
source of their donations, their financial transactions, uses of
wealth and assets, and their financial condition in general."
Record 350. Respondents opposed the motion arguing in
particular that compelled production of the identities of the
Foundation's donors and members would violate the First
Amendment rights of members and donors to privacy, freedom of religion, and freedom of association. Respondents
also moved for a protective order preventing petitioners from
disseminating any information gained through discovery.
Respondents noted that petitioners had stated their intention
to continue publishing articles about respondents and this litigation, and their intent to use information gained through
discovery in future articles.
In a lengthy ruling, the trial court initially granted the motion to compel and ordered respondents to identify all donors
who made contributions during the five years preceding the
date of the complaint, along with the amounts donated. The
court also required respondents to divulge enough membership information to substantiate any claims of diminished
membership. Relying on In re Halkin, 598 F. 2d 176
(CADC 1979), 6 the court refused to issue a protective order.
The Balkin decision was debated by the courts below. Prior to
Balkin, the only federal court of appeals to consider the question directly
had understood that the First Amendment did not affect a trial court's authority to restrict dissemination of information produced during pretrial
discovery. See International Paper Products v. Koons, 325 F . 2d 403,
407-408 (CA21963). Balkin considered the issue at length. Characterizing a protective order as a "paradigmatic prior restraint," Balkin held that
such orders require close scrutiny. The court also held that before a court
should issue a protective order that restricts expression, it must be satisfied that ''the harm posed by dissemination must be substantial and serious; the restraining order must be narrowly drawn and precise; and there
must be no alternative means of protecting the public interest which intrudes less directly on expression." /d., at 191.
6
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It stated that the facts alleged by respondents in support of
their motion for such an order were too conclusory to warrant
a finding of "good cause" as required by Wash. Super. Ct.
C. R. 26(c). 7 The court stated, however, that the denial of
respondents' motion was "without prejudice to [respondents']
right to move for a protective order in respect to specifically
described discovery materials and a factual showing of good
cause for restraining defendants in their use of those materials." Record 16.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration in which
they renewed their motion for a protective order. They submitted affidavits of several Foundation members to support
their request. The affidavits detailed a series of letters and
telephone calls defaming the Foundation, its members, and
Rhinehart-including several that threatened physical harm
to those associated with the Foundation. The affiants also
described incidents at the Foundation's headquarters involving attacks, threats, and assaults directed at Foundation
Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(c) provides:
"Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom
discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the
court in the county where the deposition is to be taken may make any order
which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more
of the following: (1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery
may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation
of the time or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of
discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) that
certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be
limited to certain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted with no one
present except persons designated by the court; (6) that a deposition after
being sealed be opened only by order of the court; (7) that a trade secret or
other confidential research, development, or commercial information not
be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way; (8) that the parties
simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed
envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.... "
Rule 26(c) is typical of the provisions adopted in many states.
7
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members by anonymous individuals and groups. In general,
the affidavits averred that public release of the donor lists
would adversely affect Foundation membership and income
and would subject its members to additional harassment and
reprisals.
Persuaded by these affidavits, the trial court issued a protective order covering all information obtained through the
discovery process that pertained to "the financial affairs of
the various plaintiffs, the names and addresses of Aquarian
Foundation members, contributors, or clients, and the names
and addresses of those who have been contributors, clients,
or donors to any of the various plaintiffs." App. 65a. The
order prohibited petitioners from publishing, disseminating,
or using the information in any way except where necessary
to prepare for and try the case. By its terms, the order did
not apply to information gained by means other than the discovery process. 8 In an accompanying opinion, the trial
court recognized that the protective order would restrict petitioners' right to publish information obtained by discovery,
but the court reasoned that the restriction was necessary to
The relevant portions of the protective order state:
"2. Plaintiffs' motion for a protective order is granted with respect to information gained by the defendants through the use of all of the discovery
processes regarding the financial affairs of the various plaintiffs, the names
and addresses of Aquarian Foundation members, contributors, or clients,
and the names and addresses of those who have been contributors, clients,
or donors to any of the various plaintiffs.
"3. The defendants and each of them shall make no use of and shall not disseminate the information defined in paragraph 2 which is gained through
discovery, other than such use as is necessary in order for the discovering
party to prepare and try the case. As a result, information gained by a
defendant through the discovery process may not be published by any of
the defendants or made available to any news media for publication or dissemination. This protective order has no application except to information
gained by the defendants through the use of the discovery processes."
App. 65a.
8
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avoid the "chilling effect" that dissemination would have on
"a party's willingness to bring his case to court." Record 63.
Respondents appealed from the trial court's production
order and petitioners appealed from the protective order.
The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed both. 654 P. 2d
673 (1982). With respect to the protective order, the court
reasoned:
"Assuming then that a protective order may fall, ostensibly, at least, within the definition of a 'prior restraint of
free expression,' we are convinced that the interest of
the judiciary in the integrity of its discovery processes is
sufficient to meet the 'heavy burden' of justification.
The need to preserve that integrity is adequate to sustain a rule like Rule 26(c) which authorizes a trial court
to protect the confidentiality of information given for
purposes of litigation." I d., at 690. 9
The court noted that "(t]he information to be discovered concerned the financial affairs of the plaintiff Rhinehart and his
organization, in which he and his associates had a recognizable privacy interest; and the giving of publicity to these
matters would allegedly and understandably result in annoyance, embarrassment and even oppression." Ibid. Therefore, the court concluded, the trial court had not abused its
discretion in issuing the protective order. 10
9
Although the Washington Supreme Court assumed arguendo that a
protective order could be viewed as an infringement on First Amendment
rights , the court also stated:
"A persuasive argument can be made that when persons are required to
give infonnation which they would otherwise be entitled to keep to themselves, in order to secure a government benefit or perfonn an obligation to
that government, those receiving that infonnation waive the right to use it
for any purpose except those which are authorized by the agency of government which exacted the infonnation. " 654 P. 2d, at 681.
0
' The Washington Supreme Court also held that, because the protective
order shields respondents from "abuse of the discovery privilege," respondents could not object to the order compelling production. We do not
consider here that aspect of the Washington Supreme Court's decision.
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The Supreme Court of Washington recognized that its
holding conflicts with the holdings of the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia in In re Halkin, 598
F. 2d 176 (1979), 11 and applies a different standard from that
of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in In re San
Juan Star Co., 662 F. 2d 108 (1981). 12 We granted certiorari
to resolve the conflict. 13 We affirm.

III
Most states, including Washington, have adopted discovery provisions modeled on Rules 26 through 37 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure 179 (1977). 14 Rule 26(b)(l) provides that a party "may
obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which
is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action." It further provides that discovery is not limited to
matters that will be admissible at trial so long as the informaSee note 6 supra.
In San Juan Star, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit considered and rejected Balkin's approach to the constitutionality of protective
orders. . Although the San Juan court held that protective orders may implicate First Amendment interests, the court reasoned that such interests
are somewhat lessened in the civil discovery context. The court stated:
"In general, then, we find the appropriate measure of such limitations in a
standard of 'good cause' that incorporates a 'heightened sensitivity' to the
First Amendment concerns at stake ... .'' 662 F. 2d, at 116.
13
The holding of the Supreme Court of Washington is consistent with the
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in International
Products Corp. v. Koons, 325 F. 2d 403, 407-408 (1963).
1
'See Bushman v. New Holland Division, 88 Wash. 2d 429, 518 P. 2d
1078, 1080 (1974). The Washington Supreme Court has stated that when
the language of a Washington rule and its federal counterpart are the
same, courts should look to decisions interpreting the federal rule for guidance. American Discount Corp. v. Saratoga West, Inc., 81 Wash. 2d 34,
499 P. 2d 869, 871 (1972). The Washington rule that provides for the
scope of civil discovery and the issuance of protective orders is virtually
identical to its counterpart in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Compare Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(b) and (c) with Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(b)
and (c).
11

12
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tion sought "appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Wash. Super. Ct. C. R.
26(b)(1); Trust Fund Services v. Aro Glass Co., 89 Wash. 2d
758, 575 P. 2d 716, 719 (1978); cf. C. Wright & A. Miller, 8
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2008 (1970). 16
The rules do not differentiate between information that is
private or intimate and that to which no privacy interests attach. Under the rules, the only express limitations are that
the information sought is not privileged, and is relevant to
the subject matter of the pending action. Thus, the rules
often allow extensive intrusion into the affairs of both litigants and third parties. 16 If a litigant fails to comply with a
request for discovery, the Court may issue an order directing
compliance that is enforceable by the Court's contempt powers. Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 37(b). 17
Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(b)(l), identical to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(l) in effect at the time, provides in full:
"In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subjec·t matter involved in the pending
action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books,
documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for
objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence."
16
Under Rules 30 and 31, a litigant may depose a third party by oral or
written examination. The litigant can compel the third party to be deposed and to produce tangible evidence at the deposition by serving the
third party with a subpoena pursuant to Rule 45. Rule 45(b)(1) authorizes
a trial court to quash or modify a subpoena of tangible evidence "if it is
unreasonable or oppressive." Rule 45 also provides: "Failure by any person without adequate excuse to obey a subpoena served upon him may be
deemed a contempt of the court from which the subpoena issued." Wash.
Super. Ct. C. R. 45(f).
17
In addition to its contempt power, Rule 37(b)(2) authorizes a trial court
to enforce an order compelling discovery by other means including, for ex16
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Petitioners argue that the First Amendment imposes strict
limits on the availability of any judicial order that has the effect of restricting expression. They contend that civil discovery is not different from other sources of information, and
therefore the information is "protected speech" for First
Amendment purposes. Petitioners assert the right in this
case to disseminate any information gained through discovery. They do recognize that in limited circumstances, not
thought to be present here, some information may be restrained. They submit, however, that:
''When a protective order seeks to limit expression, it
may do so only if the proponent shows a compelling governmental interest. Mere speculation and conjecture
are insufficient. Any restraining order, moreover,
must be narrowly drawn and precise. Finally, before issuing such an order a court must determine that there
are no alternatives which intrude less directly on expression." Petitioners' Brief 10.
We think the rule urged by petitioners would impose an unwarranted restriction on the duty and discretion of a trial
court to oversee the discovery process.
IV
It is, of course, clear that information obtained through
civil discovery authorized by modern rules of civil procedure
would rarely, if ever, fall within the classes of unprotected
speech identified by decisions of this Court. In this case, as
petitioners argue, there certainly is a public interest in knowing more about respondents. This interest may well include
most-and possibly all-of what has been discovered as a result of the court's order under Rule 26(b)(l). It does not necessarily follow, however, that a litigant has an unrestrained
right to disseminate information that has been obtained
ample, regarding designated facts as established for purposes of the action.
Cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 37(b)(2)(A).
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through pretrial discovery. For even though the broad
sweep of the First Amendment seems to prohibit all restraints on free expression, this Court has observed that
"freedom of speech . . . does not comprehend the right to
speak on any subject at any time." American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 394-395 (1950).
The critical question that this case presents is whether a
litigant's freedom comprehends the right to disseminate information that he has obtained pursuant to a court order that
both granted him access to that information and placed restraints on the way in which the information might be used.
In addressing that question it is necessary to conisder
whether the "practice in question [furthers] an important or
substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression" and whether "the limitation of First
Amendment freedoms [is] no greater than is necessary oressential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved." Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 413
(1974); see BrO'IffYI, .v. Glines, 444 U. S. 348, 354-355 (1980);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25 (1976).
A

At the outset, it is important to recognize the extent of the
impairment of First Amendment rights that a protective
order, such as the one at issue here, may cause. As in all
civil litigation, petitioners gained the information they wish
to disseminate only by virtue of the trial court's discovery
processes. As the rules authorizing discovery were adopted
by the state legislature, the processes thereunder are a matter of legislative grace. A litigant has no First Amendment
right of access to information made available only for purposes of trying his suit. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 1&-17
(1965) ("The right to speak and publish does not carry with it
the unrestrained right to gather information."). Thus, continued court control over the discovered information does not
raise the same spectre of government censorship that such
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control might suggest in other situations. See In re Balkin,
598 F. 2d, at 206-207 (Wilkey, J. dis~e]lting).
Moreover, pretrial depositions and interrogatories are not
public components of a civil trial. 19 Such proceedings were
not open to the public at common law, Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368, 389 (1979), and, in general, they
are conducted in private as a matter of modern practice.
See id., at 396 (BURGER, C. J., concurring); Marcus, Myth
and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 Cornell L.
Rev. 1 (1983). Much of the information that surfaces during
pretrial discovery may be unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying cause qf action. Therefore, restraints placed OJ?. discovered, but not yet admitted, information are not a restriction on a traditionally public source of
information.
18

18
Although litigants do not "surrender their First Amendment rights at
the courthouse door," In re Balkin, 598 F. 2d, at 186, those rights may be
subordinated to other interests that arise in this setting. For instance, on
several occasions this Court has approved restriction on the communications of trial participants where necessary to ensure a fair trial for a criminal defendant. See Nebraska Press v. Stuart, 427 U. S., 539, 563 (1976;
id., at 601 and n. 27 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U. S. 308, 310-311 (1977); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333, 361 (1966). "In the conduct of a case, a court often
finds it necessary to restrict the free expression of participants, including
counsel, witnesses, and jurors." Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U. S. 89,
104 n. 21 (1981).
19
Discovery rarely takes place in public. Depositions are scheduled at
times and places most convenient to those involved. Interrogatories are
answered in private. Rules of civil procedure may require parties to file
with the clerk of the court interrogatory answers, responses to requests
for admissions, and deposition transcripts. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 5(d).
Jurisdictions that require filing of discovery materials customarily provide
that trial courts may order that the materials not be filed or that they be
filed under seal. See ibid.; Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(c). Federal district courts may adopt local rules providing that the fruits of discovery are
not to be filed except on order of the court. See, e. g., C. D. Cal. R. 6(d);
S. D. N. Y. Civ. R. 19. Thus, to the extent that courthouse records could
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Finally, it is significant to note that an order prohibiting
dissemination of discovered information before trial is not the
kind of classic prior restraint that requires exacting First
Amendment scrutiny. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443
U. S., at 399 (POWELL, J. concurring). As in this case, such
a protective order prevents a party from disseminating only
that information. obtained through use of the discovery process. Thus, the party may disseminate the identical information covered by the protective order as long as the information is gained through means independent of the court's
processes. In sum, judicial limitations on a party's ability to
disseminate information discovered in advance of trial implicates the First Amendment rights of the restricted party to a
far lesser extent than would restraints on desemination of information in a different context. Therefore, our consideration of the provision for protective orders contained in the
Washington Civil Rules takes into account the unique position that such orders occupy in relation to the First
Amendment.
B

Rule 26(c) furthers a substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression. Procunier, 416
U. S., at 413. The Washington Civil Rules enable parties to
litigation to obtain information "relevant to the subject matter involved" that they believe will be helpful in the preparation and trial of the case. Rule 26, however, must be viewed
in its entirety. Liberal discovery is provided for the sole
purpose of assisting in the preparation and trial, or the settlement, of litigated disputes. Because of the liberality of pretrial discovery permitted by Rule 26(b)(l), it is necessary for
the trial court to have the authority to issue protective orders
conferred by Rule 26(c). It is clear from experience that
pretrial discovery by depositions and interrogatories has a
serve as a source of public information, access to that source customarily is
subject to the control of the trial court.
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significant potential for abuse. 00 This abuse is not limited to
matters of delay and expense; discovery also may seriously
implicate privacy interests of litigants and third parties. 21
The Rules do not distinguish between public and private information. Nor do they apply only to parties to the litigation, as relevant information in the hands of third parties may
be subject to discovery.
There is an opportunity, therefore, for litigants to obtainincidentally or purposefully-information that not only is irrelevant but if publicly released could be damaging to reputation and privacy. The government clearly has a substantial
interest in preventing this sort of abuse of its processes. Cf.
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 153, 176-177 (1979); Gumbel v.
Pitkin, 124 U. S. 131, 145--146 (1888). As stated by Judge
Friendly in International Products Co. v. Koons, 325 F. 2d
403, 407-408 (CA21963), "[w]hether or not the Rule itself authorizes [a particular protective order] ... we have no question as to the court's jurisdiction to do this under the inherent
'equitable powers of courts of law over their own process, to
31
See Comments of the Advisory Committee on the 1983 Amendments
to FeQ. Rule Civ. Proc. 26. In Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 153, 176
(1979), the Court observed: "[T]here have been repeated expressions of
concern about undue and uncontrolled discovery, and voices from this
Court have joined the chorus. But until and unless there are major
changes in the present Rules of Civil Procedure, reliance must be had on
what in fact and in law are ample powers of the district judge to prevent
abuse." Id., at 176, 177 (citations omitted); see also id., at 179 (POWELL,
J., concurring). But abuses of the Rules by litigants, and sometimes the
inadequate oversight of discovery by trial courts, do not in any respect
lessen the importance of discovery in civil litigation and the government's
substantial interest in protecting the integrity of the discovery process.
21
Cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589, 599 (1977); Cox Broadcasting Corp.
v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 488-491 (1975). Rule 26(c) includes among its express purposes the protection of a "party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense." Although the
Rule contains no specific reference to privacy or to other rights or interests
that may be implicated, such matters are implicit in the broad purpose and
language of the Rule.
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prevent abuses, oppression, and injustices.'" (citing Gumbel
v. Pitkin, supra). The prevention of the abuse that can attend the coerced production of information under a state's
discovery rule is sufficient justification for the authorization
of protective orders. 22

c

We also find that the provision for protective orders in the
Washington rules requires, in itself, no heightened First
Amendment scrutiny. To be sure, Rule 26(c) confers broad
discretion on the trial court to decide when a protective order
is appropriate and what degree of protection is required.
The legislature of the State of Washington, following the example of the Congress in its approval of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, has determined that such discretion is necessary, and we find no reason to disagree. The trial court is
in the best position to weigh fairly the competing needs and
interests of parties affected by discovery. 23 The unique character of the discovery process requires that the trial court
have substantial latitude to fashion protective orders.

v
The facts in this case illustrate the concerns that justifiably
may prompt a court to issue a protective order. As we have
22
The Supreme Court of Washington properly emphasized the importance of ensuring that potential litigants have unimpeded access to the
courts: "[A]s the trial court rightly observed, rather than expose themselves to unwanted publicity, individuals may well forego the pursuit of
their just claims. The judicial system will thus have made the utilization
of its remedies so onerous that the people will be reluctant or unwilling to
use it, resulting in frustration of a right as valuable as that of speech itself." 654 P. 2d, at 689. Cf. California Motor Transport Co . v. Trucking
Unlimited , 404 U. S. 508, 510 (1972); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415,

429-431 (1963).
22

In addition, heightened First Amendment scrutiny of each request for
a protective order would necessitate burdensome evidentiary findings and
could lead to time-consuming interlocutory appeals, as this case illustrates.
See, e. g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F.
Supp. 866 (ED Pa. 1981).
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noted, the trial court's order allowing discovery was extremely broad. It compelled respondents-among other
things-to identify all persons who had made donations over
a five-year period to Rhinehart and the Aquarian Foundation, together with the amounts donated. In effect the order
would compel disclosure of membership as well as sources of
financial support. The Supreme Court of Washington f~und
that dissemination of this information would "result in annoyance, embarrassment and even oppression." 654 P. 2d, at
690. It is sufficient for purposes of our decision that the
highest court in the state found no abuse of discretion in the
trial court's decision to issue a protective order persuant to a
constitutional state law. We therefore hold that where, as
in this case, a protective order is entered on a showing of
good cause as required by Rule 26(c), is limited to the context
of pretrial civil discovery, and does not restrict the dissemination of the information if gained from other sources, it does
not offend the First Amendment. 24
The judgment accordingly is
Affirmed

" It is apparent that substantial government interests were implicated.
Respondents, in requesting the protective order, relied upon the rights of
privacy and religious association. Both the trial court and the Supreme
Court of Washington also emphasized that the right of persons to resort to
the courts for redress of grievances would have been 'chilled.' See, supra,
n. 22.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the issue whether parties to civil litigation have a First Amendment right to disseminate, in advance of trial, information gained through the pretrial discovery process.
I
Respondent Rhinehart is the spiritual leader of a religious
group, the Aquarian Foundation. The Foundation has fewer
than 1,000 members, most of whom live in the State of Washington. Aquarian beliefs include life after death and the
ability to communicate with the dead through a medium.
Rhinehart is the primary Aquarian medium.
In recent years, the Seattle Times and the Walla Walla
Union-Bulletin have published stories about Rhinehart and
the Foundation. Altogether 11 articles appeared in the
newspapers during the years 1973, 1978 and 1979. The five
articles that appeared in 1973 focused on Rhinehart and the
manner in which he operated the Foundation. They described seances conducted by Rhinehart in which people paid
him to put them in touch with deceased relatives and friends.
The articles also stated that Rhinehart. had sold magical
"stones" that had been "expelled" from his body. One article
referred to Rhinehart's conviction, later vacated, for sodomy.
The four articles that appeared in 1978 concentrated on an
"extravaganza" sponsored by Rhinehart at the Walla Walla
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State Penitentiary. The articles stated that he had treated
1,100 inmates to a 6-hour-long show, during which he gave
away between $35,000 and $50,000 in cash and prizes~ One
article described a "chorus line of girls [who] shed their
gowns and bikinis and sang.... " App. 25a. The two articles that appeared in 1979 referred to a purported connection
between Rhinehart and Lou Ferrigno, star of the popular
television program, "The Incredible Hulk."
II

Rhinehart brought this action in the Washington Superior
Court on behalf of himself and the Foundation against the Seattle Times, the Walla Walla Union-Bulletin, the authors of
the articles and the spouses of the authors. Five female
members of the Foundation who had participated in the presentation at the penitentiary joined the suit as plaintiffs. 1
The complaint alleges that the articles contained statements
that were "fictional and untrue," and that the defendantspetitioners here-knew, or should have known, they were
false. According to the complaint, the articles "did and were
calculated to hold [Rhinehart] up to public scorn, hatred and
ridicule, and to impeach his honesty, integrity, virtue, religious philosophy, reputation as a person and in his profession
as a spiritual leader." App. 8a. With respect to the Foundation, the complaint also states: "[T]he articles have, or may
have had, the effect of discouraging contributions by the
membership and public and thereby diminished the financial
ability of the Foundation to pursue its corporate purposes."
App. 9a: The complaint alleges that the articles misrepresented the role of the Foundation's "choir" and falsely implied
that female members of the Foundation had "stripped off all
their clothes and wantonly danced naked .... " App. 6a.
The record is unclear as to whether all five of the female plaintiffs participated in the "chorus line" described in the 1978 articles. The record
also does not disclose whether any of the female plaintiffs was mentioned
by name in the articles.
1
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The complaint requests $14,100,000 in damages for the alleged defamation and invasions of privacy. 2
Petitioners filed an answer, denying many of the allegations of the complaint and asserting affirmative defenses. 3
Petitioners promptly initiated extensive discovery. They
deposed Rhinehart, requested production of documents pertaining to the financial affairs of Rhinehart and the Foundation, and served extensive interrogatories on Rhinehart and
the other respondents. Respondents turned over a number
of financial documents, including several of Rhinehart's income tax returns. Respondents refused, however, to disclose certain financial information, 4 the identity of the Foundation's donors during the preceding 10 years, and a list of its
members during that period.
Petitioners filed a motion under the State's Civil Rule 37
requesting an order compelling discovery. 5 In their sup' Although the complaint does not allege specifically that the articles
caused a decline in membership of the Foundation, respondents' answers to
petitioners interrogatories raised this issue. In response to petitioners request that respondents' explain the damages they are seeking, respondents' claimed that the Foundation had experienced a drop in membership in ·
Hawaii and Washington "from about 300 people to about 150 people, and [a]
concurrent drop in contributions." Record 503.
3
Affirmative defenses included contentions that the articles were substantially true and accurate, that they were privileged under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, and that the statute of limitations had run as to
the 1973 articles, that the individual respondents had consented to any invasions of privacy, and that respondents had no reasonable expectation of
privacy when performing before 1,100 prisoners.
' Rhinehart also refused to reveal the current address of his residence.
He submitted an affidavit stating that he had relocated out of fear for his
safety and that disclosure of his current address would subject him to risks
of bodily harm. Petitioners promptly moved for an order compelling
Rhinehart to give his address and the trial court granted the motion.
6
Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 37 provides in relevant part: "A party, upon
reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may
apply to the court in the county where the deposition was taken, or in
the county where the action is pending, for an order compelling
discovery .... "
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porting memorandum, petitioners recognized that the principal issue as to discovery was respondents "refusal[] to permit
any effective inquiry into their financial affairs, such as the
source of their donations, their financial transactions, uses of
wealth and assets, and their financial condition in general."
Record 350. Respondents opposed the motion arguing in
particular that compelled production of the identities of the
Foundation's donors and members would violate the First
Amendment rights of members and donors to privacy, freedom of religion, and freedom of association. Respondents
also moved for a protective order preventing petitioners from
disseminating any information gained through discovery.
Respondents noted that petitioners had stated their intention
to continue publishing articles about respondents and this litigation, and their intent to use information gained through
discovery in future articles.
In a lengthy ruling, the trial court initially granted the motion to compel and ordered respondents to identify all donors
who made contributions during the five years preceding the
date of the complaint, along with the amounts donated. The
court also required respondents to divulge enough membership information to substantiate any claims of diminished
membership. Relying on In re Balkin, 598 F. 2d 176
(CADC 1979), 6 the court refused to issue a protective order.
6
The Balkin decision was debated by the courts below. Prior to
Balkin, the only federal court of appeals to consider the question directly
had understood that the First Amendment did not affect a trial court's authority to restrict dissemination of information produced during pretrial
discovery. See International Paper Products v. Koons, 325 F. 2d 403,
407-408 (CA21963). Balkin considered the issue at length. Characterizing a protective order as a "paradigmatic prior restraint," Balkin held that
such orders require close scrutiny. The court also held that before a court
should issue a protective order that restricts expression, it must be satisfied that "the harm posed by dissemination must be substantial and serious; the restraining order must be narrowly drawn and precise; and there
must be no alternative means of protecting the public interest which intrudes less directly on expression." Id., at 191.
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It stated that the facts· alleged by respondents in support of
their motion for such an order were too conclusory to warrant
a finding of "good cause" as required by Wash. Super. Ct.
C. R. 26(c). 7 The court stated, however, that the denial of
respondents' motion was "without prejudice to [respondents']
right to move for a protective order in respect to specifically
described discovery materials and a factual showing of good
cause for restraining defendants in their use of those materials." Record 16.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration in which
they renewed their motion for a protective order. They submitted affidavits of several Foundation members to support
their request; The affidavits detailed a series of letters and
telephone calls defaming the Foundation, its members, and
Rhinehart-including several that threatened physical harm
to those associated with the Foundation. The affiants also
described incidents at the Foundation's headquarters involving attacks, threats, and assaults directed at Foundation
Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(c) provides:
"Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom
discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the
court in the county where the deposition is to be taken may make any order
which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more
of the following: (1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery
may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation
of the time or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of
discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) that
certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be
limited to certain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted with no one
present except persons designated by the court; (6) that a deposition after
being sealed be opened only by order of the court; (7) that a trade secret or
other confidential research, development, or commercial information not
be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way; (8) that the parties
simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed
envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.... "
Rule 26(c) is typical of the provisions adopted in many states.
7
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members by anonymous individuals and groups. In general,
the affidavits averred that public release of the donor lists
would adversely affect Foundation membership and income
and would subject its members to additional harassment and
reprisals.
Persuaded by these affidavits, the trial court issued a protective order covering all information obtained through the
discovery process that pertained to "the financial affairs of
the various plaintiffs, the names and addresses of Aquarian
Foundation members, contributors, or clients, and the names
and addresses of those who have been contributors, clients,
or donors to any of the various plaintiffs." App. 65a. The
order prohibited petitioners from publishing, disseminating,
or using the information in any way except where necessary
to prepare for and try the case. By its terms, the order did
not apply to information gained by means other than the discovery process. 8 In an accompanying opinion, the trial
court recognized that the protective order would restrict petitioners' right to publish information obtained by discovery,
but the court reasoned that the restriction was necessary to
The relevant portions of the protective order state:
"2. Plaintiffs' motion for a protective order is granted with respect to information gained by the defendants through the use of all of the discovery
processes regarding the financial affairs of the various plaintiffs, the names
and addresses of Aquarian Foundation members, contributors, or clients,
and the names and addresses of those who have been contributors, clients,
or donors to any of the various plaintiffs.
"3. The defendants and each of them shall make no use of and shall not disseminate the information defined in paragraph 2 which is gained through
discovery, other than such use as is necessary in order for the discovering
party to prepare and try the case. As a result, information gained by a
defendant through the discovery process may not be published by any of
the defendants or made available to any news media for publication or dissemination. This protective order has no application except to information
gained by the defendants through the use of the discovery processes."
App. 65a.
8
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avoid the "chilling effect" that dissemination would have on
"a party's willingness to bring his case to court." Record 63.
Respondents appealed from the trial court's production
order and petitioners appealed from the protective order.
The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed both. 654 P. 2d
673 (1982). With respect to the protective order, the court
reasoned:
"Assuming then that a protective order may fall, ostensibly, at least, within the definition of a 'prior restraint of
free expression,' we are convinced that the interest of
the judiciary in the integrity of its discovery processes is
sufficient to meet the 'heavy burden' of justification.
The need to preserve that integrity is adequate to sustain a rule like Rule 26(c) which authorizes a trial court
to protect the confidentiality of information given for
purposes of litigation." I d., at 690. 9
The court noted that "[t]he information to be discovered concerned the financial affairs of the plaintiff Rhinehart and his
organization, in which he and his associates had a recognizable privacy interest; and the giving of publicity to these
matters would allegedly and understandably result in annoyance, embarrassment and even oppression." Ibid. Therefore, the court concluded, the trial court had not abused its
discretion in issuing the protective order. 10
9

Although the Washington Supreme Court assumed arguendo that a
protective order could be viewed as an infringement on First Amendment
rights, the court also stated:
"A persuasive argument can be made that when persons are required to
give information which they would otherwise be entitled to keep to themselves, in order to secure a government benefit or perform an obligation to
that government, those receiving that information waive the right to use it
for any purpose except those which are authorized by the agency of government which exacted the information." 654 P. 2d, at 681.
10
The Washington Supreme Court also held that, because the protective
order shields respondents from "abuse of the discovery privilege," respondents could not object to the order compelling production. We do not
consider here that aspect of the Washington Supreme Court's decision.
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The Supreme Court of Washington recognized that its
holding conflicts with the holdings of the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia in In re Halkin, 598
F. 2d 176 (1979), 11 and applies a different standard from that
of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in In re San
Juan Star Co., 662 F. 2d 108 (1981). 12 We granted certiorari
to resolve the conflict. 13 We affirm.

III
Most states, including Washington, have adopted discovery provisions modeled on Rules 26 through 37 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure 179 (1977). 14 Rule 26(b)(1) provides that a party "may
obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which
is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action." It further provides that discovery is not limited to
matters that will be admissible at trial so long as the informaSee note 6 supra.
In San Juan Star, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit considered and rejected Balkin's approach to the constitutionality of protective
orders. . Although the San Juan court held that protective orders may implicate First Amendment interests, the court reasoned that such interests
are somewhat lessened in the civil discovery context. The court stated:
"In general, then, we find the appropriate measure of such limitations in a
standard of 'good cause' that incorporates a 'heightened sensitivity' to the
First Amendment concerns at stake.... " 662 F. 2d, at 116.
13
The holding of the Supreme Court of Washington is consistent with the
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in International
Products Corp. v. Koons, 325 F. 2d 403, 407-408 (1963).
"See Bushman v. New Holland Division, 88 Wash. 2d 429, 518 P. 2d
1078, 1080 (1974). The Washington Supreme Court has stated that when
the language of a Washington rule and its federal counterpart are the
same, courts should look to decisions interpreting the federal rule for guidance. American Discount Corp. v. Saratoga West, Inc., 81 Wash. 2d 34,
499 P. 2d 869, 871 (1972). The Washington rule that provides for the
scope of civil discovery and the issuance of protective orders is virtually
identical to its counterpart in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Compare Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(b) and (c) with Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(b)
and (c).
11

12
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tion sought "appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Wash. Super. Ct. C. R.
26(b)(1); Trust Fund Services v. Aro Glass Co., 89 Wash. 2d
758, 575 P. 2d 716, 719 (1978); cf. C. Wright & A. Miller, 8
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2008 (1970). 15
The rules do not differentiate between information that is
private or intimate and that to which no privacy interests attach. Under the rules, the only express limitations are that
the information sought is not privileged, and is relevant to
the subject matter of the pending action. Thus, the rules
often allow extensive intrusion into the affairs of both litigants and third parties. 16 If a litigant fails to comply with a
request for discovery, the Court may issue an order directing
compliance that is enforceable by the Court's contempt powers. Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 37(b). 17
15
Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(b)(1), identical to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(l) in effect at the time, provides in full:
"In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books,
documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for
objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence."
16
Under Rules 30 and 31, a litigant may depose a third party by oral or
written examination. The litigant can compel the third party to be deposed and to produce tangible evidence at the deposition by serving the
third party with a subpoena pursuant to Rule 45. Rule 45(b)(l) authorizes
a trial court to quash or modify a subpoena of tangible evidence "if it is
unreasonable or oppressive." Rule 45 also provides: "Failure by any person without adequate excuse to obey a subpoena served upon him may be
deemed a contempt of the court from which the subpoena issued." Wash.
Super. Ct. C. R. 45(f).
17
In addition to its contempt power, Rule 37(b)(2) authorizes a trial court
to enforce an order compelling discovery by other means including, for ex-
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Petitioners argue that the First Amendment imposes strict
limits on the availability of any judicial order that has the effect of restricting expression. They contend that civil discovery is not different from other sources of information, and
therefore the information is "protected speech" for First
Amendment purposes. Petitioners assert the right in this
case to disseminate any information gained through discovery. They do recognize that in limited circumstances, not
thought to be present here, some information may be restrained. They submit, however, that:
"When a protective order seeks to limit expression, it
may do so only if the proponent shows a compelling governmental interest. Mere speculation and conjecture
are insufficient. Any restraining order, moreover,
must be narrowly drawn and precise. Finally, before issuing such an order a court must determine that there
are no alternatives which intrude less directly on expression." Petitioners' Brief 10.
We think the rule urged by petitioners would impose an unwarranted restriction on the duty and discretion of a trial
court to oversee the discovery process.
IV
It is, of course, clear that information obtained through
civil discovery authorized by modern rules of civil procedure
would rarely, if ever, fall within the classes of unprotected
speech identified by decisions of this Court. In this case, as
petitioners argue, there certainly is a public interest in knowing more about respondents. This interest may well include
most-and possibly all-of what has been discovered as a result of the court's order under Rule 26(b)(l). It does not necessarily follow, however, that a litigant has an unrestrained
right to disseminate information that has been obtained
ample, regarding designated facts as established for purposes of the action.
Cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 37(b)(2)(A).
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through pretrial discovery. For even though the broad
sweep of the First Amendment seems to prohibit all restraints on free expression, this Court has observed that
"freedom of speech . . . does not comprehend the right to
speak on any subject at any time." American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 394--395 (1950).
The critical question that this case presents is whether a
litigant's freedom comprehends the right to disseminate information that he has obtained pursuant to a court order that
both granted him access to that information and placed restraints on the way in which the information might be used.
In addressing that question it is necessary to conisder
whether the "practice in question [furthers] an important or
substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression" and whether "the limitation of First
Amendment freedoms [is] no greater than is necessary oressential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved." Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 413
(1974); see Brown .v. Glines, 444 U. S. 348, 354--355 (1980);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25 (1976).
A

At the outset, it is important to recognize the extent of the
impairment of First Amendment rights that a protective
order, such as the one at issue here, may cause. As in all
civil litigation, petitioners gained the information they wish
to disseminate only by virtue of the trial court's discovery
processes. As the rules authorizing discovery were adopted
by the state legislature, the processes thereunder are a matter of legislative grace. A litigant has no First Amendment
right of access to information made available only for purposes of trying his suit. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 16--17
(1965) ("The right to speak and publish does not carry with it
the unrestrained right to gather information."). Thus, continued court control over the discovered information does not
raise the same spectre of government censorship that such
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control might suggest in other situations. See In re Balkin,
598 F. 2d, at 206-207 (Wilkey, J. dis~e.nting).
Moreover, pretrial depositions and interrogatories are not
public components of a civil trial. 19 Such proceedings were
not open to the public at common law, Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368, 389 (1979), and, in general, they
are conducted in private as a matter of modern practice.
See id., at 396 (BURGER, C. J., concurring); Marcus, Myth
and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 Cornell L.
Rev. 1 (1983). Much of the information that surfaces during
pretrial discovery may be unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying cause qf action. Therefore, restraints placed o~ discovered, but not yet admitted, information are not a restriction on a traditionally public source of
information.
18

18
Although litigants do not "surrender their First Amendment rights at
the courthouse door," In re Halkin, 598 F. 2d, at 186, those rights may be
subordinated to other interests that arise in this setting. For instance, on
several occasions this Court has approved restriction on the communications of trial participants where necessary to ensure a fair trial for a criminal defendant. See Nebraska Press v. Stuart, 427 U. S., 539, 563 (1976;
id., at 601 and n. 27 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U. S. 308, 310-311 (1977); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333, 361 (1966). "In the conduct of a case, a court often
finds it necessary to restrict the free expression of participants, including
counsel, witnesses, and jurors." Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U. S. 89,
104 n. 21 (1981).
19
Discovery rarely takes place in public. Depositions are scheduled at
times and places most convenient to those involved. Interrogatories are
answered in private. Rules of civil procedure may require parties to file
with the clerk of the court interrogatory answers, responses to requests
for admissions, and deposition transcripts. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 5(d).
Jurisdictions that require filing of discovery materials customarily provide
that trial courts may order that the materials not be filed or that they be
filed under seal. See ibid.; Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(c). Federal district courts may adopt local rules providing that the fruits of discovery are
not to be filed except on order of the court. See, e. g., C. D. Cal. R. 6(d);
S. D. N. Y. Civ. R. 19. Thus, to the extent that courthouse records could
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Finally, it is significant to note that an order prohibiting
dissemination of discovered information before trial is not the
kind of classic prior restraint that requires exacting First
Amendment scrutiny. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443
U. S., at 399 (POWELL, J. concurring). As in this case, such
a protective order prevents a party from disseminating only
that information obtained through use of the discovery process. Thus, the party may disseminate the identical information covered by the protective order as long as the information is gained through means independent of the court's
processes. In sum, judicial limitations on a party's ability to
disseminate information discovered in advance of trial implicates the First Amendment rights of the restricted party to a
far lesser extent than would restraints on desemination of information in a different context. Therefore, our consideration of the provision for protective orders contained in the
Washington Civil Rules takes into account the unique position that such orders occupy in relation to the First
Amendment.
B
Rule 26(c) furthers a substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression. Procunier, 416
U. S., at 413. The Washington Civil Rules enable parties to
litigation to obtain information "relevant to the subject matter involved" that they believe will be helpful in the preparation and trial of the case. Rule 26, however, must be viewed
in its entirety. Liberal discovery is provided for the sole
purpose of assisting in the preparation and trial, or the settlement, of litigated disputes. Because of the liberality of pretrial discovery permitted by Rule 26(b)(l), it is necessary for
the trial court to have the authority to issue protective orders
conferred by Rule 26(c). It is clear from experience that
pretrial discovery by depositions and interrogatories has a
serve as a source of public information, access to that source customarily is
subject to the control of the trial court.

82-1721-0PINION
14

SEATTLE TIMES CO. v. RHINEHART

significant potential for abuse. 20 This abuse is not limited to
matters of delay and expense; discovery also may seriously
implicate privacy interests of litigants and third parties. 21
The Rules do not distinguish between public and private information. Nor do they apply only to parties to the litigation, as relevant information in the hands of third parties may
be subject to discovery.
There is an opportunity, therefore, for litigants to obtainincidentally or purposefully-information that not only is irrelevant but if publicly released could be damaging to reputation and privacy. The government clearly has a substantial
interest in preventing this sort of abuse of its processes. Cf.
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 153, 176-177 (1979); Gumbel v.
Pitkin, 124 U. S. 131, 14~146 (1888). As stated by Judge
Friendly in International Products Co. v. Koons, 325 F. 2d
403, 407-408 (CA2 1963), "[w]hether or not the Rule itself authorizes [a particular protective order] ... we have no question as to the court's jurisdiction to do this under the inherent
'equitable powers of courts of law over their own process, to
20
See Comments of the Advisory Committee on the 1983 Amendments
to Fec;l. Rule Civ. Proc. 26. In Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 153, 176
(1979), the Court observed: "[T]here have been repeated expressions of
concern about undue and uncontrolled discovery, and voices from this
Court have joined the chorus. But until and unless there are major
changes in the present Rules of Civil Procedure, reliance must be had on
what in fact and in law are ample powers of the district judge to prevent
abuse." !d., at 176, 177 (citations omitted); see also id., at 179 (POWELL,
J., concurring). But abuses of the Rules by litigants, and sometimes the
inadequate oversight of discovery by trial courts, do not in any respect
lessen the importance of discovery in civil litigation and the government's
substantial interest in protecting the integrity of the discovery process.
21
Cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589, 599 (1977); Cox Broadcasting Corp.
v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 488-491 (1975). Rule 26(c) includes among its express purposes the protection of a "party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense." Although the
Rule contains no specific reference to privacy or to other rights or interests
that may be implicated, such matters are implicit in the broad purpose and
language of the Rule.
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prevent abuses, oppression, and injustices.'" (citing Gumbel
v. Pitkin, supra). The prevention of the abuse that can attend the coerced production of information under a state's
discovery rule is sufficient justification for the authorization
of protective orders. 22

c

We also find that the provision for protective orders in the
Washington rules requires, in itself, no heightened First
Amendment scrutiny. To be sure, Rule 26(c) confers broad
discretion on the trial court to decide when a protective order
is appropriate and what degree of protection is required.
The legislature of the State of Washington, following the example of the Congress in its approval of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, has determined that such discretion is necessary, and we find no reason to disagree. The trial court is
in the best position to weigh fairly the competing needs and
interests of parties affected by discovery. 23 The unique character of the discovery process requires that the trial court
have substantial latitude to fashion protective orders.

v
The facts in this case illustrate the concerns that justifiably
may prompt a court to issue a protective order. As we have
22

The Supreme Court of Washington properly emphasized the importance of ensuring that potential litigants have unimpeded access to the
courts: "[A]s the trial court rightly observed, rather than expose themselves to unwanted publicity, individuals may well forego the pursuit of
their just claims. The judicial system will thus have made the utilization
of its remedies so onerous that the people will be reluctant or unwilling to
use it, resulting in frustration of a right as valuable as that of speech itself." 654 P. 2d, at 689. Cf. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking
Unlimited, 404 U. S. 508, 510 (1972); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415,
429-431 (1963).
23
In addition, heightened First Amendment scrutiny of each request for
a protective order would necessitate burdensome evidentiary findings and
could lead to time-consuming interlocutory appeals, as this case illustrates.
See, e. g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F.
Supp. 866 (ED Pa. 1981).
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noted, the trial court's order allowing discovery was extremely broad. It compelled respondents-among other
things-to identify all persons who had made donations over
a five-year period to Rhinehart and the Aquarian Foundation, together with the amounts donated. In effect the order
would compel disclosure of membership as well as sources of
financial support. The Supreme Court of Washington found
that dissemination of this information would "result in annoyance, embarrassment and even oppression." 654 P. 2d, at
690. It is sufficient for purposes of our decision that the
highest court in the state found no abuse of discretion in the
trial court's decision to issue a protective order persuant to a
constitutional state law. We therefore hold that where, as
in this case, a protective order is entered on a showing of
good cause as required by Rule 26(c), is limited to the context
of pretrial civil discovery, and does not restrict the dissemination of the information if gained from other sources, it does
not offend the First Amendment. 24
The judgment accordingly is
Affirmed

24

It is apparent that substantial government interests were implicated.
Respondents, in requesting the protective order, relied upon the rights of
privacy and religious association. Both the trial court and the Supreme
Court of Washington also emphasized that the right of persons to resort to
the courts for redress of grievances would have been 'chilled.' See, supra,
n. 22.

